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In the post-9/11 era, an increasing number of extremist threats are homegrown. Radical 
organizations such as the Islamic State are actively targeting Muslim immigrants and 
nationals of Western countries as recruits. Yet, little research has addressed the factors 
that drive immigrants to aggress against their country of settlement. We integrate the 
terrorism and immigrant acculturation literatures to suggest that cultural identification 
processes play a key role in the radicalization of Muslim immigrant and minority 
populations. Specifically, we propose that “marginalized” immigrants who do not 
identify with either their heritage culture or the culture of the larger society (Berry, 1970, 
1997) have experienced significance loss (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & 
Orehek, 2009) and are at the greatest risk for radicalization due to threats to significance. 
Moreover, we argue that this can be exacerbated by exclusion from others in the larger 
society. In Study 1, we show in a sample of 198 Muslims in the United States that 
 
marginalized individuals experience significance loss, which is exacerbated by exclusion 
from the larger society, and in turn increases support for radical groups, ideologies and 
behavior. In Study 2, we find partial replication of this model outside the American 
context in a sample of 204 Muslims in Germany. In Study 3, we move to the lab and 
demonstrate in a sample of 145 first- and second-generation immigrants in the United 
States that marginalization, and to some extent exclusion, are risk factors for significance 
loss outside of the Muslim population, and that significance loss contributes to support 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
On April 15, 2013, an annual celebration of Boston spirit and patriotism turned 
tragic when two explosions at the finish line of the Boston Marathon killed three people 
and injured more than 260 others. The suspects, brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev, were young ethnic Chechen men who had resided in the United States for at 
least 10 years. It did not take long for the Internet media to explode with anecdotes about 
the brothers in the days following the event. Tamerlan did not seem to acclimate well to 
American culture. One classmate said Tamerlan claimed to have never had an American 
friend, that he didn’t understand Americans (Shane, 2013). Tamerlan’s one true passion 
was for boxing. However, although he was a talented boxer and won the title of Golden 
Gloves heavyweight champion of New England, he was forced to give up his dream 
when he was barred from participating in national championship because he was not a 
United States citizen (Sontag, Herszehorn, & Kovaleski, 2013). Tamerlan was not 
completely accepted by the Muslim community either. He was admonished by members 
of his Cambridge mosque for disrupting a sermon to share his non-mainstream views 
(Kaleem, 2013). His younger brother Dzhokhar did not appear to have experienced as 
much frustration in the United States, but had recently displayed an interested in learning 
more about his Chechen roots. Their family had never stayed in one place, having moved 
from the Russian territory of Kalmykia to Kyrgyzstan to Chechnya before seeking 
asylum in the United States. 
 In 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square. 
Shahzad was born in Pakistan in 1979 and moved to the United States in 1998, becoming 
a naturalized citizen in 2007. He studied computer science at an American university and 
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lived in a house in the Connecticut suburbs of New York. After a financial crisis 
involving the loss of his house in 2008, he began to become more involved in Islam and 
politics. He once wrote Muslim friends asking for advice on how to cope with the 
maltreatment of Muslims in a peaceful way, knowing that violence toward innocents was 
forbidden by Islam. He asked, “Can you tell me a way to save the oppressed? And a way 
to fight back when rockets are fired at us and Muslim blood flows? ... Everyone knows 
how the Muslim country bows down to pressure from west. Everyone knows the kind of 
humiliation we are faced with around the globe” (Elliott, 2010). Ultimately, Shahzad 
visited Pakistan in 2009 to train with the Pakistani Taliban before his failed attack in 
2010 (Kleinmann, 2012).  
 In 2003, eleven Northern Virginia men were charged with conspiracy to train for 
and participate in violent jihad overseas. The team included four American-born converts 
to Islam, two of whom had served in the Marines and two in the Army, a South Korean 
convert with a degree from Virginia Tech in engineering, a Pakistani-American kitchen 
designer, a Yemeni son of a diplomat, and a computational biology PhD student at 
George Mason University. The men gravitated toward each other at a Salafi mosque in 
Falls Church, Virginia, and later withdrew from the mosque community to further their 
radicalization in private meetings. The men trained at firing ranges and practiced at 
paintball war games at facilities in Virginia (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).   
What the aforementioned examples have in common is that all of the offenders 
were either born or spent substantial time in the United States. Faisal Shahzad was a 
naturalized citizen. The Tsarnaev brothers had lived in the United States for ten years. 
The Virginia Paintball group consisted of American-born men. Although earlier terrorist 
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threats were largely considered to come from abroad, more and more threats in the post-
9/11 era originate from within country borders. As recently as January of 2015, two 
French citizens attacked the headquarters of the satire publication Charlie Hebdo in Paris, 
killing twelve people.  
As the Islamist extremist movement has increased its presence on the Internet, 
they have launched a call for “Jihad in your own countries” (Rosenbach & Stark, 2011). 
This phenomenon of individuals plotting and committing extremist violence in their own 
countries is known as homegrown terrorism. The Congressional Research Service defines 
homegrown terrorism as “terrorist activity or plots perpetuated within the United States 
or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or visitors radicalized largely 
within the United States” (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010). This definition of homegrown 
terrorism can include perpetrators with or without recent immigrant backgrounds, and can 
describe variants of terrorism ranging from radical Islamism to domestic right-wing 
terrorism. For the purpose of this research, however, we are primarily interested in the 
version of homegrown terrorism wherein the perpetrators are Muslim immigrants 
(Studies 1 and 2) and immigrants from a variety of immigrant backgrounds (Study 3), 
and the targets of terrorist activity are nationals of the country within which the 
perpetrators live. More specifically, we focus on the antecedents of radicalism in the 
immigrant population rather than homegrown terrorist activity itself, as elucidating the 
factors that make individuals more or less vulnerable to radicalization is integral to the 
success of counterterrorism efforts.   
Homegrown plots have been on the rise since the September 11th attacks, and 
have dramatically skyrocketed in the past few years. Between September 11th and May 
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2009, American authorities made 22 arrests for jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by 
American citizens or permanent residents of the United States; between May 2009 and 
November 2010 alone, that number was 21 (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010). Perhaps the 
most serious homegrown threat at present is the Islamic State. This movement has 
experienced great success in recruiting foreign fighters online. As many as three thousand 
individuals from Western countries have gone to Iraq or Syria to fight with the Islamic 
State, and there is the concern that they will come back radicalized and prepared to carry 
out attacks on their own soil (Barrett, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on Homeland Security, 2014; Benach & Riechmann, 2014). The Islamic State is 
technologically savvy, making themselves accessible worldwide through outlets such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (McCoy, 2014; Barrett, 2014). A teenager interested in 
joining the movement can consult an online Frequently Asked Questions page to find out 
whether it would be better to have his braces removed before or after flying to Syria 
(Parasczcuk, 2014). Social media has also enabled the Islamic State to carefully balance 
the projection of its extreme message with personally relatable content that appeals to the 
“average” Western person, such as posting a picture of a militant holding a cat one day 
and a photo of a brutal slaughter the next (McCoy, 2014).   
 The Islamic State is just one example of the way radical organizations have 
restructured and changed their recruitment tactics in the post-9/11 era. As it becomes 
harder for organizations such as al Qaeda to infiltrate foreign countries under the watch 
of homeland security, jihad has become “leaderless” (Sageman, 2011) and al Qaeda has 
built a grassroots network of would-be terrorists. Anyone with a computer and an Internet 
connection can access al Qaeda’s catalogue of propaganda and recruitment materials. 
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Although recruits may be inspired and motivated by al Qaeda, they need not ever make a 
trip abroad to participate in a training camp or personally meet with al Qaeda officials 
(Hoffman, 2006). Instead, they can participate in “virtual training camps” (Crone & 
Harrow, 2011) and still receive support from high-ranking al Qaeda spokespeople. The 
homegrown movement not only provides the resources to act as a lone wolf, but also 
fosters a sense of organization and purpose (Kohlmann, 2008). It allows individuals to 
benefit from the support and guidance of a community without ever having to leave home 
(Post, McGinnis & Moody, 2014). Radical organizations purposefully use English to 
attract second and third generation Muslims abroad who speak no other languages. 
Although scholars have long been studying the factors that give rise to extremist 
groups abroad, the motivations of homegrown terrorists are less clear. In many cases 
these are immigrants who have moved to a new country to start a life there, or second-
generation citizens who have grown up in that society. Why would anyone want to 
aggress against their own country? What about their acculturation experience has driven 
them to radicalization? Surprisingly little is known about the psychological mechanisms 
that give way to such behavior, but it is important to gain a better understanding of the 
factors that put immigrant and minority populations at risk of becoming radicalized. This 
will be some of the first work to explicitly invoke immigrant identity processes1 in the 
study of the antecedents of radicalization.  
We propose a new theory to identify the risk factors that make immigrants 
susceptible to recruitment by extremist organizations. Immigrants are subject to a host of 
acculturation challenges, including negotiating multiple cultural identities and facing 
                                                
1 Although these processes also apply to American-born minorities (i.e., second- and third-generation), we 
will address our population of interest as “immigrants” for the sake of brevity. 
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discrimination from the host society. What about radical groups resonates with 
individuals who have had these experiences? We begin with a discussion of existing 
frameworks that describe terrorist motivations, specifically those pertinent to homegrown 
terrorism, identifying specific psychological processes that might be invoked by identity 
management challenges and exclusion experiences. Specifically, we will discuss the 
threat of “significance loss” that affects so many immigrants (Kruglanski et al., 2009). 
We will then go on to review what is known about patterns of acculturation and outcomes 
associated with different levels of identification with immigrants’ host and origin cultures. 
We will argue that failing to identify with either the heritage or host cultures puts 
individuals introduces a threat to personal significance that could thrust them toward 
fulfilling needs for self-worth by identifying with and working on behalf of an radical 
organization. We then ask which factors might exacerbate this effect. Because exclusion 
by the host culture is such a common threat to immigrants’ well-being, we will delve into 
the psychological and behavioral consequences of exclusion from the social psychology 
literature and propose that exclusion from the host society exacerbates the vulnerability 
of immigrants who lack belongingness with any culture. We will introduce three studies 
to test our theory.  
 7 
Chapter 2: What Motivates a Terrorist? 
 Psychologists, sociologists, criminologists and political scientists have failed to 
identify a typical “profile” of a terrorist based on individual characteristics. Radicalized 
individuals are no different than most other people in terms of psychopathological 
diagnoses or personality attributes (Atran, 2003; Horgan, 2003). Surprisingly, many 
terrorists come from middle-class, moderately religious families, are highly educated and 
speak several Western languages (Sageman, 2004). Rather, the motivation of an 
individual to become radicalized and commit acts of violence appears to arise from a 
constellation of macro and micro level factors, and the transition from adopting radical 
beliefs to engaging in violence does not follow a predictable trajectory (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008; Taylor & Horgan, 2006).  
However, less work has explored what motivates a homegrown terrorist, which is 
the purpose of this research. Homegrown terrorists are unique in that they are usually 
immigrants or minorities who are radicalized in the same country that they perceive as 
the enemy. In what follows, we will review four prominent models of radicalization that 
apply to homegrown terrorism: Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism,” the New York 
Police Department’s four stages of radicalization, Sageman’s four-prong approach, and 
Kruglanski’s quest for significance. Many researchers have theorized about pathways to 
radicalization (e.g., Atran, 2003; Borum, 2003; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), but we 
focus on these four models due to their emphasis on threats that are particularly relevant 
to the experience of immigrants, including identity processes and perceived exclusion by 
mainstream society.  
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Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism  
Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism” metaphor describes the six levels through 
which individuals become radicalized and move toward legitimizing violent extremism 
(Moghaddam, 2005). The ground floor contains subjective perceptions of deprivation. A 
person may feel that his group, such as ethnic or religious minority group, has received 
disproportionately unfair treatment in society. Such perceptions of deprivation may 
threaten the stability of one’s personal or collective identity. On the first floor, 
individuals consider their opportunities to address their grievances, and whether this can 
be done in a way that offers procedural justice through use of the democratic process 
(Tyler & Huo, 2002) and if they have the social mobility to engage in action. For instance, 
disenfranchised persons could participate in a peaceful protest or engage in community or 
political dialogue. This was Faisal Shahzad’s original attempt as communicated in his 
letter toward Muslim friends. If the individual cannot find a way to address their 
grievances in a constructive fashion, which was the case for Shahzad, he may move to the 
second floor, displacement of aggression. Here, the discontent is channeled toward a 
target. For instance, the United States government might be blamed for the maltreatment 
of Muslim Americans.  
Those who move on from identifying the target to considering courses of action to 
displace aggression move to the third floor, moral engagement. At this point, individuals 
become engaged with like-minded others who are able to share each other’s grievances 
and thus fulfill a need for affiliation (Moghaddam, 2005). Through the establishment of a 
group identity, they highlight the us-them demarcation to legitimize violent action 
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through disengaging with the real world and morally engaging with the ideology of 
terrorist organizations.  
From here, recruits can be drawn onto the fourth floor and formally join a terrorist 
organization, which offers both an avenue for addressing grievances and a place of 
belonging for disaffected individuals (Moghaddam, 2005). Once on the fourth floor, the 
us-them categorization between those inside and outside the terrorist organization is 
solidified as the recruit is socialized into the traditions, goals and methods of the group. 
At this point, the recruit is fully indoctrinated and cannot escape the hold of the 
organization. On the fifth and sixth floors, recruits are taught to obey and conform, and 
sidestep inhibitory mechanisms to engage in violent jihad. Although this model was 
originally designed with non-Western radicals in mind, several of these stages are 
applicable to homegrown recruits. Muslim Americans who have experienced 
discrimination in the post-9/11 era may have come to identify the United States 
government as responsible for disposing an ideology of intolerance, and find solace in 
meeting and identifying with others who have had the same experiences. Next, we look to 
a model that was specifically developed in the context of homegrown terrorism. 
NYPD’s Radicalization in the West Model  
The New York Police Department’s publication “Radicalization in the West” 
proposes a model based on case studies of known homegrown terrorists. The model 
highlights four stages of homegrown radicalization: pre-radicalization, self-identification, 
indoctrination, and jihadization (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Throughout the process, 
individuals may be subject to influence by radical others at incubators, or nodes where 
like-minded people congregate. A major incubator is the Internet, with thousands of 
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extremist websites and chat rooms. In the pre-radicalization stage, environmental and 
personal characteristics affect an individual’s risk of being radicalized. Environmental 
factors that play a role in the pre-radicalization stage include socialization with others of 
the same culture and religion, particularly if these communities tend to be isolated from 
the majority culture. Muslim males between the ages of 15 and 35 appear to be 
particularly vulnerable to the influence of extremism, as many of these individuals are at 
a time in their lives where they are looking to identify who they are and find the 
“meaning of life” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). According to the analysis of case studies of 
Western-based terror plots, most of these men do not have a previous criminal history 
and are not especially religious at the start of their radicalization.  
 During the second stage, self-identification, individuals are catalyzed by some 
crisis that presents a threat for establishing an identity. The crisis could be economic in 
nature, such as losing a house in the case of Faisal Shahzad; social, including real or 
perceived discrimination or alienation, such as Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s exclusion from 
boxing; political, such as international conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims; or 
personal, such as a death in the family (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). One could imagine that 
any of these events might exacerbate the existing struggle of an immigrant to find their 
own identity in between two cultures, which could be considered a crisis in and of itself. 
These kinds of crises can propel individuals to seek answers through religious texts, 
social networks, or the Internet. During this search, it is likely that the individual will be 
exposed to a radical interpretation of Islam, and may become alienated from his former 
life and begin to affiliate more with like-minded others. In the third stage, indoctrination, 
the individual accepts a religious-political worldview that condones violence against any 
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un-Islamic target. During the final stage, jihadization, the individual mobilizes toward 
accepting jihad as a personal obligation and begins to engage in operational planning 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007). At this point, the individual may work independently or become 
accepted to a group that works collectively. The NYPD model highlights identification 
and belongingness needs that are crucial for immigrants trying to establish themselves in 
a new society, or second- or third-generation Muslim minorities trying to find their place 
between two cultures. It also demonstrates the powerful effect of a critical life crisis that 
can catalyze an individual toward self-destructive coping strategies. 
Sageman’s Four-Prong Model  
As compared to the previous models that describe sequential stages of 
radicalization, Sageman’s model conceptualizes radicalization as emerging from the 
interplay of four factors: a sense of moral outrage, a specific worldview, resonance with 
personal experiences, and mobilization through networks (Sageman, 2008). Moral 
outrage is the result of an event interpreted as a moral violation. For instance, Zachary 
Chesser of Fairfax County, Virginia lodged death threats at the creators of “South Park” 
after the series depicted the Prophet Muhammad wearing an animal costume, which was 
interpreted as a moral offense (Kleinmann, 2012). The specific worldview provides the 
context for interpreting moral violations, such as that they are part of a unified Western 
strategy to wage war against Islam (Sageman, 2008). Resonance with personal 
experiences refers to moral violations with which one can personally identify, such as 
perceived discrimination or exclusion on account of being Muslim. Finally, mobilization 
through networks involves allying with like-minded people who can empathize with and 
confirm their interpretation of events (King & Taylor, 2011; Sageman, 2008). 
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Mobilization can occur on the Internet, where the Islamic social movement provides an 
outlet for Muslim Americans to find acceptance and validation.  
Kruglanski’s Significance Quest Theory  
The aforementioned models all highlight personal or group grievances that 
precipitate the radicalization process. The ground floor of Moghaddam’s staircase 
contains subjective perceptions of deprivation; the self-identification stage of the NYPD 
model can be characterized by an identity-related crisis such as discrimination; 
Sageman’s moral outrage factor may be linked to unfair treatment of Muslims. Such 
grievances have been discussed by Kruglanski and colleagues as sources of significance 
loss (Kruglanski et al., 2009). Individuals strive to find meaning in their lives in a 
universe where one’s human presence is finite. This is called a quest for significance. The 
quest for significance can sideline other competing goals for self-preservation, justifying 
risky means for achieving significance gain (Kruglanski et al., 2013). For example, 
committing to jihad and potentially sacrificing one’s life for a higher cause offers status, 
honor and respect as a martyr (Crenshaw, 2007), thereby gaining personal significance.  
In addition to earning status and recognition, fulfilling a role in an extremist 
organization can also restore a loss of significance. Loss in significance can be attributed 
to individual and social causes, including personal trauma (e.g., Faisal Shahzad’s loss of 
his house), humiliation, and perceived maltreatment by society (Kruglanski et al., 2009). 
If an individual feels he has been treated unjustly as compared to others in society 
because of his ethnicity or religion, the humiliation of being treated with disrespect might 
engender a sense of inferiority, and consequently lead to significance loss. For example, 
Muslims in Diasporas who feel alienated by the local society might experience 
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significance loss, and then engage in a quest for emotional and social support (Kruglanski 
et al., 2009; Sageman, 2004) in order to establish a sense of purpose. Preliminary work 
has found support for this quest. Analysis of Pew Global Attitude Surveys revealed that 
perceived discrimination was associated with justification for suicide bombings amongst 
American and European Muslims (Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012).  
Additionally, some empirical evidence for the significance quest has revealed that 
individuals who experience a loss in significance engage in a “collectivistic shift,” 
wherein a person becomes especially aware of one’s group norms and starts to abide by 
them (Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna, 2012). This is hypothesized to be the case 
because belonging to and acting on behalf of a collective for a common cause should 
reestablish one’s own significance. In two experimental studies, individuals who were 
given failure as opposed to success feedback endorsed interdependence more and 
independence less, and preferred to work in a group instead of alone. In an online study 
of twelve Arab countries along with Pakistan and Indonesia, low success in life was 
related to stronger identification with collectives such as one’s nation or religion 
(Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna, 2012). Although the relationship between 
significance loss and collectivistic shift has yet to be explored in an immigrant sample, 
significance loss is a crucial threat for immigrants who are making new lives for 
themselves and negotiating cultural identities, and those who lack a collective to identify 
with might seek out a new group to gain significance.  
Summary 
All four models have highlighted the important role of identity processes in 
pathways to homegrown radicalization. For instance, the third floor of Moghaddam’s 
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staircase involves forging a group identity with individuals who share the same 
grievances, and the NYPD model includes an identity threat stage that results in a search 
for affiliation with like-minded others. Individuals who are searching for their identity 
and place in the world are particularly susceptible to groups that offer a sense of certainty, 
purpose and commitment (Schwartz, Dunkel, & Waterman, 2009). Joining a highly 
entitative group with a clear ideology has been shown to reduce uncertainty. (Hogg, 
Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007). Identity searching is a critical issue for 
Muslim immigrants and minorities residing in the United States, who are caught between 
cultures and may lack a sense of clear belongingness (Stroink, 2007). These individuals 
in particular may be compelled to regain significance to confirm their sense of self-worth 
by joining a supportive group that promises revenge against a society that has not been 
accepting of them. This could ultimately lead to moral disengagement and acceptance of 
radical strategies to counter maltreatment from the host society perceived as relative 
deprivation.  
The aforementioned perspectives have been extremely influential in theorizing on 
homegrown radicalization; however, little empirical work has been conducted (Borum, 
2011). Moreover, despite the clear relevance of identity issues among immigrant 
populations, homegrown terrorism research has not looked to the extensive literature on 
immigrant acculturation, with few exceptions (e.g., Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon, 
Reichert, & Grabow, 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). This is the gap that we intend to fill 
with the present research. In what follows, we will review the acculturation literature and 
argue that identity issues among immigrants threaten one’s significance and are a 
precipitating force toward radicalization.  
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Chapter 3: Acculturation Processes 
 According to the United States Census Bureau’s 2010 American Community 
Survey, about 40 million immigrants reside in the United States, amounting to thirteen 
percent of the total US population (Passel & Cohn, 2012). More than half of this figure is 
accounted for by Latin American immigrants. Of the remaining amount, about ten million 
come from South and East Asia, nearly six million from Europe and Canada, and almost 
three million come from the Middle East and Africa. As the immigrant community grows, 
the American cultural landscape is changing too. The United States used to be described 
as a “melting pot” society, wherein any immigrant could come to the country and become 
an American by assimilating to the majority culture. Nowadays, as different ethnic 
communities have made their home in the United States, the existence of a single 
majority culture is less defined. Rather, the very notion of American culture is constantly 
being shaped by the contributions of immigrants from around the world.  
Yet, as the expectations for immigrants’ integration into American society are 
always shifting, newcomers and second- and third-generation cohorts alike struggle to 
find belongingness in their host society as well as maintain their culture of origin. This 
process is known as acculturation, which has been widely defined as “those phenomena 
which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous 
first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or 
both groups… under this definition acculturation is to be distinguished from... 
assimilation, which is at times a phase of acculturation” (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 
1936). As noted, acculturation processes apply to first-generation immigrants as well as 
second- and third-generations. However, due to the emphasis of the acculturation 
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literature on first-generation immigrants, we will focus on the experiences of this group 
in our review. 
 Many factors influence immigrants’ adjustment to society and level of 
acculturative stress, which is the psychological impact of adaptation to a new culture 
(Berry, 2006a). One factor is the reason for immigration. Some immigrants come to a 
new country voluntarily, to seek economic betterment and opportunity. Sojourners and 
expatriates live in the host society for only a limited period of time, for travel or work 
purposes. Yet others are refugees or asylum seekers, escaping from dangerous conditions 
in their country of origin and driven by “push” factors to reach the host country. 
Adjustment is related to age of immigration, in that it is easier to adapt at a younger age, 
although adolescents may struggle with identity issues (Berry, 1997). Cultural distance 
between the culture of origin and culture of settlement also plays a role; for cultures 
different across dimensions such as values, norms and religious beliefs, adjustment is 
more challenging. There are gender differences in adjustment patterns; females have a 
more difficult time than males due to different definitions of gender roles across cultural 
contexts. Education affects the process as well; individuals who are higher educated have 
more job mobility and possess higher status, and also may be equipped with better tools 
to handle acculturative stress (Berry, 1997, 2006c). Finally, individual characteristics 
such as locus of control, need for cognitive closure, anxiety, extraversion and self-esteem 
act as protective or risk factors against acculturative stress (Kosic, 2006; Kosic, 
Kruglanski, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004). It is important to note that despite challenges 
inherent in the acculturation process, many immigrants are actually better off than their 
native-born peers with respect to outcomes such as health, education and criminal 
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behavior, a phenomenon known as the immigrant paradox (Nguyen, 2006). We will now 
discuss some of the factors that lend themselves to positive versus negative adjustment 
outcomes. 
 Individual modes of acculturation have been described in terms of an 
acculturation orientation framework (Berry, 1970, 1997; Sam & Berry, 2010). 
Individuals display preferences for 1) how much they wish to maintain ties with their 
culture of origin, and 2) the extent to which they want to have contact with people outside 
their cultural group and participate in mainstream society. Preferences for these two 
dimensions are reflected in attitudes and behavior across a number of domains related to 
acculturation adjustment, such as culture, customs, language, values, neighborhood 
community, marriage, and employment (Bourhis & Barrette, 2006; Berry, 2006b). Those 
who primarily participate in the larger host society and forgo contact with their culture of 
origin community are said to endorse the assimilation orientation. These individuals 
predominantly identify with being a national of the country of settlement and may have 
abandoned their family’s cultural traditions or only speak the language of the host society. 
Those who maintain more contact contact with their culture of origin community and 
decline to participate in mainstream society are said to endorse the separation orientation. 
These individuals may be reluctant to adopt new customs or traditions and prefer not to 
socialize with people who do not belong to their own cultural group.  
However, attachments to the host and origin cultures are not mutually exclusive 
options. Individuals who seek to participate in the larger society while maintaining 
cultural values, norms and customs from their culture of origin are said to endorse the 
integration orientation. These individuals are able to experience belongingness in the 
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mainstream community while not sacrificing their heritage culture. Yet, there are some 
individuals who have trouble or are not interested in maintaining their culture of origin or 
forming relationships with others outside the cultural community. These people are said 
to endorse the marginalization orientation (Berry, 1970, 1997, 2006a; Sam & Berry, 
2010). They lack a sense of belongingness to either culture and do not feel as if they fit in. 
The term “marginalization” is somewhat of a misnomer; it implies that immigrants have 
been rejected from both their heritage and host cultures (Bourhis & Dayan, 2004; Bourhis, 
Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997). Although this could certainly be the case some of the 
time, there are likely many pathways to marginalization. Some immigrants simply might 
not seek out or value contact with members of each community, or do not feel 
knowledgeable enough do so due to lack of consistent participation or exposure with 
either culture (e.g., Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s newfound interest in his cultural background 
after his family had been uprooted several times). For the purpose of the present research, 
we do not make any assumptions as to what causes marginalized immigrants to 
experience low identification with their host and heritage cultures. Instead, we are 
interested in their reported identification with each culture. Please see Figure 1 below for 
a graphical depiction of Berry’s acculturation orientations. 
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Figure 1. Berry’s Acculturation Model 
Decades of research have investigated outcomes of these orientations. Across 
various studies of immigrants, integration is typically found to be the most preferred of 
the acculturation orientations, and marginalization the least preferred (Bourhis et al., 
1997). These orientations are associated with a number of psychological, health and life 
outcomes. The outcomes of acculturation orientations are often discussed in terms of 
psychological (i.e., well-being, mental health) and sociocultural (i.e., social competence) 
adaptation (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). We will 
review some of these findings in what follows.  
Across the board, integration has repeatedly been associated with psychological 
well-being and is negatively related to acculturative stress (Berry & Sam, 1997), and 


























predicts positive long-term health outcomes (Berry, 2006a; Schmitz, 1992). A meta-
analysis of 325 acculturation studies revealed that integration is associated with better 
mental health than the other orientations (Yoon et al., 2013). In comparison, 
marginalization is linked with a number of negative outcomes. Marginalization has been 
related to alienation, psychosomatic stress and deviance, including delinquency, 
substance and familial abuse (Berry, 1997). In a study of the relationship between 
acculturation orientations and Big Five personality characteristics, marginalization was 
associated with high unsociability, neuroticism, anxiety, and closed-mindedness (Schmitz, 
1994). The marginalized are also susceptible to the experience of anomie, which refers to 
a sense of instability or uncertainty that comes from a lack of purpose (Durkheim, 1951). 
Thus, along with the challenges of lacking identification with either culture and 
experiencing greater acculturative stress (Sang & Ward, 2006), the anomie and 
uncertainty of belongingness is likely to adversely affect self-esteem and other social and 
psychological processes (Berry, 1970; Bourhis et al., 1997). Marginalized Dutch 
immigrants in the United States, Canada and Australia reported lower satisfaction with 
life than immigrants engaging in other acculturation orientations (van Oudenhoven, 
2006), a relationship that has been found in other samples as well (Berry & Sam, 1997; 
Neto, 1994).  
The assimilation and separation orientations are more or less beneficial depending 
on the context. The separation and assimilation orientations fulfill certain belongingness 
needs that can help attenuate the effects of acculturative stress; having a sense of 
community and a social support system in place prepares individuals to contend with 
personal hardships (Cohen & Wills, 1985). However, each of the orientations comes with 
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drawbacks as a consequence of alienation from either the host or heritage culture. 
Assimilation into the mainstream culture distances the immigrant from their heritage 
culture, and can lead to ethnic- and self-hatred (Nguyen, 2006). Assimilation has been 
associated with disorders such as depression, substance abuse and anorexia, delinquency 
and family conflict (Chun & Akutsu, 2003; Szapocznik, Kurtines, & Fernandez, 1980). 
However, separation has also been associated with depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and withdrawal (Torres-Matrullo, 1976), general dissatisfaction in life (e.g., 
boredom, sadness), as well as negative life events like divorce and hospitalizations 
(Salgado de Snyder, 1987). The separation orientation keeps immigrants from feeling 
comfortable and competent in their new environment, and can lead to loneliness and 
isolation (Nguyen, 2006). 
Given that many homegrown radicals tend to be young adults (Silber & Bhatt, 
2007), of special interest is the effect of acculturation orientations on immigrant young 
people. Much of the literature on acculturation orientation outcomes has focused on 
youth samples. In a study of adolescents in four countries, students with integrated 
identities demonstrated greater psychological adjustment at school, especially in terms of 
mastery and self-esteem (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001). A study of 
immigrant youth in thirteen societies garnered additional support for the finding that the 
integration style yields positive adjustment outcomes; integration was associated with 
greater psychological and sociological adaptation, which included school adaptation and 
behavior issues (Berry et al., 2006). In a study of Chinese adolescents in New Zealand, 
post-hoc comparison tests revealed that the integration orientation was related to higher 
self esteem as compared to separation or marginalization (Eyou, Adair, & Dixon, 2000). 
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The finding that integration leads to higher self-esteem than marginalization has been 
replicated among youth immigrants in Montreal and Paris (Berry & Sabatier, 2010). 
In addition to school adaptation, the effects of acculturation orientations have also 
been found in the work domain. In a work setting, compatibility with the host culture is 
especially important because most jobs require some interaction with host country 
nationals. Among Chinese professionals in Australia, assimilation was associated with 
the greatest job satisfaction (Lu, Samaratunge, & Härtel, 2012). New Zealand 
government employees on international assignments who had integrated identities 
experienced less psychological distress, while assimilated workers experienced better 
sociocultural adjustment. These findings were replicated in a study of international aid 
workers in Nepal; integrated workers showed fewer signs of depression, and assimilated 
workers experienced fewer social difficulties (Ward & Rana-Deuba, 1999). Much like 
other domains of adjustment, the marginalization orientation yields negative outcomes in 
the workplace. For ethnic minority workers in government jobs in the Netherlands, most 
of whom were Moroccan immigrants, marginalization orientation predicted lower job 
satisfaction, lower organizational commitment, lower self-efficacy, and greater cynicism 
toward their work (Peeters & Oerlemans, 2009). Acculturation preferences may even 
influence hiring decisions. Norwegian managers saw applications that were manipulated 
to portray integrated, assimilated and separated acculturation orientations 
(marginalization was not included). As compared to assimilated or integrated applicants, 
Norwegian managers saw separated Turkish job applicants as “less hirable” due to low 
perceived Person-Organization fit, despite that they were rated high on Person-Job fit 
(Horverak, Bye, Sandal, & Pallesen, 2013). Although marginalized was not included as a 
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condition, one might surmise that their Person-Job fit would also be perceived as low due 
to their low host culture orientation.  
In general, integration is related to the best outcomes for adjustment, 
marginalization is the worst, and the separation and assimilation orientations fall in 
between. However, it is implied that an acculturation orientation (commonly referred to 
as a “strategy” in the literature) is a matter of choice; the individual prefers to associate 
with one culture or another. In fact, immigrants’ choice of acculturation orientation is 
constrained by the options for socialization in their environment. Attitudes of the host 
society and resources provided by the culture of origin influence an individual’s 
acculturation process (Ahmed, Kia-Keating, & Tsai, 2011; Berry, 1997). We will now 
address the contextual factors that lead immigrants to adopt these different acculturation 
orientations.  
The individual’s acculturation orientation in some part depends on the climate of 
the host society. For a person to endorse the separation orientation there must be a 
community of other individuals from the host culture; for a person to endorse the 
assimilation orientation, there must be an expectation that assimilation is an option (i.e. 
the host society must demonstrate willingness to incorporate immigrants as members of 
their society). Broad factors such as national policies and institutional ideologies to some 
extent constrain the acculturation choice of immigrants (Berry, 2003, 2006b). Societies 
that are receptive to multiculturalism encourage integration orientations; societies that 
subscribe to the “melting pot” metaphor of immigration are likely to produce assimilation 
orientations; societies where minority groups are segregated from the rest of society will 
result in individuals adopting the separation orientation; finally, societies that are not 
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welcoming to immigrants (i.e., have no immigrant communities) and have excluded them 
from participating in society will force individuals into the marginalization orientation. 
As an example, one study found that Turkish youth in Norway were more marginalized 
than Turkish youth in Sweden. Norway’s Turkish community is smaller and less 
established than Sweden’s, and Norway’s policy toward immigration encourages 
immigrants to give up their cultural identity, whereas Sweden’s does not (Westin, 2006). 
Being that many urban centers in the United States are multicultural, most 
immigrants have opportunities for contact with others from their culture of origin as well 
as people outside their cultural group. However, despite that the United States is a nation 
of immigrants and is by definition a multicultural society, the country has not historically 
engendered the same welcoming spirit for all cultural groups (Montreuil & Bourhis, 
2001). Italian and Irish settlers were once held with low regard (Glazer & Moynihan, 
1963), and although they have since been better integrated into society, more recent 
migrants from Muslim countries in the post-9/11 era have been met with discrimination 
from the host society (Amer & Hovey, 2007). Current dialogues about immigration 
reform reinforce the message that not all immigrants are welcome in American society, 
and the host country narrative bears a major impact on the adaptation experiences of 
immigrants (Berry, 2003, 2006b; Berry & Sabatier, 2010). In a study of youth 
acculturation in thirteen Western societies, perceived discrimination was negatively 
related to psychological and sociocultural adaptation (Berry et al., 2006).  
The impact of societal constraints on acculturation processes has begun to be 
illuminated in recent work on the acculturation experiences of Muslim immigrants in 
non-Muslim countries. Anti-Islamic sentiment following the September 11th attacks has 
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introduced new acculturation challenges for Muslims, relating to cultural adjustment as 
well as mental and physical distress (Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). In a study of 
Arab immigrants in the United States, the relationship between acculturation orientation 
and health outcomes to some extent depended on whether participants were Christian or 
Muslim (Amer & Hovey, 2007). Integration-marginalization was measured on one 
continuum, and separation-assimilation was measured on another. All immigrants who 
were less integrated and more marginalized experienced greater family dysfunction, and 
marginalized orientation was additionally associated with depression in Christians. 
Although more than 50% of both Christians and Muslims preferred adopting an 
integration orientation, Christians reported actually experiencing greater integration and 
assimilation into American society than did Muslims. The difficulty of Muslim 
immigrants as compared to Christians could be accounted for by greater cultural distance 
(Berry, 2006a). People who maintained their Arab family and religious values and 
engaged in Arab cultural practices but were disengaged from mainstream society suffered 
from greater acculturation stress, such as discrimination and alienation from society. In a 
worst case scenario, the association between maintaining cultural practices and being 
subject to acculturative stress could encourage some Muslim immigrants to give up their 
culture altogether. Another study of Arab Americans similarly found a relationship 
between sociocultural adversities and psychological distress, but additionally found a 
negative relationship between stress and cultural resources provided by the origin 
community (Ahmed et al., 2011). Thus, connections to the culture of origin appear to be 
especially important in finding a healthy way to cope with discrimination from the host 
society. 
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Despite the known acculturation challenges for Muslims and the rising threat of 
homegrown radicalization, little work has examined the relationship between Muslim 
immigrant acculturation experiences and support for extremism or attraction to extremist 
organizations. Some research has found support for the benefits of integrated identities in 
the context of extremism; Turks and Russians living in Germany who held dual (i.e., 
integrated) identities were more likely to participate in political action in a peaceful, 
normative manner, and holding a dual identity was unrelated to the acceptance of 
political violence (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). However, a recent 
study by the same research group revealed that Turks and Russians living in Germany 
who held dual identities demonstrated greater sympathy for radical action when they felt 
their German identities were in conflict with their heritage identities (Simon et al., 2013). 
Dual identity was measured with items such as “Sometimes I feel more like a German 
and sometimes more like a Turk/Russian— it depends on the situation.” Identity conflict 
was measured with one item, “I have the feeling that I would have to give up my 
Turkish/Russian identity if I wanted to become German.” This research addressed the 
consequences of maintaining integrated identities when under pressure to assimilate. The 
study did not speak to the implications of not identifying with either Turkish/Russian or 
German cultures; there was no measure of marginalization per se. This is the quadrant of 
immigrants for whom we suspect are at an even greater risk for being radicalized. 
In our review of the acculturation literature we have demonstrated that the 
immigrant acculturation orientation framework applies widely to many domains of life 
adjustment. One clear take-home point is that whereas integration is consistently linked 
to positive life outcomes, marginalized immigrants are at the greatest risk for 
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experiencing poor psychological well-being and sociocultural adaptation. However, this 
literature has not yet been applied to the study of terrorism, and in particular, to 
developing a better understanding of the psychological foundations of homegrown 
radicalization. This is the purpose of the current research, and in the following chapter we 
will draw from the terrorism and acculturation literatures to introduce our theory that 
marginalization processes can relate to risk for radicalization through mediating 
psychological processes. 
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Chapter 4: Introduction to Theory and Hypotheses 
Research has yet to explore the threat of radicalization for marginalized 
immigrants, a population known to be vulnerable to negative psychological and 
sociocultural outcomes from the acculturation literature (Berry, 1997). We offer a novel 
approach to the study of homegrown radicalization by focusing on the identity processes 
of immigrants. We integrate the terrorism and acculturation literatures to address the 
question of whether and how acculturation processes can increase attraction to and 
support for extremist groups and causes. As discussed in the review of the acculturation 
literature, immigrants who endorse the marginalization orientation lack a sense of clear 
ingroup self-categorization or belongingness; in other words, they are in a state of 
identity uncertainty because they do not identify with either the host or the heritage 
culture. They suffer from low self-esteem and anomie (Berry, 1997), indicators of 
significance loss. Holding a marginalized identity can be seen as a source of significance 
loss, based on one’s subjective assessment that he does not belong to either his heritage 
or host cultures. Individuals without a sense of belongingness in either culture may be 
looking for opportunities to find a place where they fit in society and thereby gain 
significance (Kruglanski et al., 2009). Theories of radicalization support the notion that 
would-be terrorists are looking to identify with like-minded others who share their 
grievances (Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007), and we suggest that marginalized 
immigrants are particularly in need of identifying such a support network.  
In what follows, we will propose that immigrant marginalization can relate to 
radicalization processes through significance loss. Our theory is that marginalized 
immigrants experience threats to their sense of self-worth due to their inability to build 
 29 
and maintain connections to either their heritage or their host cultures, group 
memberships that are important in providing individuals with a sense of belongingness, 
meaning and purpose. In turn, feelings of significance loss will increase the attractiveness 
of radical groups and causes, as they provide a means for restoring self-worth. We will 
also address factors that can exacerbate feelings of significance loss among marginalized 
immigrants. We will highlight exclusion from others in the host society as a particularly 
relevant risk factor for marginalized immigrants, as hostile reminders that one is not 
wanted in a society can provide an additional “shock” to existing threats to significance. 
Please see Figure 2 below for a graphical depiction of our immigrant marginalization 
theory of radicalization.  
 
Figure 2. Immigrant marginalization theory of radicalization. 
The Impact of Marginalization on Significance Loss 
The psychological mediators that explain the relationship between risk factors and 
radicalization have thus far received little empirical attention, and explaining mediating 
processes is an aim of the current research. The benefit of looking at significance loss as 














psychological motivations, including needs for belongingness, esteem, achievement, 
meaning, competence, and control (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2010; Frankl, 2000; 
Higgins, 2012; Maslow, 1943; White, 1959; in Kruglanski et al., 2014; Leary & 
Baumeister, 1995). We suggest that several of these underlying motivations are 
particularly relevant to marginalized immigrants who struggle to make sense of their 
cultural identity. 
For example, belongingness is known to serve the function of providing 
individuals with a positive self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Leary & Baumeister, 1995). Of all immigrants, the 
marginalized are at the greatest risk of experiencing unfulfilled needs for belongingness. 
Optimal distinctiveness theory highlights two needs that are in tension for individuals: the 
need to belong, and the need to be distinguished from others (Brewer, 1991). Immigrants 
in the marginalized quadrant are over-satisfied in the need for differentiation, while their 
belongingness needs are not met. In this sense, assimilated and separated immigrants are 
in a better position than the marginalized; despite being estranged from one culture or 
another, the assimilated and separated are still able to achieve belongingness in either 
their host or heritage communities. Research has revealed that individuals for whom 
belongingness is threatened are more likely to conform to a unanimous inaccurate 
judgment (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) and more likely to succumb to the 
persuasion of others (Carter-Sowell, Chen, & Williams, 2008). This raises the question of 
whether marginalized immigrants who lack any group membership might be more 
susceptible to fulfilling requests by malevolent groups (e.g., radical organizations) in 
order to gain social approval and belongingness. Working for a collectivistic cause can 
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lead to empowerment that subdues anxiety about one’s failures and death, making 
individuals more willing to engage in self-sacrifice for an important cause (Kruglanski et 
al., 2014; Orehek et al., 2011). 
Relatedly, another important process that may be invoked in significance loss 
among marginalized immigrants is the search for meaning. Evolutionary explanations 
maintain that one’s meaning in life is derived from social belongingness; because humans 
rely on their group members for survival rather than on the natural environment alone, 
failing to secure group membership can actually threaten one’s existence (Stillman & 
Baumeister, 2009). Empirical work has supported this link between social belongingness 
and meaning in life; in one study, participants who experienced chronic loneliness saw 
life as meaningless and absurd (Stillman et al., 2009). Because of the chronic loneliness 
marginalized immigrants likely suffer from due to their low attachment with either their 
host or heritage cultures, these individuals may subjectively perceive their life as having 
less meaning. Subjective perceptions of life’s meaning are related to other psychological 
outcomes; people who perceive greater meaning in life experience less depression, 
greater satisfaction in life, optimism, and higher self-esteem (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & 
Kaler, 2006). We know from the acculturation literature that marginalized immigrants are 
at greater risk of depression and low self-esteem (Berry, 1997). If marginalized 
immigrants are deprived of a sense of meaning in life, they may seek to regain it as part 
of a significance quest (Kruglanski et al., 2009). The pursuit for meaning in life is 
thought to be driven by four needs: a sense of purpose, feelings of efficacy, the belief that 
one’s actions have value, and a positive sense of self-worth (Baumeister, 1991; Stillman 
& Baumeister, 2009).  
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As per our review of the acculturation literature, we have reason to expect that 
marginalized immigrants are at risk for experiencing significance loss, as the 
marginalized lack a sense of cultural belongingness and are known to suffer from 
negative psychological outcomes (Berry & Sam, 1997; Neto, 1994; Schmitz, 1994; van 
Oudenhoven, 2006;). We aim to illuminate in the present research how marginalization 
can influence radicalization processes through feelings of significance loss.  
The experience of significance loss does not necessitate or guarantee enrollment 
in a radical organization. Yet, practicing jihad on behalf of a radical group might be 
perceived as offering a means to restore deprived psychological needs for meaning or 
belongingness. Members are given the autonomy to orchestrate attacks for a higher 
purpose, and are praised for their work. We expect that individuals who have experienced 
significance loss may be thrust toward radical groups and causes, to the extent that they 
are seen as effective sources for gaining significance. Accordingly, we predict that 
marginalization will induce feelings of significance loss, which in turn will increase 
support for radical groups, causes and behavior.  Significance loss unites a number of 
psychological processes that are at play under conditions of threat to self-worth, and we 
will capture the diverse components of significance loss in a scale that we will address in 
the methods section.  
Hypothesis 1a: Marginalization will be related to greater feelings of significance 
loss amongst immigrants (Studies 1, 2 & 3).  
Hypothesis 1b: Feelings of significance loss will predict greater support for 
radical groups, causes, and behavior (Studies 1, 2 & 3). 
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As noted, of particular interest for this research program is the marginalized 
quadrant, who do not identify with either the host or the heritage cultures. We believe 
them to be at the greatest risk of radicalization due to threats to significance. Yet, it is 
worth speculating on potential outcomes for other acculturation orientations. Although 
we do not make specific predictions with respect to each other acculturation orientation, 
we do expect integration to act as a protective factor against significance loss. This would 
be consistent with the literature on the benefits of integration, and additionally, 
integration can be seen as the flip side of marginalization; the more an individual 
identifies with both cultures, the less marginalized they are. Likewise, the less an 
individual identifies with both cultures, the more marginalized they are.  
However, the acculturation literature has found evidence for risk factors among 
separated and assimilated immigrants as well, as they each have one positive cultural 
orientation and one negative cultural orientation. We will explore these other identity 
conditions in our analyses. We do not expect them to be at as great of a risk as the 
marginalized who have two negative cultural orientations, because the assimilated and 
separated each have a social buffer in their belongingness to the host or heritage 
community, respectively. Yet, they may still be more susceptible to radicalization than 
integrated immigrants. Both separated and assimilated immigrants have been found to 
suffer from loneliness (Chun & Akutsu, 2003; Nguyen, 2006) due to their alienation from 
one culture or the other. Their needs for personal significance may not be as fulfilled as 
the integrated. Certain extenuating conditions may exacerbate the threat to these needs, 
which we will discuss next.  
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Moderating Factors 
One of the goals of this research is to identify the conditions under which the 
vulnerabilities of immigrants are exacerbated. Unfortunately, on top of negotiating their 
own cultural identities, immigrants are at times confronted with maltreatment by 
members of their host society, as discussed in the review of acculturation processes 
(Ahmed et al., 2011; Amer & Hovey, 2007). Discrimination against Muslim immigrants 
and minorities has increased in the post-9/11 era as many Muslims are subject to name-
calling, racial profiling, and even community policing (Sirin & Fine, 2007). Despite 
occasional episodes of discrimination from the host culture, many Muslim immigrants 
report that they are successfully able to integrate into society (Sirin & Gupta, 2012). 
Therefore, discrimination clearly does not turn all immigrants into aggressive radicals. 
However, some immigrants may be more affected by negative treatment from the host 
society than others. Although immigrants who endorse the other acculturation 
orientations are not immune to discrimination, marginalized immigrants are the least 
equipped to handle these experiences due to a lack of community connectedness. 
Separated immigrants can find support in their cultural communities, and assimilated and 
integrated immigrants still have other positive associations with the host culture. 
Marginalized immigrants, however, may be particularly jarred by hostile reminders that 
they do not fit into the society within which they live. 
 The terrorism literature highlights the role of acute, significance loss-inducing 
events in radicalization processes (King & Taylor, 2011; Kruglanski et al., 2009; 
Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Threats to significance, as 
discussed earlier, can be induced by individual as well as social factors. For example, acts 
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of social disrespect by others or conflict with an out-group can induce a sense of 
powerlessness and humiliation that provokes a desire to reestablish significance through 
revenge (Kruglanski et al., 2014). We argue that the relationship between marginalized 
identities and radicalization might be amplified by a “shock” to significance, which in the 
case of immigrants means a severe instance of maltreatment by the host community. This 
trigger could lead marginalized immigrants to find other like-minded individuals who 
share the sense of being wronged, as discussed in the radicalization literature.  
Host culture maltreatment can be explicit in the case of name-calling, but it often 
times exists under the subtle guise of exclusion, such as in the case of Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev’s thwarted participation in an American boxing tournament. Exclusion is a 
process that has received thorough attention in the social psychology literature and has 
been linked to threatened psychological needs and aggression (Williams, 2007). Given 
the known consequences for exclusion, we think that this is a process worthy of more 
thorough investigation in the context of homegrown radicalization. We next discuss 
empirical research on the relationship between exclusion, psychological processes 
invoked in significance loss and aggressive responses, as well as the relevance for 
theories of radicalization. 
Exclusion as a Cause of Significance Loss 
Researchers have found robust universal support for negative reactions to 
exclusion; the experience of being excluded does not appear to be better or worse in 
different cultures (Williams, 2007). The effects of exclusion have been replicated using a 
wide variety of experimental paradigms, such as being left out in “Cyberball,” a 
computerized ball-tossing game (Williams et al., 2000), being told that you will spend 
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your life alone (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001), and being informed that 
none of the other participants want to work with you (Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Blevins, 
& Holgate, 1997). Surprisingly, individuals are even upset even when they’re excluded 
from groups they do not wish to belong to, such as the KKK (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 
2007). Exclusion has repeatedly been shown to threaten fundamental needs including 
belongingness, self-esteem, control, and the perception of a meaningful existence, as well 
as increase sadness and anger (Williams, 2007; Williams et al., 2000).  
In many cases, exclusion is likely to produce aggressive responses. In one set of 
studies, participants who felt rejected demonstrated a hostile cognition bias; they were 
more likely to interpret future ambiguous stimuli as aggressive (DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, 
& Baumeister, 2009). After participants were told that they would likely live their life 
alone, they made more hostile attributions toward the author of an ambiguous essay. This 
hostile cognition bias in turn was associated with aggression toward a range of others, 
including people who had excluded them but also individuals unrelated to the original act 
of exclusion. This hostile cognition bias is thought to have developed because normative 
social behavior was met with rejection instead of approval, and thus did not promote 
future social behavior. People who repeatedly experience exclusion may display a greater 
propensity for interpreting others’ actions as hostile. 
One recent study examined the aggressive responses of excluded Moroccan, 
Turkish and Dutch students in the Netherlands (Schaafsma & Williams, 2012). The 
Netherlands has a large Moroccan and Turkish population, and these Muslim immigrant 
communities have faced difficulty integrating into the larger society, in part due to 
negative attitudes held by the Dutch majority. Some participants in the study were 
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Christian, and others were Muslim. Students were either excluded by their ethnic ingroup 
or outgroup in a Cyberball game. Participants who were excluded by their ethnic 
outgroup displayed more aggression toward the excluder than participants who were 
excluded by their ethnic ingroup; however, participants who were excluded by their 
ethnic ingroup demonstrated greater support for fundamentalist religious beliefs. This 
finding was attributed to the activation of different threats as a function of the social 
identity of the excluders. Exclusion by the outgroup constitutes a categorization threat, 
where an us-them distinction is made clear to the victim. In this case, aggression is a 
salient response option. Exclusion by the ingroup, however, constitutes an acceptance 
threat; individuals who are rejected from a group to which they should belong are faced 
with uncertainty and may seek to restore certainty by seeking ties with clear and 
distinctive groups, such as religious fundamentalists (Hogg et al., 2007; Schaafsma & 
Williams, 2012). Given that ingroup exclusion led to the endorsement of religious 
fundamentalism and outgroup exclusion led to aggression, one might consider whether 
marginalized immigrants who already experience threats to significance would be 
especially prone to host country-directed aggression in the face of host culture exclusion. 
Summary. In sum, the previously discussed work highlights the very real threat 
of exclusion for personal significance. These processes have in turn been associated with 
aggressive behavior geared toward restoring these needs. We suggest that immigrants 
who are already experiencing significance loss may be drawn toward extreme groups to 
increase self-clarity, and severe experiences of exclusion from the mainstream culture 
might exacerbate significance loss. We already know that excluded individuals may be 
more willing to aggress against outsiders when seeking acceptance (Carter-Sowell et al., 
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2008; DeWall et al., 2009; Schaafsma & Williams, 2012). Thus, a state of internal 
significance loss (identity marginalization) coupled with an instance of significance 
shock (host culture maltreatment via exclusion) could prove to be a lethal combination.  
Importantly, with these predictions we maintain that marginalization and 
exclusion are two discrete contributors to significance loss (and will show in the method 
section that they factor separately). Although exclusion could certainly increase risk for 
marginalization, there are many pathways to marginalization beyond exclusion. Likewise, 
plenty of people experience exclusion without becoming marginalized. What we predict 
is that both marginalization and exclusion will lead to feelings of significance loss, and 
further, that exclusion experiences will amplify the existing relationship between identity 
marginalization and significance loss.  
Hypothesis 2a: Perceived (Studies 1 & 2) or real (Study 3) exclusion by the host 
society will increase feelings of significance loss. 
Hypothesis 2b: Perceived (Studies 1 & 2) or real (Study 3) exclusion by the host 
society will exacerbate the relationship between marginalization and feelings of 
significance loss.  
Finally, we expect that all of these factors together will explain how 
marginalization indirectly influences support for radicalism via mediating and 
moderating processes. 
Hypothesis 2c: Marginalization will indirectly predict support for radicalism as 
mediated by feelings of significance loss and amplified by exclusion. 
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Overview of Studies 
We conducted field and experimental studies to explore the relationship between 
immigrant acculturation processes, exclusion experiences and support for radicalism. We 
tested the theory in the United States and abroad, in Muslim and also non-Muslim 
immigrant samples. We examined several indicators of support for extremism, including 
attraction to radical groups, support for radical ideologies, and willingness to engage in 
radical behavior. 
In Study 1, we administered online surveys to first- and second-generation 
Muslims in the United States, measuring identity processes, perceived exclusion, and 
support for extremist groups and causes. We also explored the process theorized to 
mediate the relationship between these variables: significance loss. In Study 2, we 
administered the same survey in Germany to demonstrate that our theory applies beyond 
the American context. The survey design was partially informed by pilot interviews with 
first- and second-generation Muslims in each country. In Study 3, we tested the 
robustness of the theory in a sample of non-Muslim college students with diverse 
immigrant heritage backgrounds. Additionally, to better draw a causal relationship 
between host culture exclusion and radicalization, Study 3 measured identity processes 
and manipulated exclusion by the majority group in a controlled laboratory setting. In this 
study we also sought to explore factors that could mitigate the relationship between 
identity processes, exclusion and support for radicalization. Because homegrown 
terrorism is a phenomenon that has affected not only first-generation immigrants but also 
second-generation citizens (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), and acculturation is a process that 
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affects non-immigrant minorities (Nguyen, 2006), we included multiple generations of 
immigrants in each of our studies.  
Although our key interest for this research is in immigrants who are marginalized, 
we test our hypotheses including the other acculturation orientations as controls. We 
report throughout any findings involving the role of separation, assimilation, and 
integration orientations.  
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Chapter 5: Immigrant Marginalization in the United States (Study 1) 
Participants, Design and Procedure  
In Study 1, we utilized a field sample to investigate the relationship between 
acculturation processes, perceived exclusion and support for radicalism via feelings of 
significance loss. We administered surveys to 260 first- and second-generation 
immigrants in the United States. We developed a contract with the World Organization 
for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) to assist with collecting survey 
responses in the United States. WORDE is a nonprofit organization with access to 
Muslim immigrant communities throughout the country. We focused our recruitment 
efforts on young adults under the age of 35, according to demographic trends associated 
with radicalization (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). We primarily recruited participants of 
Pakistani origin because there are known to be widespread Pakistani communities in 
different regions of the United States. 
WORDE helped identify participants and administer surveys throughout the 
United States. Surveys were administered on a computer using an online survey platform. 
The survey took between 30-40 minutes for most participants, and a $25 Amazon.com 
gift card was provided as compensation. 
Participant characteristics. Our final sample included 198 participants, as 62 
survey responses had to be excluded2 (78 Male, 107 Female; mean age = 27.42). Of these 
                                                
2 Participants who indicated that they did not come from an immigrant heritage background (e.g., Muslim 
converts) were not included in the final analyses. We also excluded participants whose responses indicated 
that they were not devoting their full attention to the survey or who were trying to take the survey multiple 
times to receive extra compensation. In order to detect inattention to the survey, we included five attention 
check questions throughout the survey (e.g., “Please select ‘3’ if you are paying attention.”) Participants 
who failed more than one attention check question were excluded. We also looked for unusual patterns in 
the responses, such as large sections of incomplete data or abnormally short submission times. There were 
some participants who appeared to be taking the survey from outside of the United States, raising suspicion 
that these respondents did not actually live in the country. These responses were also excluded. 
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participants, 92 indicated that they were first-generation immigrants, and 107 were 
second-generation Americans who had been born in the United States. Controlling for 
generational status and gender did not influence the results. The participants came from a 
total of 27 states, with the majority coming from Maryland (N = 60), Virginia (N = 35), 
California (N = 30), New York (N = 11), or Washington D.C. (N = 10). The participants 
represented more than 20 different heritage country backgrounds, with slightly more than 
half reporting Pakistan as their heritage country (N = 108). The sample was highly 
educated, with more than 75% possessing a college or other advanced degree. The 
sample came from a higher than average social class, with more than 75% reporting that 
they belonged to the upper-middle class or higher.  
Pilot Interviews 
 Prior to the dissemination of large-scale surveys, we conducted qualitative 
interviews with 20 first- and second-generation Muslims in the United States. Participants 
varied on the same demographic characteristics that we intended to include in our survey 
sample. The aim of these interviews was to gain a more thorough understanding of 
immigrants’ experiences living in the host culture with respect to cultural identification, 
exclusion, and attitudes toward the host culture, and to ensure that our survey materials 
were fully representative of immigrants’ experiences across cultural and social 
backgrounds. These questions were developed in collaboration with WORDE. The 
interviews were transcribed and analyses of these responses informed final decisions 
regarding choice of materials to be included in the surveys.  
We learned that the Muslim identity was a significant part of the heritage culture 
identity for most interview respondents, which influenced the development of our 
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marginalization measure. We found that it was difficult for many individuals to speak 
directly and honestly about radicalism in the Muslim community, specifically with 
respect to their own attitudes, so this influenced the choices we made in developing and 
selecting indicators to measure support for radicalism.  
We also came across themes that were unrelated to the present hypotheses but 
were important for WORDE’s understanding of the issues the Muslim American 
community faces, so we addressed some of these issues in greater depth in the survey for 
WORDE’s benefit. For example, some interviewees discussed the pressure to prove to 
both of their cultural communities that they were a “real” Muslim or a “real” American. 
Some also mentioned the hypocritical nature of Americans’ self-proclaimed positive 
attitudes toward diversity and multiculturalism. A full discussion of the interview themes 
is beyond the scope of the current research but will be subject to more thorough analysis 
in the future. Please see Appendix A for all of the questions contained in the interview 
protocol. 
Stimuli 
 Participants were asked questions about their acculturation orientations, 
experiences of exclusion by mainstream society in the United States, perception of 
personal significance, and attitudes toward extremism. A number of other measures 
pertaining to experiences in the host country were also included at WORDE’s request but 
are not part of the present analyses. These measures addressed online media consumption 
behavior, satisfaction with community mosques, and open-ended accounts of personal 
discrimination experiences.  
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Marginalization. We included two items from the Immigrant Acculturation Scale 
(Bourhis & Barrette, 2006), specifically with respect to two dimensions of acculturation: 
customs and values. For example, the item pertaining to values was “I do not wish to 
maintain my heritage culture values or adopt American values as I feel uncomfortable 
with both types of values.”  
We supplemented these items with an additional two items that assessed the 
extent to which participants felt that they did not belong to any culture. One of these 
items was framed with respect to Muslim culture rather than the culture of the heritage 
country, given that our interviews suggested that Muslims in the United States also focus 
on their Muslim identity. These items were “There are times when I feel like I don’t 
belong to any culture” and “Sometimes I don’t feel part of American culture or part of 
Muslim culture.” All items were measured on a six-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 
= Strongly Agree; α = .68)3. 
Other acculturation orientations. In order to isolate the unique role of 
marginalization, we took a conservative approach and included control measures for 
endorsement of other acculturation orientations including separation (α = .78), 
assimilation (α = .78), and integration (α = .78). These six items (two for each of the three 
acculturation orientations) also came from the Immigrant Acculturation Scale and were 
measured on a six-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree) for both the 
domains of customs and values (Bourhis & Barrette, 2006). Sample items include “I wish 
                                                
3 Participants also completed a nine-item measure of ingroup identification (Hogg & Hains, 1996; Hogg, 
Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hogg et al., 2007), both with respect to their heritage identity and their host culture 
identity. We intended to use the product term of these two dimensions as another measure of 
marginalization, but the means on both scales were so high that it would have been difficult to make 
meaningful distinctions between the different cultural orientations. Therefore, we decided to utilize the 
approach of including specific items for each acculturation orientation in our analyses. 
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to maintain my heritage culture values and also adopt key features of American values” 
(integration, values), “I wish to maintain my heritage culture customs rather than adopt 
American customs” (assimilation, customs), and “I wish to give up my heritage culture 
values for the sake of adopting American values” (separation, values). Please see 
Appendix B for all acculturation orientation measures.  
 Exclusion. Participants completed the nine-item Inclusionary Status Scale 
(Spivey, 1990; Rubin, Watt & Ramelli, 2012) pertaining to experiences of exclusion by 
non-Muslim Americans. Sample items include “I sometimes feel that other non-Muslim 
Americans avoid interacting with me” and “I often feel like an outsider in non-Muslim 
American social gatherings.” These items were measured on a six-point scale (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree; α = .86). Please see Appendix C for all of the 
items in the scale. 
Significance loss. We adapted the 24-item Need Threat Scale (Williams, 2009) 
with subscales for belongingness, certainty, control, and self-esteem, as these are all 
needs thought to be captured in the quest for significance. We removed one item from the 
control subscale and added four of our own items pertaining to humiliation, shame, 
hopelessness and anger, given that they directly reflect significance loss. Participants 
were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how often they felt different states and 
emotions. In order to explore the structure of the scale, we conducted Principal Axis 
Factoring (PAF) analyses on the 27-items with direct oblimin rotation. PAF is a 
technique that allows shared variance among items, and direct oblimin rotation is used 
when factors may be related. This was an appropriate technique for our scale, as the 
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subscales could theoretically be correlated. Our Kaiser’s criterion was set for Eigen-
values over one.   
We found that a single factor explained 47.8% of the variance in responses, with 
the second and third factors explaining an additional 7.9% and 4.3%, respectively. We 
interpreted the first eight-item factor as representing significance loss. These items were: 
“I feel ashamed,” “I feel humiliated,” “I feel rejected,” “I feel meaningless,” “I feel 
hopeless,” “I feel like an outsider,” “I feel nonexistent,” and “I feel disconnected from 
other people” (α = .90). Two additional items were removed from the factor because of 
loadings less than .40 (“I feel angry” and “I feel invisible”)4.   
In order to demonstrate divergent validity of this scale, we conducted additional 
exploratory factor analyses that indicated significance loss factored separately from our 
measures of exclusion or marginalization. This was to be expected, as our 
marginalization and exclusion measures pertained to specific social identities and social 
experiences, respectively, whereas our significance loss items reflected how these and 
other experiences become internalized psychologically and interpreted as threats to self-
worth. Please see Appendix E for the complete set of items and their respective factor 
loadings.  
Support for radicalism. We included several indicators of support for radical 
groups, causes and action. These measures included readiness to sacrifice oneself for a 
cause, support for an extreme interpretation of Islam, and support for a hypothetical 
radical group. 
                                                
4 There was a second factor that represented 11 positively valenced items. Top-loading items included “I 
feel like others interact with me,” “I feel like others like me,” and “My self-esteem is high” (α = .90). A 
final third factor included six items, most of which came from the uncertainty subscale. Top-loading items 
included “I feel confused,” “I feel uncertain,” and “I feel unsure of myself or my future” (α = .90). See 
Appendix D for the complete set of items and their respective loadings. 
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Readiness to self-sacrifice. Participants completed items from the Self-Sacrifice 
Scale (e.g., “Under the right circumstances, I would sacrifice my life for an important 
cause”; Bélanger, Caouette, Sharvit, & Dugas, 2014). This scale has been used in the 
context of terrorism research and has undergone extensive psychometric work to 
establish its unidimensionality, internal consistency, temporal stability, and predictive 
validity. It has been distinguished from measures of depression and suicidal ideation, 
confirming the idea that readiness to die for a cause is not related to the presence of some 
psychopathology. Because of survey length concerns, we only included the five top-
loading items. The items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = Not Agree at All, 7 = 
Very Strongly Agree; α = .95). Please see Appendix F for the full measure.  
Extreme interpretation of Islam. We included ten items representing a radical 
interpretation of certain tenets of Islam, such as the meaning of Jihad (Kruglanski et al., 
2015). Sample items include “Muslims in America should help their oppressed brothers 
and sisters in other parts of the world by particting in combative jihad” and “Combative 
jihad is the only way to conduct jihad.” These items were measured on a six-point scale 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree; α = .80). Please see Appendix G for the full 
measure.   
Hypothetical group vignette. Participants read a description of a group that 
resembled an extremist organization, modeled after extremist groups described in past 
research (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010). The group was called “Fundamental 
Muslim” and was said to consist of young Muslims in the United States. The group was 
described as highly cohesive, loyal and valuing group member contributions, and firmly 
committed to the goal of avenging American injustices toward Muslims at any cost. This 
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description was developed in conjunction with WORDE and was subject to piloting in 
advance.  
After reading the description, participants responded to a) four items indicating 
how likely they would participate in a number of behaviors for an extreme group (e.g., 
“How likely would you be to participate in demonstrations, sit-ins, and blockades on 
behalf of the group?”; 1 = Very Unlikely, 7 = Very Likely), b) four items indicating how 
much they identified with and wished to know members of the group (e.g., “To what 
extent do you desire to get to know the group’s members?”; 1 = Not at All, 7 = Very 
Much; Hogg et al., 2010), and c) four items indicating the extent to which they would 
show understanding for group members participating in a variety of radical behaviors 
(e.g., participating in a violent demonstration, blocking a road; 1 = Not at All, 7 = Very 
Much; Simon et al., 2013). Because of the expectation that many participants would not 
be willing to admit support for the group, we framed the items with respect to descriptive 
norms, or in other words, the extent to which they expected most members of their social 
circle would support the group. The final scale was a compilation of these twelve items 
measured on a seven-point scale (α = .94). Please see Appendix H for the complete 
vignette and Appendix I for the corresponding measures.5 
Results 
Table 1 presents the scale means and standard deviations and Table 2 shows the 
correlations across study variables. As would be expected from a general sample, overall 
support for radicalism was quite low. To test our hypothesis that marginalization predicts 
                                                
5 We included several additional measures in the survey that will not be addressed here, such as cultural 
tightness-looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011) and perceived closed-mindedness of the host society, for 
exploratory comparative analyses between the American sample in Study 1 and the German sample in 
Study 2. These specific measures will be introduced in our discussion of Study 2. 
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support for radical groups and causes, mediated by significance loss and exacerbated by 
exclusion, we utilized a moderated mediation analysis approach. We also looked at the 
role of other variables such as generational status, sex, and age. None of these variables 
changed the relationship between our predictor and outcome variables, so they were not 
included in the subsequent analyses.   
Moderated mediation. We conducted moderated mediation analyses following 
the procedure outlined by Hayes (2012). We entered marginalization as the independent 
variable, significance loss as the mediator, and exclusion as the moderator. Exclusion was 
only entered as a moderator on the path leading to significance loss. Integration, 
assimilation and separation scores were entered as covariates in both the paths leading to 
significance loss and the outcome variables. We ran this model three separate times for 
each of our three outcome variables. Marginalization and exclusion were mean-centered 
to reduce the threat of multicollinearity in the interaction term. 
We ran the analyses with 5000 bootstrap samples to generate 95% confidence 
intervals for the conditional indirect effect, which was estimated at -1, 0, and +1 standard 
deviations from the mean of the moderator (exclusion). When the confidence intervals do 
not contain zero, the effect is considered significant. This is recommended over 
traditional significance testing, as significance tests do not respect the non-normality of 
the sampling distribution of the indirect effect (Hayes, 2012).  
Willingness to self-sacrifice.  Marginalization predicted greater significance loss 
(B = .24, SE = .04 p < .001), as did exclusion (B = .34, SE = .05, p < .001). This 
supported our hypotheses that both marginalization and exclusion would be related to 
greater feelings of significance loss. The interaction term for marginalization and 
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exclusion also predicted greater significance loss, such that the relationship between 
marginalization and significance loss was amplified by perceived exclusion (B = .15, SE 
= .05 p = .003). This supported our hypothesis that exclusion would exacerbate the 
relationship between marginalization and feelings of significance loss. 
Significance loss in turn predicted readiness to self-sacrifice (B = .51, SE = .19, p 
= .008). This provided support for our hypothesis that feelings of significance loss would 
be associated with greater support for radicalism. There was no direct effect for 
marginalization, controlling for the other acculturation orientations (B = -.17, SE = .13, 
n.s.). 
We then looked to see whether there was an indirect effect of marginalization on 
readiness to self-sacrifice through significance loss. The confidence intervals suggested 
that there was an indirect effect from marginalization to support for radical ideologies via 
significance loss when exclusion was high (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean; 
95% CI [.0646, .3851]). Please refer to Figure 3 below for a graphical depiction of the 
interaction on significance loss, and Figure 4 for a depiction of the moderated mediation 
relationship, including unstandardized loadings with standard errors in parentheses. See 
Table 3 for the full set of results.    
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Figure 3. Interaction between marginalization and exclusion on significance loss in Study 3. 




Figure 4. Moderated mediation path to readiness to self-sacrifice in Study 1. 
Support for a radical interpretation of Islam. The path to significance loss was 
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and exclusion both predicted greater significance loss, as did the interaction term for 
marginalization and exclusion 
Significance loss in turn predicted support for a radical interpretation of Islam (B 
= .17, SE = .07, p = .03). This provided support for our hypothesis that feelings of 
significance loss would be associated with greater support for radicalism. Controlling for 
the role of the other variables, there was a marginal direct negative effect from 
marginalization to support for radical ideologies (B = -.10, SE = .05, p = .06).  
We then looked to see whether there was an indirect effect of marginalization on 
support for a radical interpretation of Islam through significance loss. The confidence 
intervals suggested that there was an indirect effect from marginalization to support for 
radical ideologies via significance loss when exclusion was high (95% CI [.0057, .1322]). 
Please refer to Figure 5 below for a depiction of the moderated mediation relationship, 
including unstandardized loadings with standard errors in parentheses. Table 4 presents 
the full set of results.   
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Support for radical groups. Because the support for radical groups measure was 
inserted shortly after data collection was underway, 21 participants did not complete this 
measure and thus the analyses for the path to significance loss produced slightly different 
results than the analyses for the two previous variables. The pattern, however, was the 
same. Marginalization predicted greater significance loss (B = .26, SE = .05 p < .001), as 
did exclusion (B = .35, SE = .06, p < .001). This supported our hypotheses that both 
marginalization and exclusion would be related to greater feelings of significance loss. 
The interaction term for marginalization and exclusion also predicted greater significance 
loss (B = .15, SE = .05 p = .005). This supported our hypothesis that exclusion would 
exacerbate the relationship between marginalization and feelings of significance loss. 
In turn, significance loss predicted attraction to the group (B = .43, SE = .12, p 
= .003). This provided support for our hypothesis that feelings of significance loss would 
be associated with greater support for radicalism. Controlling for the role of the other 
acculturation orientations, there was not a direct effect for marginalization (B = -.12, SE 
= .08, n.s.). 
We then looked to see whether there was an indirect effect of marginalization on 
support for radical groups through significance loss. The confidence intervals suggested 
that there was an indirect effect from marginalization to attraction to the group via 
significance loss when exclusion was high (95% CI [.0682, .3235]). Please refer to Figure 
6 below for a depiction of the moderated mediation relationship, including 
unstandardized loadings with standard errors in parentheses. Table 5 presents the full set 
of results.    
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Figure 6. Moderated mediation path to support for the radical group in Study 1. 
Other acculturation orientations. Although the focus for this research was the 
role of marginalization, we also report the patterns for the other acculturation orientations 
included as control variables. Table 3 shows that integration was a buffer against 
significance loss as well as readiness to self-sacrifice. The relationship between the other 
acculturation orientations and the dependent variables were less consistent. Separation 
was a buffer against readiness to self-sacrifice, but a risk factor for possessing a radical 
interpretation of Islam. Assimilation was unrelated to any of the variables of interest. 
Notably, marginalization was the only acculturation orientation that came up as a risk 
factor for significance loss.  
We also looked into whether any of these other acculturation orientations would 
interact with exclusion to predict significance loss. Appendices J – R show that 
integration was the only acculturation strategy that interacted with exclusion, such that 
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Study 1 Summary 
 As expected, we found that marginalization of Muslims in the United States 
predicted significance loss, and this was exacerbated by the perception of having been 
excluded by other non-Muslim Americans. In turn, significance loss predicted all three 
indicators of support for radicalism. All three sets of results provided support for our 
hypotheses. We also found an interaction between integration and exclusion on 
significance loss, such that participants who were less integrated experienced greater 
significance loss under conditions of exclusion. This finding is consistent with our 
predictions about marginalization, as less integration can be interpreted as more 
marginalization. Assimilation was unrelated to any of our variables of interest, and the 
role of separation was unclear as it was a risk factor for a radical interpretation of Islam, 
but a protective factor against readiness to self-sacrifice. 
 Although we found support for our predicted model in an American sample, it is 
important to know whether our theory can be applied to other cultural contexts. Thus, we 
sought to replicate the study in a sample of German Muslims in Study 2. 
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Chapter 6: Immigrant Marginalization in Germany (Study 2) 
 Homegrown terrorism is not a phenomenon unique to the United States. Some 
Muslim immigrants living in Western European countries have also become radicalized. 
Germany, which has a large Turkish population, is a country where many immigrants 
have had difficulty integrating into society (Phalet & Kosic, 2006; Kunst & Sam, 2013). 
We conducted the same interviews and surveys in Germany to determine whether the 
relationship between identity processes, exclusion and radicalization applies beyond the 
United States. To the extent that the theory can apply to other cultural contexts, it 
suggests that immigrant identity issues are a universal concern, not just relevant to the 
United States.  
Participants, Design and Procedure 
We administered surveys to 302 Muslims with immigrant backgrounds in 
Germany. Our collaborators at Jacobs University Bremen assisted in collecting survey 
responses in Germany. They contacted Muslim student associations at universities 
throughout the country, and also advertised in Muslim-German forums. Like in the 
United States, we attempted to maximize variability in ethnic background, gender, 
generational status and religiosity, and focused on young adults. We primarily recruited 
individuals of Turkish origin because they comprise the largest immigrant community in 
Germany.  
As in the United States, surveys were administered using an online survey 
platform. The survey underwent a thorough translation and back-translation procedure to 
ensure that the German version of the survey was equivalent to the original English. 
Participants were informed of the purpose of the study, completed the survey, and then 
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received a full debriefing. Participants were compensated with an 8€ gift certificate sent 
through e-mail. 
Participant characteristics. We used the same criteria as in Study 1 to exclude 
participants who failed to meet our eligibility criteria or demonstrated that they were not 
paying attention to the survey. Our final sample consisted of 204 participants (75 Male, 
119 Female; mean age = 25.3). The sample included first (N = 77), second- (N = 107), 
and third-generation (N = 20) Muslim immigrants. Controlling for generational status and 
gender did not influence the results. Participants represented all states in Germany, with 
the largest number coming from Nordrhein-Westfalen (N = 46), Niedersachsen (N = 45), 
Bremen (N = 24), and Hessen (N = 20). Participants reported more than a dozen different 
heritage backgrounds, with approximately half coming from Turkey (N = 102). Perhaps 
in part owing to the younger average age and differences in the educational structure 
between Germany and the United States (i.e., Germans start university at an older age 
than Americans), a smaller proportion of the sample had a university degree (42%). More 
than 50% possessed an advanced high school degree that prepares students for university 
study. Slightly more than 60% of participants considered themselves as belonging to the 
upper-middle class or higher.  
Pilot Interviews 
 As in the United States, we first conducted interviews with 10 Muslim first- and 
second-generation immigrants in Germany. These interview responses were translated 
into English and considered along with the American responses in the development of the 
survey materials so that we could make sure to address issues that were relevant to both 
Muslims in the United States as well as in Germany. The interview responses in Germany 
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touched upon many of the same issues as the American responses regarding identity 
management and attitudes toward radicalization. German Muslims additionally discussed 
some different discrimination issues than the American sample, such as discrimination in 
the workplace, pushback for wearing religious articles of clothing in public, and unfair 
depictions of Muslims in the mainstream media. Again, these responses will be subject to 
more thorough analysis in future research. 
Stimuli 
 All measures from the American survey were translated and back-translated for 
inclusion in the German survey, and any translation discrepancies were discussed and 
resolved with the German collaborators. Some items needed to be modified slightly to 
appropriately fit the German context, as they had been initially designed with an 
American sample in mind.  
Marginalization. We utilized the same four-item composite scale consisting of 
two of our own items and two items from the Immigrant Acculturation Scale (Bourhis & 
Barrette, 2006) to measure marginalization of immigrants in Germany (α = .64). 
Other acculturation orientations. In order to measure other acculturation 
strategies, we used the same items from the Immigrant Acculturation Scale (Bourhis & 
Barrette, 2006). These items were measured on a six-point scale for both the domains of 
customs and values pertaining to integration (α = .76), separation (α = .83), and 
assimilation (α = .78).  
 Exclusion. Participants completed the same nine-item Inclusionary Status Scale 
(Spivey, 1990; Rubin, Watt & Ramelli, 2012) pertaining to experiences of exclusion by 
non-Muslim Germans (α = .86). 
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Significance loss. We used the same eight items adapted from the Need Threat 
Scale (Williams, 2009) to measure significance loss among Muslims in Germany in order 
to be consistent with our measurement of the construct in the American sample (α = .88).  
 Support for radicalism. We included the same indicators of support for 
radicalism as we had in the American sample. 
Readiness to self-sacrifice. We administered the same five items from the Self-
Sacrifice Scale, translated into German (Bélanger et al., 2014; α = .89). 
Extreme interpretation of Islam. We used the same ten items on a six-point scale 
representing a radical interpretation of certain tenets of Islam, translated into German (α 
= .81). 
Hypothetical group vignette. The hypothetical group vignette was translated and 
back-translated before being administered in the survey. Potential translation issues were 
taken into account when developing the English version of the description, so as to avoid 
problems with the German version. We used the same twelve-item scale to measure 
support for the group in terms of descriptive norms (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 
2010; Simon et al., 2013; α = .95). 
Additional measures. We included additional measures in the survey for 
exploratory comparative analyses between the American and German samples. 
Host country tightness-looseness. We included a measure of cultural tightness-
looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011) for exploratory cross-national comparative analyses of 
the surveys. Tightness-looseness describes the extent to which a society maintains and 
enforces social norms (Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011). Societies 
that are “tight” expect more conformity to normative behavior, and norm breakers are 
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subject to punishment. Societies that are “loose” do not have such strict expectations for 
behavioral conformity, and are more permissive toward norm-breaking. Tightness has 
been linked to higher rates of terrorism at the country level (Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey & 
Feinberg, 2013), and other data has indicated that Germany is moderately tight, whereas 
the United States is moderately loose (Gelfand et al., 2011). Accordingly, we included 
this measure to see if there were any differences in radicalization rates in the United 
States and Germany as a function of tightness-looseness. 
The Tightness-Looseness Scale consisted of six items pertaining to the perceived 
tightness or looseness of the host society. Sample items include “There are many social 
norms that people are supposed to abide by in this country” and “In this country, if 
someone acts in an inappropriate way, others will strongly disapprove.” Items were 
measured on a six-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 1 = Strongly Agree; α = .666). 
Higher scores represented the tightness end of the continuum, whereas lower scores 
represented looseness. One item was reverse-coded prior to analyses (“People in this 
country have a great deal of freedom in deciding how they want to behave in most 
situations”). 
Perception of host country closed-mindedness. Analysis of the interview 
responses revealed that many Muslims perceive that members of the mainstream society 
are not truly accepting of or interested in learning about other cultures. Tighter cultures 
tend to be more ethnocentric (Gelfand et al., 2011), so we expected that perceptions of 
cultural closed-mindedness in the host society might be an important mediator of 
tightness-looseness effects if they were found on the outcome variables. 
                                                
6 The alpha for the Tightness-Looseness Scale in the American sample was also .66. 
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We developed four items to speak to this issue in both the United States and 
Germany: “Even though most Americans/Germans like to think they are open-minded, 
they actually are not,” “Most Americans/Germans are more prejudiced than they would 
like to believe they are,” “When Americans/Germans ask me where I come from, I sense 
that they aren’t really interested in learning about my culture,” and “Most 
Americans/Germans are not interested in learning about other people’s cultures” (α 
= .807). 
The additional measures including the Tightness-Looseness Scale (Gelfand et al., 
2011) and Perceived Host Country Closed-Mindedness Scale can be found in Appendix S.  
Results 
Table 6 presents the scale means and standard deviations and Table 7 shows the 
correlations across study variables. As with the American sample, the overall support for 
radicalism in the German sample was considerably low.  
Moderated mediation. We proceeded to test the same moderated mediation 
model using the same procedure outlined in Study 1. As in Study 1, we looked at the role 
of other variables such as generational status, sex, and age. None of these variables 
changed the relationship between our predictor and outcome variables, so they were not 
included in the analyses. 
Readiness to self-sacrifice. Marginalization predicted significance loss (B = .23, 
SE = .04, p < .001), as did perceptions of exclusion (B = .32, SE = .04, p < .001). This 
supported our hypotheses that both marginalization and exclusion would be related to 
greater feelings of significance loss. The interaction term for marginalization and 
exclusion predicted significance loss as well, such that exclusion exacerbated the 
                                                
7 The alpha for the Host Country Closed-Mindedness Scale in the American sample was .86. 
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relationship between marginalization and significance loss (B = .10, SE = .05, p = .02). 
This supported our hypothesis that exclusion would exacerbate the relationship between 
marginalization and feelings of significance loss. 
However, significance loss did not predict readiness to self-sacrifice (B = -.03, SE 
= .16, n.s.). Therefore, we did not find support for our hypothesis that feelings of 
significance loss would be associated with greater support for radicalism. There was no 
direct effect of marginalization on readiness to self-sacrifice (B = -.14, SE = .11, n.s.), 
nor was there an indirect effect. Therefore, only the mediator portion of the model from 
Study 1 was replicated in Study 2. Table 8 presents the full set of results. 
Support for a radical interpretation of Islam. The path to significance loss was 
identical to that of the analyses for willingness to self-sacrifice, such that marginalization 
and exclusion both predicted greater significance loss, as did the interaction term for 
marginalization and exclusion.  
Next, significance loss predicted support for a radical interpretation of Islam (B 
= .21, SE = .07, p = .004). This provided support for our hypothesis that feelings of 
significance loss would be associated with greater support for radicalism. A negative 
direct effect of marginalization remained (B = -.15, SE = .05, p = .005).  
We then looked to see whether there was an indirect effect of marginalization on 
support for a radical interpretation of Islam through significance loss. There was a 
positive indirect effect of marginalization through significance loss at low (B = .03, SE 
= .012, 95% CI [.02, .0055]), medium (B = .05, SE = .02, 95% CI [.01, .09]), and high (B 
= .07, SE = .03, 95% CI [.02, .13]) values of exclusion, suggesting that the indirect effect 
of marginalization through significance loss grew as exclusion increased. Therefore, the 
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relationship that we found in Study 1 for support for a radical interpretation of Islam 
replicated in Study 2. Please refer to Figure 7 below for a graphical depiction of the 
interaction between marginalization and exclusion on significance loss, and Figure 8 for a 
depiction of the moderated mediation relationship, including unstandardized loadings 
with standard errors in parentheses. Table 9 presents the full set of results.   
 
Figure 7. Interaction between marginalization and exclusion on significance loss in Study 3. 




















Figure 8. Moderated mediation path to support for a radical interpretation of Islam in Study 2. 
 
Support for radical groups. The path to significance loss was identical to that of 
the analyses for willingness to self-sacrifice and support for a radical interpretation of 
Islam, such that marginalization and exclusion both predicted greater significance loss, as 
did the interaction term for marginalization and exclusion. 
Significance loss did not, however, predict support for the group (B = .11, SE 
= .11, n.s.). Therefore, we did not find support for our hypothesis that feelings of 
significance loss would be associated with greater support for radicalism. There was no 
direct effect of marginalization on support for the group (B = -.03, SE = .08, n.s.), nor 
were there indirect effects through significance loss at any value of exclusion. Therefore, 
only the mediator portion of the model from Study 1 was replicated in Study 2. Table 10 
presents the full set of results. 
Other acculturation orientations. As in Study 1, we also report the patterns for 
the other acculturation orientations included as control variables. Appendix T shows that, 
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for significance loss, and it was also related to greater support for a radical interpretation 
of Islam and support for radical groups. Assimilation was also related to greater support 
for the group. Integration buffered against support for a radical interpretation of Islam as 
well as marginally so against readiness to self-sacrifice.  
We also explored interactions between exclusion and each of the acculturation 
strategies on significance loss, and these results are presented in Appendices T – BB. 
Unlike the American sample, integration did not interact with exclusion to predict 
significance loss. There was a marginal interaction with separation, such that exclusion 
exacerbated the positive relationship between separation and significance loss. There was 
also a positive marginal interaction with assimilation, meaning that assimilation became a 
marginally significant risk factor when exclusion was high.  
Study 2 Summary 
As in the American sample, marginalization and exclusion interacted to predict 
significance loss among Muslims in Germany. This finding supported our hypothesis that 
marginalization is a source of significance loss for Muslim immigrants both within and 
outside the United States, and that this loss is exacerbated by experiences of exclusion.  
Significance loss was a risk factor for support for a radical interpretation of Islam, 
but it did not predict readiness to self-sacrifice or support for the radical group. Instead, 
separation emerged as a stronger risk factor for radicalism, predicting two out of our 
three measured indicators. Therefore, we found partial but not full replication of the 
moderated mediation model that explained the data from the American sample in Study 1.  
Additionally, we observed an unexpected effect for separation on both 
significance loss and support for radicalism, which we did not find in the American 
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sample. We will address potential explanations for the unique effect of separation in the 
German sample in the general discussion. 
Exploratory Comparison of the American and German Samples  
We performed t-tests to identify any differences between the American and 
German samples on demographic characteristics or variables included in our analyses. 
The American sample was older than the German sample (t(397) = 3.00, p = .003). The 
gender distribution was even between countries (χ2(1) = .48, n.s.). 
The American sample reported a stronger endorsement of the integration 
orientation than the German sample (M = 4.96, SD = .95 and M = 4.48, SD = 1.19, 
respectively; t(400) = 4.50, p = .002), but there were no differences for marginalization, 
separation, or assimilation. The German sample reported experiencing more exclusion 
than the American sample (M = 2.88, SD = .93 and M = 2.49, SD = .87, respectively; 
t(400) = 4.42, p < .00), as well as greater significance loss (M = 1.84, SD = .75 and M = 
1.61, SD = .73, respectively; t(400) = 3.23, p = .001).   
Additionally, the German sample indicated greater support for radicalism than the 
American sample on two out of the three indicators. Germans reported greater readiness 
to self-sacrifice than the Americans (M = 4.24, SD = 1.54, and M = 3.23, SD = 1.78, 
respectively; t(400) = 6.05, p < .001), and also demonstrated higher support for a radical 
interpretation of Islam (M = 2.56, SD = .80 and M = 2.13, SD = .74, respectively; t(400) 
= 5.65, p < .001). The samples did not differ in terms of support for radical groups.  
Finally, the two samples differed on the cultural variable of tightness-looseness. 
Muslims in Germany reported that the larger society was tighter than Muslims in the 
United States (M = 4.00, SD = .65 and M = 3.80, SD = .73, respectively; t(400) = 2.86, p 
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= .004). They also differed on perceptions of closed-mindedness in the host society, such 
that the German sample reported higher levels of closed-mindedness than the American 
sample (M = 4.20, SD = .99 and M = 3.45, SD = 1.19, respectively; t(400) = 6.57, p 
< .001). Please see Appendix CC for the complete list of t-test results. 
Structural equivalence. Before we could conduct comparative analyses on the 
American and German data, it was necessary to first establish structural equivalence for 
all of the variables to be included in a model. In other words, we needed to determine 
whether or not there were any differences in the factor structure and loadings between the 
two samples. To this end, we performed a Procrustean factor rotation to compare the 
German and American patterns of responding. We carried out a target rotation such that 
the German data was rotated toward the American factor matrix in order to assess 
similarity of the factor structures. We performed the Procrustes rotation for the 
acculturation items and the indicators of support for radicalism. Because Tightness-
Looseness and Host-Country Closed-Mindedness were only theorized to load on one 
factor, we were unable to perform the Procrustes rotation, as this analysis requires at least 
two factors. Instead, we conducted multigroup confirmatory factor analysis procedures. 
We first performed the factor analysis and Procrustes rotation on the acculturation 
items. We used the principal axis factoring with varimax rotation, as the Procrustes 
procedure requires that the factors be treated as orthogonal. The factor analysis indicated 
that the items representing the four different acculturation orientations loaded onto the 
four hypothesized factors for both the American and German samples. In order to 
increase reliability of the marginalization measure, we used a parceling approach to 
consolidate the four marginalization items to two. Thus, one item from the Immigrant 
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Acculturation Scale was paired with one item from our original measure. After 
submitting the solutions to the Procrustes rotation, we looked to Tucker’s Phi as an index 
of congruence, as is commonly used in the cross-cultural literature. Values above .95 
generally demonstrate acceptable equivalence, and values below .85 indicate poor 
equivalence (Fischer & Fontaine, 2011; van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Tucker’s Phi 
was .96 for marginalization, .95 for separation, .94 for assimilation, and .98 for 
integration. Therefore, we found acceptable levels of structural equivalence among the 
acculturation orientation items. 
Next, we performed principal axis factoring analyses with a varimax rotation on 
the radicalism variables, constraining the structure to three factors to represent the 
readiness to self-sacrifice, support for a radical interpretation of Islam, and support for 
radical groups scales. We used parcels in order to procure a more parsimonious factor 
structure across the groups. We consolidated the twelve-item support for radical group 
scale to four items consisting of one item from each of the subscales (attraction to the 
group, willingness to act on behalf of the group, and sympathy for the group’s radical 
behavior). Likewise, we used parcels for the radical interpretation of Islam and readiness 
to self-sacrifice scales. Through the factor analyses we identified two problematic items 
from the support for a radical interpretation of Islam scale, which were loading on the 
support for a radical group factor to differing extents in the US and Germany. These 
items were “Muslims in America should help their oppressed brothers and sisters in other 
parts of the world by participating in combative jihad” and “Combative jihad is the only 
way to conduct jihad.” After removing these two items, we created four parcels from the 
eight remaining items, combining high- and low-loading items with each other. We used 
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the same criteria for reduce the five readiness to self-sacrifice items to two parcels. We 
found acceptable structural equivalence for these three measures through the Procrustean 
rotation, with Tucker’s Phi coefficients of 1.00 for support for the radical group, .98 for 
readiness to self-sacrifice, and .99 for support for a radical interpretation of Islam.  
Because the tightness-looseness measure only consisted of a single theorized 
factor represented by six items, we conducted multigroup confirmatory factor analyses 
instead of a Procrustes factor analysis. We looked for evidence of metric invariance, or in 
other words, support for the assumption that the items loaded on the tightness-looseness 
factor similarly between the American and German samples. We used absolute and 
parsimony-adjusted fit indices as guidelines for assessing cross-cultural equivalence. The 
comparative fit index (CFI) was .93, slightly lower than the conventionally used .95 as a 
guideline for good absolute fit. The parsimony-adjusted root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA) index was .06 (90% CI [.041, .081]). This was within the range 
of values found to demonstrate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). An additional parsimony-
adjusted index, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), could not be 
computed on account of missing data.  
The perceptions of host-country closed-mindedness scale also only consisted of 
one theorized factor with four items. Therefore, we conducted multigroup confirmatory 
factor analyses instead of the Procrustes factor analysis to assess metric invariance. The 
CFI index was .92, slightly below the conventionally used value of .95 as a guideline for 
good absolute fit. The parsimony-adjusted RMSEA index was .13 (90% CI [.10, .17]). 
This was above the .08 – .10 range typically used as an indicator of mediocre fit (Milfont 
& Fischer, 2010; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara, 1996). 
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However, we found an additional parsimony-adjusted index of model fit, the SRMR, to 
be .05, which is below the cut-off point of .08 as a marker of acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). Therefore, we decided to move forward with including this measure in the US-
Germany path model. 
Path model. As reported, the German sample scored higher than the American 
sample on two of the indicators of radicalism. Although we had not made specific 
predictions as to whether to expect differences in support for radicalism between the two 
countries, we were interested in exploring possible explanations for this difference. 
We also found that tightness scores were higher in Germany than in the United 
States. This is consistent with research on patterns of tightness-looseness across 33-
nations, which revealed that the United States is fairly loose, while Germany is 
considerably tight (Gelfand et al., 2011). The same research found that tighter countries 
are less tolerant of outsiders. For example, tightness was found to be correlated with 
negative attitudes toward migrant workers. Therefore, we might expect that immigrants 
who live in tighter countries have a more difficult time successfully integrating into 
society, because there are strict norms for conforming to societal expectations in ways 
that might be difficult for immigrants (e.g., language, dress), and at the same time there is 
less open-mindedness toward diversity (Gelfand et al., 2011). 
Thus, we tested a path model that looked into whether tightness in Germany 
might have contributed the US-Germany differences in readiness to self-sacrifice and 
support for a radical interpretation of Islam through producing the perception of closed-
mindedness of the society and leading to less integration. We did not include significance 
loss in this path model, because significance loss had functioned inconsistently across the 
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outcome variables in the German sample. See Figure 9 below for a graphical depiction of 
the model. 
 
Figure 9. Hypothesized serial mediation model between country and support for radicalism. 
 
Serial mediation analyses. In our model, country was the predictor variable (US 
= 1, Germany = -1). We tested three mediators in serial. First, country led directly to 
tightness-looseness. Then, tightness-looseness led to perceptions of host country closed-
mindedness. Next, perceptions of host country closed-mindedness led to integration. 
Finally, integration led to the outcome variable. The analysis for each mediator included 
the predictor variable (country) as well as all previous mediators in the model. We ran the 
model one time for readiness to self-sacrifice, and one time for support for a radical 
interpretation of Islam. As mentioned, two items were dropped from the support for a 
radical interpretation of Islam scale. 
Readiness to self-sacrifice. There were country differences for tightness-
looseness, such that Germany was tighter than the United States (B = -.10, SE = .03; p 
= .004). In turn, tightness predicted the perception of host country closed-mindedness (B 
= .19, SE = .08; p = .02). There were also country differences for host country closed-
mindedness, such that Germans were thought to be more closed-minded than Americans 
(B = -.34, SE = .05; p < .001).  
In the next step, host country closed-mindedness predicted lower integration 
scores (B = -.10, SE = .06; p = .04). There were also country differences in integration 











integrated than immigrants in the German sample (B = .21, SE = .06; p < .001). 
Tightness-looseness did not directly influence integration scores (B = .07, SE = .08, n.s.). 
Finally, less integration predicted greater readiness to self-sacrifice (B = -.25, SE 
= .07; p < .001). There remained an effect of closed-mindedness (B = .25, SE = .07, p 
< .001) but not tightness-looseness (B = .14, SE = .12; n.s.). The direct effect of country 
on readiness to self-sacrifice was reduced from the total effect but still significant (B = -
.34, SE = .09; p < .001, and B = -.50, SE = .08; p < .001).  
The confidence intervals produced from 5000 bootstrap samples suggested an 
overall indirect effect of country on readiness to self-sacrifice through the mediators (B = 
-.0005, SE = .09; 95% CI [-.002, -.0001]). Please see Appendix DD for the complete set 
of results, and Figure 10 below for a graphical depiction of the model. 
 
Figure 10. Serial mediation model between country and readiness to self-sacrifice. 
 
Support for a radical interpretation of Islam. As in the previous model, there 
were country differences for tightness-looseness, such that Germany was tighter than the 
United States (B = -.10, SE = .03; p = .004). In turn, tightness predicted the perception of 
host country closed-mindedness (B = .19, SE = .08; p = .02). There were also country 
differences for host country closed-mindedness, such that Germans were thought to be 
more closed-minded than Americans (B = -.34, SE = .05; p < .001).  
In the next step, host country closed-mindedness predicted lower integration 
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scores, as addressed previously; immigrants in the American sample were more 
integrated than immigrants in the German sample (B = .21, SE = .06; p < .001). 
Tightness-looseness did not directly influence integration scores (B = .07, SE = .08, n.s.). 
Finally, less integration predicted greater support for a radical interpretation of 
Islam (B = -.11, SE = .04; p = .006). There remained an effect of closed-mindedness (B 
= .15, SE = .04, p < .001) but not for tightness-looseness (B = -.01, SE = .06; n.s.). The 
direct effect of country on support for a radical interpretation of Islam was reduced from 
the total effect but still significant (B = -.17, SE = .04; p < .001, and B = -.24, SE = .04; p 
< .001).  
The confidence intervals produced from 5000 bootstrap samples did contain zero, 
suggesting there was not an overall indirect effect of country on support for a radical 
interpretation of Islam through the mediators (B = -.0002, SE = .0002; 95% CI [-
.001, .0000]). The confidence intervals did suggest indirect effects through tightness and 
host country closed-mindedness (B = -.002, SE = .001; 95% CI [-.006, -.0003]) or 
through closed-mindedness and integration (B = -.004, SE = .003; 95% CI [-.01, -.0003]), 
but not all three mediators combined. Please see Appendix EE for the complete set of 
results, and Figure 11 below for a graphical depiction of the model. 
 
















Summary of Exploratory Analyses 
Cross-national comparisons illuminated a number of differences between our 
samples. Although we did not see differences in marginalization, separation or 
assimilation scores, we did find that Muslim immigrants in Germany reported feeling less 
integrated than Muslim immigrants in the United States. We also found that Muslims in 
the German sample reported greater readiness to self-sacrifice and more support for a 
radical interpretation of Islam than Muslims in the American sample.  
Therefore, we began to theorize as to how certain cultural conditions in the host 
society might produce more or less support for radicalism through identity processes. We 
knew that Germany is known to be less tolerant of deviance and norm-breaking than the 
United States, as per recent research on cultural tightness-looseness (Gelfand et al, 2011). 
Given that integrating into the host country environment means learning how to adapt to 
new norms while maintaining certain norms from the heritage culture, we surmised that 
this process might be more challenging in tighter contexts where expectations for norm 
following are strict and consequences for norm-breaking are severe.  
As expected, participants reported that Germany was a tighter context than the 
United States. We found through our path model that tightness, in turn, led to perceptions 
of closed-mindedness, specifically with respect to cultural diversity. These perceptions of 
closed-mindedness predicted less successful integration, which in turn predicted support 
for both readiness to self-sacrifice and support for a radical interpretation of Islam. There 
was an overall indirect effect of country through these mediators for the former outcome 
variable, and partial indirect effects for the latter.  
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These preliminary exploratory analyses reveal that cultural characteristics of the 
host society play a key role in radicalization processes, and investigating other such 
cultural characteristics will be an important direction for future research.  
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Chapter 7: Immigrant Marginalization and Exclusion in the Lab   
(Study 3) 
In Studies 1 and 2 we utilized Muslim community samples from different national 
contexts to explore the role of acculturation and exclusion experiences in attitudes toward 
the host culture and support for extremism. A key question is whether the phenomenon of 
immigrant radicalization is endemic to the Muslim community, or if marginalization and 
exclusion experiences can threaten significance loss and produce support for extremism 
amongst immigrants more broadly. In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 participants 
came from a diverse variety of heritage culture backgrounds, including from different 
religions.  
In addition to the shift in demographic focus, we made some changes in our 
methodological approach. Studies 1 and 2 were online surveys, and in Study 3 we 
brought participants into a more controlled setting in the lab. We collected data from 
participants on their acculturation orientations in advance during an online pre-test in 
order to have a more stable measure for predicting significance loss and support for 
radicalism.  
Moreover, participants’ exclusion experiences are likely qualitatively distinct and 
occur throughout different periods of time, and this is an issue we addressed in Study 3. 
We simulated exclusion experiences in the lab so that we could compare excluded 
participants against non-excluded participants. As in Studies 1 and 2, we expected 
marginalization to be related to greater significance loss, which would in turn predict 
greater support for extremism. We expected the relationship between marginalization and 
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significance loss to be particularly strong for participants who had undergone an 
exclusion manipulation, as compared to participants in the control condition. 
 Finally, we were also interested in what intervening processes might weaken the 
link between marginalization, exclusion and radicalism through significance loss that we 
observed in Studies 1 and 2. It is theorized that individuals pursue the quest for 
significance through extreme and potentially dangerous means when motivations for 
significance gain or restoration override other goals, such as goals pertaining to self-
preservation (Kruglanski et al., 2013). For instance, in acts of suicide terrorism, losing 
one’s life is outweighed by the gain of the status and recognition afforded by the heroic 
act of self-sacrifice for an important cause (Crenshaw, 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2009).  
However, there may be several ways to get these self-preservation motives back 
on track, and this has been addressed in the context of deradicalization. Reduction of 
support for radical causes can occur when individuals develop the belief that their quest 
for significance has already been filled, such as in the case of jihadists who feel as if they 
have already contributed enough to their cause and no longer need to continue working 
on behalf of the organization (Kruglanski et al., 2013). Another option is shifting 
attention to alternative self-preservation goals that do not require extreme and self-
sacrificial behavior (Kruglanski et al., 2013). For example, some terrorists who left the 
Basque organization ETA cited the desire to get married, do something else with their life, 
or see their family and children (Reinares, 2011; Kruglanski et al., 2013).  
For marginalized and excluded immigrants who feel a threat to their significance 
but have not yet become radicalized, a different tactic might be needed to direct attention 
toward less destructive outlets for significance restoration. The path toward significance 
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gain need not necessarily be one of violence. For example, some work found that Shiite 
Muslims in Iran whose significance was threatened by reminders of their mortality 
supported more aggressive anti-West attitudes. However, this hostility was reduced when 
individuals were primed with positive verses of the Koran (Rothschild, Abdollahi, and 
Pyszczynski, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2014). Therefore, we conceive that shifting the 
focus toward an alternative outlet for significance attainment might be an effective way 
to detract from the appeal of radical groups and ideologies.  
We decided to explore this idea in Study 3. We hypothesized that redirecting 
attention toward personal significance derived from other sources in one’s life (e.g., 
family, career goals, volunteerism) might reduce feelings of lost significance caused by 
marginalization and exclusion, and thereby attenuate support for radical groups and 
causes. To this end, we introduced a significance reminder manipulation wherein 
participants recalled and wrote about things that gave their life meaning. This 
manipulation was administered in conjunction with an exclusion manipulation, so that we 
could see if reminders of personal significance could attenuate the effects of exclusion. 
However, for reasons explained in what follows, we were not able to test this particular 
set of significance restoration hypotheses as planned. 
Participants, Design and Procedure 
Participants were 194 first- and second-generation students at the University of 
Maryland. We recruited participants through contacting various cultural organizations on 
campus as well as widespread flyer postings and e-mail announcements. Following 
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exclusions8, our final sample consisted of 139 participants (mean age = 21.41; 31 male, 
114 female). Of the participants, 68 reported being first-generation (mean length of time 
spent in the United States = 9.96 years), and 77 were second-generation. Participants 
represented a range of heritage culture backgrounds, including Asian (N = 85), African 
(N = 35), Latin American (N = 8), or other, including Middle Eastern, Eastern European 
or mixed heritage backgrounds (N = 17). Of the final sample, 48 participants were 
assigned to the control condition, 55 to the exclusion-only condition, and 42 to the 
exclusion + significance restoration condition. We had aimed to reach 40-50 participants 
per condition in order to achieve adequate statistical power.  
Pretest. First, participants completed an online eligibility survey and pre-test in 
which they indicated their generational status in the United States as well as their heritage 
culture background. They also completed acculturation orientation measures prior to 
being invited to participate in the lab study. Other distractor questions were included in 
order to detract from the focus on cultural identity. The purpose of administering this pre-
test at a separate time from the laboratory study was so that cultural identities would not 
be made too salient during the experimental procedure. 
Eligibility criteria. Participants had to meet several criteria in order to be invited 
for the lab study. First, prospective participants had to have been born outside the United 
States or their parents had to have been born in another country. Second, for those born in 
another country, we required that they have lived in the United States for at least six 
                                                
8 In some cases, technical problems prohibited us from matching the pretest data with the experiment data, 
and we could not analyze all of a participant’s data. There were also several participants who did not follow 
instructions during the experiment. Finally, we had initially invited a number of individuals to participate 
who had been in the United States for a very short period of time (less than six months). We ultimately 
decided that these individuals had not been in the country long enough to develop an American identity and 
removed them from the dataset. 
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months. The rationale for this decision is that students who have lived in another country 
for less than half a year have not had ample time to develop an American cultural identity. 
Finally, first- or second-generation students were not invited if the heritage country they 
listed belonged to Western Europe. This was because Western Europeans are afforded a 
higher status in the United States than are immigrants from other countries, and are often 
indistinguishable by physical appearance from white Americans, so we did not expect 
them to react to the exclusion manipulation in the same way as immigrants from other 
nationalities.  
Group activities study. Participants came to the lab and were told that they 
would participate in a study about how people from different groups interact with each 
other. They were told that they would break into groups with other participants, but in 
reality, there was no group exercise. Participants were given a condition-specific 
explanation as to why they were not selected into a group activity. Then, participants 
were told they would be assigned to an unrelated “Student Activism” study. Half of 
participants in the exclusion condition underwent an additional significance restoration 
manipulation and were then asked to complete a short writing task about things that give 
their life a sense of meaning. Participants in all conditions then completed the Need 
Threat Scale (Williams, 2009) that was administered in both Studies 1 and 2. They were 
then directed to the “Student Activism” study, in which they would be asked to give their 
opinions about different groups on campus. As a part of this task, they read a description 
of a hypothetical extremist group, which was slightly modified from Studies 1 and 2 such 
that it spoke to immigrants and minorities more broadly rather than just Muslims. Finally, 
 81 
participants completed additional extremism measures and, upon completion of the study, 
were fully debriefed regarding the purpose of the study and the exclusion manipulation.  
Experimental manipulations  
Exclusion manipulation. Our exclusion manipulation was based on an existing 
paradigm where a group of real participants engage in a “getting acquainted” 
conversation, and afterwards participants choose a group member with whom they would 
like to work with most (Nezlek et al., 1997; Williams, 2007). Later, participants receive 
feedback as to whether the other group members wanted to work with them (inclusion 
condition), or did not want to work with them (exclusion condition). Because all of our 
participants had recent immigrant backgrounds and were to be excluded by non-minority 
individuals, we could not assemble groups of actual participants for our manipulation. 
Therefore, we modified this paradigm by using a “getting to know you” worksheet 
featuring non-minority confederate profiles instead. 
Furthermore, we modified the design of the control condition so that it did not 
contain elements of inclusion, because we did not want to unintentionally induce 
significance gain through feelings of belongingness. Therefore, we designed the control 
condition to be as similar to the exclusion condition as possible, such that individuals 
across both conditions were unable to participate in a group activity, but only individuals 
in the exclusion condition were made to believe this was because they were personally 
excluded. The specifics of each condition are described in what follows. 
Exclusion condition. Participants were told that they along with the rest of the 
participants at the study appointment would organize into groups for a task. Participants 
in the exclusion condition in particular were told that that selection into groups would be 
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on the basis of individual preferences, such that the participant could indicate whom he or 
she would like to work with, and the other participants would be able to state the same 
preferences. Participants were alerted to the possibility that they could be assigned to an 
alternate activity if they were not chosen to be part of a group. 
After explaining the procedure, the experimenter handed out a “Group 
Introduction Worksheet” in which participants were asked to fill out questions about their 
hobbies and interests as well as their religion and ethnic background. The experimenter 
took an instant photo of each participant and affixed it to the worksheet. Participants in 
the exclusion condition were told that the profiles would be used to pick preferred group 
members. The experimenter took the completed profiles and pretended to make copies 
for the other participants. 
The experimenter returned a few minutes later with four profiles belonging to the 
other participants. These profiles were generated in advance to reflect a prototypical 
American college student. All of the students were white, and they came from Western 
European backgrounds. Each profile’s responses were based on a survey of actual 
University of Maryland students’ hobbies and interests. The profiles were piloted in 
advance to make sure that none seemed unlikeable or unrealistic, and that they were 
perceived to be distinct from the participants’ own heritage backgrounds. See Appendix 
FF for the profiles. 
Participants in the exclusion condition were instructed to look through the profiles 
and decide who they would like to work with the most. They were reminded that the 
other participants would also be looking at their own profiles to make their group 
member decisions. Then, participants were instructed to use the computer to enter the 
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online group assignment system. Participants in the exclusion condition first entered their 
top three choices for group members. Because there were four profiles, it was clear that 
only one profile would not be selected. After a short delay, during which time the other 
participants were ostensibly making their own group member preferences, the computer 
informed the participant that no one else had selected them as a group member. This 
message remained on the screen for 30 seconds before advancing to the instructions for 
the alternative study. 
Control condition. Participants were told at the beginning that they along with the 
other study participants would organize into groups for a task, and that group assignment 
would be done randomly over the computer. The experimenter explained that in some 
time slots, there were not enough participants to assign everyone to the group activity. In 
this case, some participants could be asked to participate in an alternative activity. 
Participants were alerted to the possibility that they could be assigned to an alternate 
activity if they were unable to be assigned to a group, and that this decision would be 
made at random. 
After explaining the procedure, the experimenter handed out the same “Group 
Introduction Worksheet” in which participants were asked to fill out questions about 
themselves. The experimenter took an instant photo of each participant and affixed it to 
the worksheet. Participants in the control condition were told that the profiles would be 
used during a “getting to know you” exercise after the group assignment. The 
experimenter took the completed profiles and pretended to make copies for the other 
participants. 
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The experimenter returned a few minutes later with the same four profiles 
belonging to the other participants that were given out to participants in the exclusion 
condition. Whereas participants in the exclusion condition were told that these profiles 
would be used for picking group members, participants in the control condition were told 
that they wouldn’t use the profiles until after the group assignment. The participants were 
then instructed to use the computer to enter the online group assignment system. In the 
control condition, participants were told that a randomization algorithm determined that 
they could not partake in the group task. They were told that every participant had an 
equal chance of being assigned to a group, and that this was not an outcome that should 
be taken personally. 
Thus, although all participants were ultimately unable to participate in the group 
activity, only participants in the exclusion condition were made to believe that they were 
explicitly rejected by students belonging to the mainstream culture.  
Significance restoration manipulation. An additional condition consisted of 
participants who underwent the exclusion manipulation as well as an additional 
significance restoration manipulation. Following the notification that participants were 
not chosen for the group activity, participants in the exclusion + significance restoration 
condition were asked to engage in a short writing exercise: “Please write for a few 
minutes about what gives your life a sense of meaning; significance; importance; 
purpose; a feeling that you matter. There may be multiple things that come to mind, and 
you can write about any or all of them. Describe why you feel these things give your life 
significance and how they make you feel.” Additional words such as “SIGNIFICANCE,” 
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“MEANING,” “PURPOSE,” and “IMPORTANCE” appeared in bold across the screen. 
Participants were able to proceed with the next part of the study after 5 minutes of writing.  
Manipulation checks. To assess the exclusion manipulation check, participants 
were asked whether or not they participated in a group exercise, and if not, they were 
asked to explain why. We also included the nine-item exclusion scale from Studies 1 and 
2, framed as being excluded by Americans more generally rather than non-Muslim 
Americans (Spivey, 1990; Rubin, Watt & Ramelli, 2012; α = .87). We expected that 
individuals in the exclusion-only condition should score higher on the scale than 
individuals in the control condition.  
The second factor of the Need Threat Scale (Williams, 2009), which contained 
eleven items such as “My self-esteem is high,” “I feel powerful,” and “I feel important,” 
was used to assess the effectiveness of the significance restoration manipulation. Please 
refer again to Appendix D for the factor loadings. 
Stimuli 
Marginalization and other acculturation orientations. We used the same items 
from the Immigrant Acculturation Scale (Bourhis & Barrette, 2006). However, due to 
concerns about length in the pretest, we only included one set of four items (one item per 
acculturation orientation) pertaining to cultural values. Additionally, we did not include 
the two additional marginalization items that had been created specifically for the Muslim 
sample in Studies 1 and 2, because participants from Study 3 came from a wide range of 
cultural and religious backgrounds. 
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Significance loss. Participants completed the same set of eight items from the 
Need Threat Scale (Williams, 2009) representing significance loss as in Studies 1 and 2 
(α = .87). 
Support for radicalism.  Study 3 included many of the same indicators of 
support for radicalism as in Studies 1 and 2, modified so that they were no longer 
oriented toward religious extremism.  
Readiness to self-sacrifice. Participants completed the same five top-loading 
items from the Support for Martyrdom Scale (e.g., “Under the right circumstances, I 
would sacrifice my life for an important cause”; Bélanger, 2013). These items were 
measured on a seven-point scale ranging from “Very Strongly Agree” to “Not Agree at 
All,” α = .88. 
Hypothetical group vignette. The vignette was adapted from Studies 1 and 2 such 
that the group’s cause was to avenge injustices toward immigrants and minorities in the 
United States, rather than solely Muslims. The name of the group was changed to 
“Minorities with Might.” See Appendix GG for the full text of the description.  
Participants completed the same twelve items about attraction to the group, 
willingness to act on behalf of the group, and support for their radical activities as in 
Studies 1 and 2, framed at descriptive norms level (α = .90). 
Willingness to engage in radical action9. Participants indicated how willing they 
would be engage in six different extreme behaviors, such as participating in a violent 
demonstration, blocking a road, or damaging other people’s property. Willingness to 
                                                
9 This scale was also administered in Studies 1 and 2, but the scale endpoints had been mistakenly flipped 
(1 = Definitely Yes, 5 = Definitely No). This led to confusion for many of the participants because the 
valence of the rest of the survey measures used higher scale numbers to reflect agreement with scale items, 
and resulted in inconsistent responding. Thus we were unable to analyze this measure in Studies 1 and 2.  
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participate in these behaviors was measured on a five-point scale (1 = Definitely Not, 5 = 
Definitely Yes; α = .82). 
Anti-American Sentiment10. Participants responded to twelve statements that 
expressed negative perceptions of the American government and society (Glick et al., 
2006). Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt these statements were 
characteristic of the United States on a five-point scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much; α 
= .88). Sample items include “The US has no concern for what is best for other nations,” 
“The US is responsible for problems in other nations,” and “The US believes that own 
way of life is superior to all others.” 
Results 
In what follows, we explain that the significance restoration manipulation did not 
appear to results in stronger perceptions of significance. Therefore, we were only able to 
test the part of the model pertaining to the role of exclusion, and not the role of 
significance restoration. Table 11 presents the scale means and standard deviations and 
Table 12 shows the correlations across study variables. 
Manipulation checks 
Exclusion. The measure of perceived exclusion revealed that participants in the 
exclusion-only condition did not actually feel more excluded than participants in the 
control condition (M = 2.59, SD = .85 and M = 2.33, SD = .89, respectively; t(101) = 
1.47, n.s.). Participants in the exclusion + significance restoration condition did, however, 
report feeling more excluded than those in the control condition (t(88) = 2.49, p = .015). 
We found that most participants who underwent an exclusion manipulation were able to 
                                                
10 This scale had also been administered in Studies 1 and 2, but we decided that some of the items were not 
appropriate for the German context and were left out of the survey. Therefore, we did not include that 
measure in our analyses. 
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correctly identify the reason that they were not able to participate in the group activity. In 
other words, people in both exclusion conditions (the exclusion only and exclusion + 
significance restoration conditions) identified that others had excluded them, whereas 
people in the control condition indicated that there were not enough people for the group 
exercise and the computer assigned them to another activity. Indeed, looking at the two 
exclusion conditions collapsed did reveal that individuals in both exclusion conditions 
combined felt more excluded than participants in the control condition (t(142) = 2.31, p 
= .022).  
Significance restoration. Paired comparisons revealed that excluded participants 
who underwent the significance restoration manipulation did not feel greater significance 
than excluded participants who had not undergone the significance gain manipulation (M 
= 3.46, SD = .67 and M = 3.55, SD = .60, respectively; t(95) = .73, n.s.).  
The significance gain manipulation did not appear to work, but participants in 
both exclusion conditions combined reported feeling more excluded than participants in 
the control condition. Therefore, we decided to collapse the two exclusion conditions in 
our subsequent analyses. This allowed us to explore our hypotheses about the role of 
actual exclusion, but meant that we were unable to test the significance restoration 
hypothesis as planned.  
Moderated mediation. We conducted the same moderated mediation analyses as 
in Studies 1 and 2, substituting condition for perceived exclusion. One dummy variable 
for condition was included such that the exclusion-only and exclusion + significance gain 
conditions were combined and compared against the control condition as the reference 
group. Both exclusion conditions were coded as 1, and the control condition was coded as 
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0. Marginalization was entered as the independent variable and was mean-centered prior 
to analyses. Separation, assimilation and integration scores were included as controls in 
both paths leading to and from the mediator. We ran the analyses with 5000 bootstrap 
samples to generate 95% confidence intervals for the conditional indirect effect. The 
indirect effect for each of the analyses can be interpreted as the effect of marginalization 
on the dependent variable through significance loss for the exclusion conditions relative 
to the control group. 
Readiness to self-sacrifice. First, we looked at significance loss as an outcome. 
There was a positive main effect for marginalization on significance loss (B = .12, SE 
= .05; p = .01) There was a marginally positive effect of condition on significance loss, 
meaning that individuals in the exclusion conditions experienced more significance loss 
than those in the control condition (B = .10, SE = .06; p = .09). Thus, we found support 
for our hypothesis that marginalization would be related to greater feelings of 
significance loss, and marginal support for our hypothesis that exclusion would be related 
to greater feelings of significance loss. Condition did not interact with marginalization to 
predict significance loss (B = -.01, SE = .05; n.s), so we did not find support for our 
hypothesis that marginalization would be associated with greater feelings of significance 
loss under conditions of exclusion. None of the other acculturation orientations 
influenced significance loss.  
Next, we looked at significance loss as a predictor of readiness to self-sacrifice. 
Significance loss did not directly predict readiness to self-sacrifice (B = .09, SE = .19, 
n.s.). Therefore, we did not find support for our hypothesis that feelings of significance 
loss would predict greater support for radicalism. There were no direct or indirect effects 
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of marginalization, and none of the other acculturation orientations predicted readiness to 
self-sacrifice. Table 13 presents the complete set of results.  
Willingness to engage in a radical act.  The path to significance loss was 
identical to that of the analyses for readiness to self-sacrifice, such that marginalization 
predicted feelings of significance loss, exclusion condition marginally predicted feelings 
of significance loss, and there was no interaction between marginalization and condition.  
Next, we looked at significance loss as a predictor of willingness to engage in a 
radical act. Significance loss did predict willingness to engage in a radical act (B = .25, 
SE = .09, p = .006). Therefore, we found support for our hypothesis that feelings of 
significance loss would predict greater support for radicalism. Marginalization emerged 
as a marginally significant predictor of willingness to engage in a radical act (B = .09, SE 
= .05, p = .07), and assimilation was a protective factor (B = -.14, SE = .06, p = .02). 
Unexpectedly, integration was marginally associated with greater willingness to engage 
in a radical act (B = .11, SE = .06, p = .07).  
In line with our finding that marginalization did not interact with condition to 
predict significance loss, the confidence intervals suggested that there was not a 
conditional indirect effect of marginalization on willingness to engage in a radical act 
through significance loss under conditions of exclusion. Table 14 presents the complete 
set of results. 
Support for radical groups. The path to significance loss was identical to that of 
the previous analyses, such that marginalization predicted feelings of significance loss, 
exclusion condition marginally predicted feelings of significance loss, and there was no 
interaction between marginalization and condition.  
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Next, we looked at significance loss as a predictor of support for radical groups.  
Significance loss did not predict support for the group (B = .21, SE = .14, n.s.). Therefore, 
we did not find support for our hypothesis that feelings of significance loss would predict 
greater support for radicalism. There were no direct effects of marginalization, nor 
indirect effects through significance loss. The only significant predictor of support for the 
group was integration as a protective factor (B = -.27, SE = .10; p = .007). Table 15 
presents the complete set of results.  
Anti-American sentiment. The path to significance loss was identical to that of 
the previous analyses, such that marginalization predicted feelings of significance loss, 
exclusion condition marginally predicted feelings of significance loss, and there was no 
interaction between marginalization and condition.  
Next, we looked at significance loss as a predictor of anti-American sentiment. 
Significance loss did predict anti-American sentiment (B = .41, SE = .10, p < .001). 
Therefore, we found support for our hypothesis that feelings of significance loss would 
predict greater support for radicalism. There were no remaining direct effects for 
marginalization or any of the other acculturation orientations.  
In line with our finding that marginalization did not interact with condition to 
predict significance loss, the confidence intervals suggested that there was not a 
conditional indirect effect of marginalization on support for radical groups through 
significance loss under conditions of exclusion. Table 16 presents the complete set of 
results. 
Mediation analyses. Because we found that marginalization predicted 
significance loss, and significance loss predicted both willingness to engage in a radical 
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act and anti-American sentiment, we decided to explore simple mediation models for 
each of these two variables, leaving out the variable of exclusion. We conducted the 
analyses using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2012) with marginalization as the 
independent variable, significance loss as the mediator, and willingness to engage in a 
radical act and anti-American sentiment as the outcome variables, respectively. 
Separation, assimilation and integration orientation scores were included as covariates in 
both paths. We ran the analyses with 5000 bootstrap samples to generate 95% confidence 
intervals for the indirect effect.  
Willingness to engage in a radical act. In the first step of the mediation model, 
marginalization predicted significance loss (B = .12, SE = .05, p = .01). In turn, 
significance loss predicted willingness to engage in a radical act (B = .25, SE = .09, p 
= .006). The confidence intervals suggested an indirect effect of marginalization on 
willingness to engage in a radical act through significance loss (B = .03, SE = .02; 95% 
CI [.003, .09]). The total effect of marginalization had been significant (B = .12, SE 
= .05; p = .02), but when including significance loss as a mediator only a marginal direct 
effect remained (B = .09, SE = .05; p = .07).  
With respect to the covariates, none of the other variables were related to 
significance loss. Assimilation was negatively related to willingness to engage in a 
radical act (B = -.14, SE = .06, p = .02) and integration was marginally positively related 
(B = .11, SE = .06, p = .08). Appendix HH presents the results, and Figure 12 below 
displays a visual depiction of the mediation model. 
 93 
 
Figure 12. Mediation model for marginalization, significance loss, and willingness to engage in a 
radical act in Study 3. 
Anti-American sentiment. In the first step of the mediation model, 
marginalization predicted significance loss (B = .12, SE = .05, p = .01). In turn, 
significance loss predicted anti-American sentiment (B = .41, SE = .10, p < .001). The 
confidence intervals suggested an indirect effect of marginalization on anti-American 
sentiment (B = .05, SE = .03; 95% CI [.007, .11]). The total and direct effects of 
marginalization were not significant (B = .07, SE = .06; n.s., and B = .02, SE = .06; n.s., 
respectively.  
With respect to the covariates, none of the other variables were related to 
significance loss or anti-American sentiment. Appendix II presents the results, and Figure 
13 below displays a visual depiction of the mediation model. 
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Figure 13. Mediation model for marginalization, significance loss, and anti-American sentiment in 
Study 3. 
Study 3 Summary 
 Because the issues pertaining to the effectiveness of our manipulations, we were 
unable to test the theory as originally intended. We had planned to compare the 
exclusion-only condition to the control condition to explore the role of exclusion, and 
compare the exclusion + significance restoration condition to the exclusion-only 
condition to explore the role of significance restoration. Instead, we ended up combining 
both exclusion conditions in order to conduct our analyses on the effect of exclusion and 
could not examine significance gain in this study. 
Despite these issues, there were a number of interesting findings in Study 3. First, 
we found that marginalization was related to greater significance loss, as had been 
predicted. Additionally, participants who were excluded experienced significance loss to 
a marginally greater extent than participants in the control condition. However, unlike in 
Studies 1 and 2, marginalization and exclusion did not interact to predict exclusion. This 
aspect of the findings was inconsistent with our predictions. One explanation for this lack 
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of replication could be that the exclusion manipulation was not strong enough relative to 
the control condition. We will elaborate on this issue in greater detail in the general 
discussion. 
Next, significance loss was related to two indicators of radicalism: willingness to 
engage in a radical act, and anti-American sentiment. Follow-up mediation analyses 
revealed an indirect effect of marginalization on each of these variables through 
significance loss. Thus, marginalization appeared to increase support for radicalism, to 
the extent that it resulted in significance loss. Yet, it is important to note that significance 
loss did not predict two of our indicators of radicalism that it had predicted in Study 1 
(readiness to self-sacrifice and support for radical groups).  
In sum, we found partial replication of the theory in a non-Muslim immigrant 
sample. This indicates that the path from marginalization to radicalism through 
significance loss is not limited to the phenomenon of Islamist extremism. Rather, all 
immigrants struggling with the maintenance of multiple identities are at risk of 
experiencing significance loss, which has downstream consequences for radicalization. 
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Chapter 8: General Discussion 
“Islam told me God is One and the Prophet is his messenger. Adhere to 
the five pillars and all will be well. But we were living in a non-Muslim country. 
But I wasn’t Dutch, nor was I secular. I had to find a way to reconcile my 
religious background with a secular world. I felt orphaned.  
And resolving that dilemma is much harder in a secular society that seems 
to have stopped struggling with these big questions altogether.” 
–Abdelkader Benali, “From Teenage Angst to Jihad: The Anger of Europe’s 
Young Marginalized Muslims,” The New York Times, January 13, 2015 
There is a crucial need to better understand the puzzle of how and why some 
immigrants become radicalized, and this is becoming increasingly important in the 
Western world. Some counterterrorism experts have postulated a link between 
radicalization and identity struggles (Trianni & Katz, 2014; Benac & Riechmann, 2014), 
and our research provides some of the first data in support of this relationship. Our study 
of the link between identity processes, exclusion and radicalization through significance 
loss comes during a critical time in the world where we are simultaneously seeing an 
increased threat of homegrown acts and increased public displays of anti-Islamic 
sentiment. In a single week during the time this manuscript was being written, anti-
Islamic rallies were held in large cities throughout Germany while homegrown attacks in 
the name of Islam were orchestrated in France. Homegrown acts such as the Charlie 
Hebdo shooting in Paris engender discriminatory attitudes toward Muslims as a general 
group, and these discriminatory attitudes in turn fortify the view among European 
Muslims that Muslims are not accepted in the West. Thus, it is more important than ever 
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to address how acculturation and exclusion experiences can influence radicalization 
processes among immigrants. 
Summary of Findings 
In Study 1, marginalized immigrants in the United States were at a greater risk for 
significance loss, which in turn was related to increased support for radical groups and 
ideologies. This provided support for our hypothesis that significance loss would act as 
the mechanism for increasing risk for radicalization among marginalized immigrants. 
Moreover, we found that experiences of exclusion exacerbated the relationship between 
marginalization and significance loss. This interaction between marginalization and 
exclusion on significance loss was replicated among Muslims in Germany in Study 2, 
suggesting that this relationship is not unique to American Muslims. In Study 2, 
significance loss predicted support for a radical interpretation of Islam. Although the 
model did not replicate across all of our dependent variables, we did find some evidence 
that our theory applies beyond the American context. In Study 3, we found once again 
that marginalization was related to significance loss, and significance loss predicted 
willingness to engage in a radical act and anti-American sentiment. We also found a 
marginal effect of the exclusion manipulation on significance loss, but this did not 
interact with marginalization. 
The main effect of marginalization on significance loss across all three studies is 
an important finding for significance loss theory (Kruglanski et al., 2009) and 
acculturation research. Previous work has linked marginalization to mental health 
problems and poor sociocultural adjustment (Berry, 1997; Neto, 1994; Berry & Sam, 
1997; van Oudenhoven, 2006), and we have now demonstrated that marginalization is 
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also related to psychological threats to self-worth. This is consistent with our 
expectations that marginalized immigrants lack the sense of belongingness and certainty 
that is afforded by group-membership and contributes to a positive self-concept (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), and this cultural homelessness emerges as a source of 
significance loss. 
The interaction between marginalization and exclusion on significance loss 
highlights how external “shocks” to significance can put marginalized immigrants at even 
greater risk for significance loss. It was important to then test whether exclusion 
interacted with other acculturation orientations to predict significance loss, or if this was 
a phenomenon specific to marginalization. When we explored interactions between 
exclusion and other acculturation orientations, we found that exclusion was also more 
damaging for American Muslims who were less integrated. In a way, this fits with our 
conceptualization of exclusion increasing significance loss among marginalized 
immigrants, because integration lies on the opposite end of the continuum as 
marginalization. We did not find exclusion to interact with assimilation or separation in 
the American sample, suggesting that assimilated and separated individuals are at not any 
extra risk for the negative psychological effects of exclusion. In Germany, however, we 
did find exclusion to interact with separation, a finding that we will discuss in greater 
detail in what follows. 
We also found support for our hypothesis that exclusion would be directly related 
to feelings of significance loss, even when controlling for other acculturation orientations. 
Exclusion predicted significance loss in both of the survey studies, and to a marginal 
extent in the lab. The relationship between exclusion and significance loss makes sense, 
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given the literature linking exclusion to lowered self-esteem, control, and the perception 
of a meaningful existence, among other psychological threats (Williams, 2007; Williams 
et al., 2000). The fact that we still found this relationship in the context of other variables 
in our model suggests other acculturation orientations involving at least one positive 
cultural identity do not necessarily buffer against the effects of exclusion. Exclusion 
appears to produce significance loss for all immigrants, regardless of acculturation 
orientation.  
We observed some other differences between the American and German survey 
samples in our exploratory analyses. First of all, although there were no differences 
between the samples on marginalization, separation, or assimilation, American Muslims 
reported feeling more integrated than German Muslims. Given the knowledge that 
integration is associated with the best psychological and sociocultural outcomes for 
immigrants (Berry & Sam, 1997; Berry, 2006a; Schmitz, 1992; Yoon et al., 2013), this is 
a finding of some concern. Especially taking into account our previous discussion of the 
relationship between separation and radicalism, it appears that German Muslims have a 
particularly difficult time successfully integrating into society. Indeed, they also reported 
experiencing more exclusion and greater significance loss than the American sample. 
Yet, a finding of even more concern is that the German sample demonstrated 
readiness to self-sacrifice and support for a radical interpretation of Islam to a greater 
extent than the American sample. We drew from the cultural psychological literature to 
explore the role of cultural tightness in creating difficult conditions for integration, and 
see how these factors might explain the differences we observed in support for radicalism. 
Tightness has been associated with negative attitudes toward migrant workers (Gelfand et 
 100 
al., 2011), and has also been linked to greater incidence of terrorist attacks (Gelfand, 
LaFree, Fahey & Feinberg, 2013), but this cultural dimension had not yet been applied to 
the study of acculturation and radicalization. Because Germany is known to be tighter 
than the United States (Gelfand et al., 2011), a finding that we confirmed in our own data, 
it seemed plausible that tightness could play a role in explaining this cross-country 
difference. 
We conducted a path model where we showed that perceptions of tightness in the 
host country were directly related to the perception that the host society is not accepting 
of cultural diversity. This, in turn, predicted lower integration, which was related to 
greater support for a radical interpretation of Islam and readiness to self-sacrifice in the 
combined two-country sample. Our path model demonstrated that these three mediators 
operated in serial to explain some of the difference between the United States and 
Germany on the radicalism variables. Thus, these results provide some indication that 
tight societies may be particularly vulnerable to the radicalization of immigrants within 
their borders if they are unable to successfully integrate. Understanding how the path to 
radicalization differs for immigrants in different countries is a crucial component of our 
overall understanding of homegrown radicalization, and is one important direction for 
future research.  
We then moved to the laboratory in Study 3. Despite problems with the strength 
of the control condition, we did find some evidence in support of the hypothesized model 
in a non-Muslim immigrant sample, which was the main strength of the study. 
Marginalization and perceived exclusion were both, to varying extents, related to 
significance loss, which in turn predicted willingness to engage in radical acts and anti-
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American sentiment. Therefore, we can conclude that radicalization through identity 
process-induced significance loss is not solely a threat in the population of Muslim 
immigrants, and can apply to immigrants more broadly. We did not find that exclusion 
exacerbated the relationship between marginalization and significance loss, as we had in 
Studies 1 and 2, but this could be attributed to the weakness of the exclusion 
manipulation relative to the control condition, an issue that we will address in the 
discussion of methodological limitations. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
As with any research, we must consider problems with our methodology as well 
as issues regarding the theory itself. With respect to methodological limitations, we focus 
on the cross-sectional design of the survey studies (Studies 1 and 2) and the failed 
manipulations in the laboratory study (Study 3). We then go on to consider the meaning 
of acculturation as it was measured in our studies, the independence of the 
marginalization, exclusion and significance loss constructs in our model, and the extent to 
which our results can be applied generally to the understanding of radicalization 
processes. We address the benefits and drawbacks of our approaches, and possible 
directions that could be taken in the future to address these issues. 
Methodological limitations 
Cross-sectional design. First, the cross-sectional design of Studies 1 and 2 made 
it difficult to draw causal conclusions about the relationship between marginalization, 
exclusion, significance loss and radicalization. The decision to administer the survey at 
one time point only was to maximize anonymity for participants given the sensitive 
nature of the questions. It is possible to make a reverse-causation argument, such that 
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individuals who display radical tendencies find themselves distanced from their host and 
heritage cultural groups, and excluded by the mainstream society. For example, we 
cannot be sure whether separation caused significance loss and support for radical groups 
and ideologies among Germans in Study 2, or whether adoption of a radical mindset and 
significance loss associated with the Muslim community’s grievances increased 
identification with the heritage culture. A natural extension of this work would be to 
replicate the survey studies using longitudinal design.  
Experimental manipulations. The most problematic methodological limitation 
was the failed manipulations in Study 3. We found no evidence that the significance gain 
manipulation worked, and the strength of the control condition compromised our 
exclusion manipulation. This prevented us from drawing causal conclusions about 
significance restoration, and to some extent, exclusion. We were able to collapse the two 
exclusion conditions to make comparisons against the control group, but it was 
problematic that we did not find differences in perceived exclusion between the 
exclusion-only condition and control condition. 
The exclusion manipulation was based on previous work that involved individuals 
being excluded from a group task (Williams, 2007; Nezlek et al., 1997). Many 
participants in the exclusion condition, when asked why they did not participate in the 
group activity, wrote that they assumed they were excluded due to their minority racial or 
ethnic status, suggesting that the manipulation was not lost on them. Thus, the failure of 
the exclusion manipulation can most likely be attributed to the strength of the control 
condition rather than the weakness of the exclusion manipulation. We tried to isolate the 
role of intentional exclusion by designing the control and exclusion conditions to be as 
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similar as possible, save for the reason of being left out of the group activity. However, 
participants in the control condition did get excluded from the activity in the end. It 
appears that participants in the control condition may have also been upset, even though 
we went to great lengths to emphasize that the assignment to the alternative non-group 
activity was made purely at random. The exclusion literature has shown that people feel 
upset even when they are excluded by computers or from groups to which they do not 
want to belong (Zadro, Williams & Richardson, 2004; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007), 
and exclusion by means of a random algorithm appears to be no exception. It could be 
described by the so-called “fear of missing out” (Przybylski, Murayama, DeHaan, & 
Gladwell, 2013), such that even participants in the control condition were upset by not 
being able to take part in the Group Activities exercise. In the future, we would suggest to 
researchers attempting to replicate these conditions that the control procedure be 
designed so as to not contain any elements of exclusion. 
The reason behind why the significance gain manipulation did not work is less 
straightforward. First of all, the significance gain condition was only introduced in one of 
the exclusion conditions and not in a control condition, so it is difficult to know how the 
significance gain prime would have worked independently of the exclusion manipulation. 
An additional significance gain-only condition would have helped answer this question. 
Puzzlingly, our exclusion manipulation check revealed that participants in the exclusion-
only condition did not feel more excluded than participants in the control condition, but 
participants in the exclusion condition that contained a significance restoration prime did 
feel more excluded than those in the control condition. This suggests that, if anything, 
individuals in the exclusion + significance restoration condition might have felt more 
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excluded than in the exclusion-only condition. Therefore, we cannot simply say that the 
exclusion and significance gain manipulations canceled each other out. Rather, it is 
possible that having the significance restoration prime directly juxtaposed with the 
exclusion experience made participants feel simultaneously rejected but also empowered 
to seek revenge. This is perhaps a more dangerous combination than feeling threatened 
alone, and warrants further inquiry as to whether and how significance gain can buffer 
against the appeal of radical groups and causes. This is a question we will address at 
greater length in our discussion of future research directions. 
Theoretical issues 
Measurement of acculturation orientations. The measurement of acculturation 
orientations is both a theoretical and a methodological issue. There is an extensive 
literature on the benefits and drawbacks of the different approaches used to measure 
acculturation (for a review, see Berry 2006c, or Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2006), 
such as looking at acculturation categorically (i.e., discrete orientations) or continuously 
(i.e., seeing heritage and host identification as a fluid range). We included multiple 
measures and they each had a differential ability to predict the other variables in our 
model. We included one set of scales in which the heritage and host culture identification 
were measured separately (Hogg & Hains, 1996; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hogg et 
al., 2007), so that we could categorize individuals as belonging to different acculturation 
orientations according to where they scored relative to the midpoint of the scale. We also 
had the option to analyze these host and heritage culture identity scales as representing 
assimilation and separation, respectively, and create an interaction term to represent 
integration and marginalization. However, this measure was unable to be used because of 
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ceiling effects, meaning most participants reported identifying fairly strongly with both 
their heritage and host cultures.  
As explained in the methods sections, we decided to utilize the method of 
assessing each acculturation orientation independently. This measure was strongly 
predictive, but it also has some limitations. For example, some of the items from the 
Immigrant Acculturation Scale could be seen as double-barreled (e.g., “I do not wish to 
maintain my heritage culture customs or adopt American customs as I feel uncomfortable 
with both types of customs”). Another problem with this approach is that it is possible for 
an individual to receive high scores on orientations that contradict with one another. Our 
solution to this problem was to include all orientation strategies in the model, so as to 
control for the unique role of marginalization as compared to scores on the other 
acculturation orientations. In the end, this method allowed us to have more confidence in 
our measure of marginalization than we would have had if we had gone with the two-
dimensional approach. We would still recommend that future research test this theory 
using various indicators of acculturation orientations, and with larger samples that could 
accommodate the expected smaller proportion of marginalized immigrants using the two-
dimensional mid-point split approach. 
A final point to address with respect to our marginalization measure is that we 
included items pertaining to both the heritage country identity and the Muslim identity. 
Our interview responses indicated that the Muslim identity is often considered to be more 
important than the heritage country identity, and at the very least, much of one’s heritage 
country identity is likely to be derived from one’s identity as a Muslim. As such, it is 
difficult to disentangle religious and national identities in this sample. We attempted to 
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address this issue in our marginalization measure by including items pertaining to both, 
but we did not have equivalent items pertaining to the Muslim identity to fit with the 
integration, assimilation, or separation orientations. On top of that, the reliability of our 
combined four-item marginalization measure was not especially high, particularly in the 
German sample. Nevertheless, this suggests we had a conservative test of the theory. 
Construct independence. Second, there is room for debate as to whether the 
constructs of marginalization, exclusion, and significance loss are completely 
independent from each other.  We do see connections between the constructs of 
marginalization and exclusion, but maintain that they play separate, significant roles in 
our theorized model. To be sure of this assumption, we conducted factor analyses on the 
combined American and German survey samples, which suggested that participants did 
in fact distinguish between these constructs (see Appendix E). It is certainly possible that, 
to some extent, experiences of exclusion from both the host and heritage cultures cause 
marginalization. Indeed, there was a small correlation between marginalization and 
exclusion in the American sample, although notably none in Germany. Yet, we surmise 
that there are additional pathways to marginalization. After all, many immigrants 
experience exclusion but most do not report feeling marginalized. Likewise, some 
immigrants may become marginalized without having been excluded. For example, an 
individual might become marginalized if his parents did not uphold language and cultural 
customs at home, and on top of that was not completely socialized into the customs and 
traditions of the mainstream society.  
Additionally, we maintain that exclusion is independent from the construct of 
significance loss. Although several items from the significance loss scale reflected 
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experiences of exclusion (e.g., “I feel rejected” or “I feel like an outsider”), we see 
significance loss as an internalization of experiences such as exclusion that result in a 
threatened sense of self-worth. Our exclusion items specifically spoke to social situations 
involving members of the mainstream culture rather than a personal sense of significance 
(e.g., “If I want to socialize with my non-Muslim American friends, I am generally the 
one who must seek them out”). Although the literature has demonstrated the damaging 
consequences of exclusion as a whole, we suggest that people internalize these 
experiences to different extents, namely that individuals with a sense of security in their 
cultural group memberships are less likely to let these experiences shape their sense of 
self-worth.  
Limits of the results for explaining terrorism. In addition to the aforementioned 
constructs, it is necessary to critically evaluate our measures of radicalism and address 
the extent to which they can predict actual radical behavior. For practical reasons, it was 
impossible to measure actual extremism. However, there is debate as to the extent that 
attitudes lead to real action (Wicker, 1969; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Presumably many 
individuals bear grievances against their host societies without ever engaging in radical 
activity. Our results should not be taken to mean that individuals who are marginalized or 
excluded and experience significance loss will eventually join a radical movement.  
We should also emphasize that our theory provides just one framework for 
understanding the risk for radicalization. We are exploring one aspect of the complicated 
network of factors that influence adoption of radical beliefs and tendencies. There are 
many other factors that are likely to increase or lessen the appeal of radical organizations 
among immigrants, including life circumstances outside the realm of cultural identity. 
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For example, case studies of homegrown terrorists have highlighted crises such as the 
death of parents or financial hardships as catalysts (Kruglanski et al., 2009; Post, 
McGinnis, & Moody, 2014), events that can be categorized as significance loss but are in 
no uncertain terms related to identity processes. 
Moreover, there has been debate among terrorism researchers as to whether 
adopting a radical ideology is a necessary prerequisite to joining a radical movement 
(Sageman, 2004, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2014), but we included adoption of a radical 
ideology alongside other indicators of radicalism rather than as a precondition. It would 
be naïve to suggest that ideological beliefs always play a secondary role to identity 
processes in the path to radicalization. Indeed, some individuals are likely drawn to 
radical groups primarily because they already share the same ideology. We would simply 
propose that, in some cases, particularly among immigrants who are struggling to find 
their identity, individuals are motivated by psychological needs for personal significance 
and belongingness and rather than because of the ideology itself. Future longitudinal 
research could assess whether support for a radical ideology is developed before or after 
the initial stages of attraction to radical groups and causes among immigrants. 
A final issue is the extent to which our measures captured different aspects of 
radicalization, and whether we can make claims about the predictive power of our model 
knowing that it did not work for all of our indicators of radicalism. We decided to assess 
the attractiveness of group belongingness through our inclusion of the hypothetical group 
scenario, the appeal of a radical ideology through measuring a radical interpretation of 
Islam and anti-American sentiment, and the behavioral component of extremism through 
our measures of readiness to self-sacrifice and engage in radical activity. We found 
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support for our hypothesized model across all three indicators of radicalism in the 
American sample in Study 1, although only for one indicator (radical interpretation of 
Islam) in the German sample in Study 2. In the laboratory study with the non-Muslim 
immigrant sample, significance loss was only related to anti-American sentiment and 
willingness to engage in radical action. Therefore, we found evidence for our theory with 
respect to some indicators of radicalism and not others, differing across cultural contexts.  
Moreover, one could argue that some of our measures did not actually measure 
radicalization. For instance, the Self-Sacrifice Scale (Bélanger et al., 2014) covers broad 
ground and is not a direct measure of terrorist behavior. The more extreme items pertain 
to risking one’s life or enduring intense suffering for a cause, but the other items are 
about giving up material possessions and comforts, and are devoid of a specific context. 
“For a cause” could mean a number of things, ranging from defending one’s religion to 
fighting for civil rights. Readiness to self-sacrifice should not be conflated with 
willingness to commit a suicide attack. However, the scale has been used and validated in 
the context of terrorism research (Bélanger et al., 2014), hence its inclusion in our studies.  
One could continue about how the hypothetical radical group task was not the 
same as joining a radical group, the radical interpretation of Islam scale was not the same 
as committing to acts of jihad, and so on. The decision to include each of these measures 
involved a choice between being too direct and alienating participants, or using proxies 
for radical behavior that do not constitute radicalism in and of themselves. Future 
research should look more closely as to how identity processes and significance loss 
relate to different individual facets of radicalism, and whether it is possible to examine 
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our theory with other indicators of radicalism or even actual extremist-related activity 
(e.g., donating to organizations known to support terrorist groups).   
Future Directions 
As discussed in the limitations sections, there are a number of directions that 
could be taken to improve upon certain weaknesses in this research. Likewise, there are a 
number of future research directions that could be taken to enhance our understanding of 
the relationship between identity processes, significance loss and radicalization. We 
discuss the benefits of expanding this research to include greater representation of various 
heritage culture and host countries across a longer period of time, focus on the role of 
other acculturation orientations, and perform a more in depth investigation of factors such 
as significance restoration that could attenuate support for radicalism.  
Temporal and cultural expansion. First of all, replicating the survey studies with 
a longitudinal design could help us address questions about the causal role of 
acculturation orientations in significance loss and support for radicalism, particularly 
with respect to separation. Apart from our interest in the risk factors for radicalization, 
longitudinal work would help psychologists better understand acculturation processes in 
general. Acculturation is thought to be a dynamic process and not a static variable that 
can be reliably measured at a single time-point (Berry, 2006c). Longitudinal design 
would allow us to see not only how acculturation orientations influence significance loss 
and radicalization over time, but also how social context factors such as acculturation 
expectations, exclusion and discrimination, and other significance loss events affect 
identity processes. 
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In the future, we would also aim to reach larger samples with a stronger 
representation of various heritage culture groups. We were able to recruit substantial 
numbers of Pakistani Americans and Turkish Germans, but other heritage culture 
communities were underrepresented. We were unable to make comparisons between 
heritage culture groups within and across each of our country samples. Part of the reason 
we did not focus explicitly on one heritage culture group is that we were interested in 
seeing how identity processes influence significance loss among immigrants more 
broadly, and we would not have been able to generalize our findings had we limited 
ourselves to one heritage country background. Yet, there are in fact differences between 
heritage country backgrounds, both with respect to political, historical and cultural 
differences as well as unique social experiences in the context of their host communities.  
Additionally, it is important to study additional host society contexts beyond the 
United States and Germany. To this end, we are already in the process of conducting the 
survey in the Netherlands, a country with a large Moroccan Muslim community that 
provides another European context but is lower on tightness than Germany (Gelfand et al., 
2011). It is a particularly important population to study at this point in history, as tensions 
between the Muslim migrant minority and the mainstream Dutch society are at an all-
time high. The outspoken leader of the anti-Islam Freedom Party, Geert Wilders, has 
been openly promoting an anti-immigrant agenda while widespread Islamophobia has 
permeated the general public (Lageman, 2014). In the meantime, there is a growing 
concern about the potential for Dutch Muslims to join organizations such as the Islamic 
State abroad. In the future, we plan to compare this sample against our existing American 
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and German samples to further explore the role of cultural tightness-looseness as it 
pertains to identity processes and attitudes toward radicalism.  
Attention to the role of separation and other acculturation orientations. 
Marginalization was the focus of the present research, but other acculturation orientations 
deserve further attention in the context of immigrant radicalization. We would especially 
propose that it is important to expand on the unanticipated finding that separation was a 
key driver of significance loss and support for radicalism in Germany in Study 2. We 
discussed the reverse-causality explanation earlier, in that individuals who were already 
becoming radicalized could have developed a stronger attachment to their heritage 
culture by the time the survey was administered. However, we dismissed this reasoning 
because we did not observe this relationship in the United States (with the exception of 
the relationship between separation and support for a radical interpretation of Islam). We 
will elaborate on possible factors that may have contributed to this finding, and suggest 
how these ideas could be addressed in future research.  
In Germany, the sample was majority Turkish. There is a large body of research 
on the acculturation patterns of German Turks, and some researchers believe that they are 
an exceptional immigrant group in terms of their preference for separation over 
integration (Kunst & Sam, 2013). However, we did not actually find the German sample 
to express stronger adherence to the separation orientation than the American sample. 
Overall, integration was the most preferred orientation in both samples. Nonetheless, it 
appears as though separated immigrants in Germany are at a greater risk for 
radicalization than separated immigrants in the United States. Therefore, it could be a 
specific pathway to separation in the German sample that creates the greatest conditions 
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for risk. Addressing how the same acculturation orientation functions differently across 
cultural contexts is a key direction for future research.  
Societal expectations for acculturation both among immigrant peers and the 
mainstream society could play some part in the development of a separation orientation. 
Recent research has found that expectations for separation among immigrant peers can 
produce both separation and assimilation orientations, suggesting that normative pressure 
to acculturate in a specific way can result in both accordant and discordant acculturative 
responses (Kunst & Sam, 2013). Peer expectations for separation among Muslim youth in 
Europe (including 301 German Turks) were related to greater endorsement of the 
separation orientation, acculturative stress, and indirectly related to lower self-esteem and 
sociocultural adjustment. The same research theorized potential discordant responses to 
the mainstream society’s expectations for acculturation; backlash against the pressure to 
assimilate can actually produce stronger endorsement of the separation orientation. We 
collected information on the perceived acculturation attitudes of the host society, so we 
were able to test this theory. The expectation that Germans preferred immigrants to 
assimilate was not correlated with endorsement of the separation orientation in our data, 
but it was negatively correlated with endorsement of both the assimilation and integration 
orientations. Therefore, it does appear as though the more Germans pressure immigrants 
to assimilate, the less the immigrants want to become a part of German culture. Our 
research was not about host culture expectations for acculturation per se, but this is a 
theme that certain warrants inclusion in future research on the relationship between 
acculturation and radicalization. 
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A final non-psychological explanation could be that political conditions in Turkey 
were related to support for radicalization among immigrants who maintained strong ties 
to their heritage culture. Political scientists have noted that Turkey’s political structure, 
which tolerates civic activism to a greater extent than its neighboring countries, has 
unintentionally created a space for radical Islamists to organize and promote their agenda 
without experiencing legal consequences (Tezcur & Cifci, 2014). Although we are unable 
to test this hypothesis in our present set of studies, future work could compare samples of 
Turkish immigrants in Germany against Turkish immigrants in other countries or against 
a larger subset of another Muslim immigrant population (e.g., Pakistani) within Germany. 
Protective factors against radicalization. Although the two survey studies helped 
us better understand the relationship between acculturation and radicalization through 
mediating and moderating processes, we stand to learn much more about the role of 
alternative sources of significance gain as a protective factor for immigrants. This was 
our objective for Study 3, and as was already discussed, we were unable to test the role of 
significance restoration due to problems with the manipulation. Yet, this is an extremely 
important issue for understanding if and how radicalization processes can be reversed. 
Reminders of social connectedness can attenuate the negative effects of exclusion 
(Twenge et al., 2007), and researchers should explore whether significance loss can be 
“undone.” Personal significance has been discussed with respect to both loss and gain 
frameworks (Kruglanski et al., 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2014), such that joining radical 
groups and causes can remedy significance loss as well as provide opportunities for 
significance gain. However, the question remains as to whether there is something unique 
about radical groups as a source of significance gain and restoration, or whether these 
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conditions can be created elsewhere. Radical groups typically organize against a common 
enemy who that has wronged them, so the revenge component may play an important 
role in attracting immigrants who have experienced significance loss through exclusion. 
It will be important to explore whether joining groups or purposes that provide 
significance without the revenge component can hold the same appeal.  
It is also important to better understand which facets of significance are most 
relevant for repairing loss. As discussed, personal significance encompasses a wide range 
of psychological motivations, and it is unclear whether deficits in significance that come 
from one source (e.g., threats to belongingness) can be satisfied with significance gain 
that is derived from another source (e.g., reminders of meaning). Some work on the 
effectiveness of deradicalization programs has suggested that alternative sources of 
significance can attenuate support for radicalism (Kruglanski et al., 2014), but we were 
interested in how this could work in a non-radicalized population. In our study, we 
attempted to counter belongingness-derived significance threats with reminders of 
meaning and importance. It could be that our manipulation was simply ineffective, but it 
is also possible that reminders of meaning were not sufficient to counter threats to 
belongingness. Future research could explore whether sources of significance restoration 
need to necessarily “match” the form of significance loss in order to protect against the 
appeal of radicalism. A better understanding of significance restoration could help inform 
the design of community programs to protect marginalized and excluded youth against 
radicalization.  
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Contributions to Theory and Practice 
Theoretical implications. This research advanced both acculturation and 
radicalization research by connecting two literatures that thus far have rarely consulted 
one another. Acculturation research has largely focused on outcomes such as education 
and psychological adjustment, and has rarely been applied to the study of issues 
pertaining to social and political conflict. Seeing the need for a better understanding of 
radicalization processes among immigrants, we applied the immigrant acculturation 
framework to the domain of terrorism. In doing so, we also gleaned more basic 
knowledge about the benefits and drawbacks of the different acculturation orientations 
across various contexts. 
Our findings reinforced existing work in the acculturation literature by 
illuminating the perils of marginalization and the benefits of integration in another 
context. Marginalization was a risk factor for significance loss in both of the survey 
studies and in the laboratory study. Although integration did not always present itself as a 
protective factor, it did not tend to increase risk for radicalization, with one exception 
where it was marginally related to willingness to engage in a radical act in Study 3.  
It is important to note, however, that we did not find marginalization to have a 
direct effect on radicalization. In some cases, there was even a negative relationship 
between marginalization and radicalization once significance loss was taken into account. 
One interpretation of this finding is that marginalization is a risk factor for radicalization 
to the extent that it causes significance loss, but should not be assumed to lead directly to 
extremism. It is likely that some marginalized immigrants have found belongingness and 
significance in other communities that do not pertain to the cultural identity. Another 
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potential explanation could be that competing processes were at play, such that 
marginalized immigrants who had experienced significance loss were actively resisting 
being drawn into the radical faction of the Muslim community. To put our results in the 
context of acculturation theory more broadly, marginalization does appear to be linked to 
psychological threats to self-worth but is not necessarily a direct guarantee of negative 
social adaptation or radicalization.  
In contrast to marginalization and integration, we did not find consistent 
relationships between separation and assimilation with respect to significance loss or 
support for radicalism. In some cases, separation served as a protective factor, such as 
against readiness to self-sacrifice in the American sample. In the same sample, separation 
was a risk factor for finding appeal in a radical interpretation of Islam. It could be that in 
the former case, one’s heritage culture identity affords oneself with a sense of social 
connectedness that reduces the need to find significance through sacrificing oneself for a 
cause. In the latter case, it could be that connectedness to one’s heritage culture identity 
results in more exposure to extreme interpretations of Islam. We also found assimilation 
to play an inconsistent role. Assimilation was a protective factor against significance loss 
in the lab study, but was related to increased support for the radical group among 
Germans. These findings echo our review of the literature that noted the contextual 
benefits and drawbacks of each of these orientations. 
This work also expanded existing theorizing on the pathways to radicalization. 
Earlier, we addressed several frameworks for radicalization processes that had emerged 
in the terrorism literature. With the exception of the NYPD Radicalization and the West 
model (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), none of these frameworks spoke directly to the specific 
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issue of homegrown radicalization among immigrants. Likewise, with the exception of 
significance quest theory (Kruglanski et al., 2009), these theories of radicalization had 
seldom been subject to empirical testing. The current research does not by any means 
invalidate previous theorizing on radicalization; rather, we highlighted a common thread 
amongst the existing perspectives on risk factors—namely, identity processes—and 
explored the underlying psychological mechanism.  
Another key contribution of our model above and beyond the other frameworks 
we described is the focus on cultural processes. Radicalization research thus far has for 
the most part ignored culture despite the clear relevance of cultural factors, with some 
exceptions that have linked terrorism to society-level cultural characteristics such as 
fatalism, low gender egalitarianism, and tightness (Gelfand et al., 2013). To our 
knowledge, there has been little attention paid to how culture plays a role in 
radicalization processes at the individual level.  
This lack of focus on culture at an individual level has been a crucial missing 
piece of the radicalization literature, because each and every case of radicalization is 
situated within a unique constellation of personal, social and cultural circumstances. In 
particular, given that the homegrown variety of radical Islamist extremism is becoming 
more commonplace, understanding the role of immigrant acculturation processes and 
how they interact with social experiences is of critical importance. Our work not only 
highlighted the problem of immigrant marginalization, but also addressed the nuances of 
other cultural identity orientations as they pertain to risk for radicalization, and namely, 
how this risk can ultimately be explained through psychological processes and 
exacerbated by social factors such as exclusion. 
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In our exploratory analyses of the American and German survey data, we also 
connected patterns in support for radicalism to the cultural dimension of tightness-
looseness. Tightness-looseness has been linked to terrorism on a national-level (Gelfand 
et al., 2013), and we demonstrated how this societal characteristic permeates the 
psychological process of acculturation on an individual level and influences immigrants’ 
support for radicalism. This finding demonstrates the importance of conducting research 
that contributes to our understanding how other societal-level cultural characteristics 
might become manifested in individual psychological processes related to radicalism. 
Relatedly, psychological science is in the unique position to identify not only risk 
factors but also the psychological mechanisms that explain the attraction to radical groups 
and causes, and identifying such explanatory mechanisms was a particular strength of this 
research. Previous work on radicalization had alluded to identity crises or other “trigger” 
events that catalyze the radicalization process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Sageman, 2008), but 
there was little empirical data to back up these theories. Ours was some of the first 
systematic work to capture how such identity crises and trigger events become 
internalized and interpreted as significance loss (Kruglanski et al., 2009).  
Finally, we sought to triangulate our methods by exploring our theory in both 
field and laboratory settings, in the United States and abroad. This is an important piece 
of developing sustainable theories that can explain radicalization across social and 
cultural contexts. Also worth noting is that we used non-radicalized samples in all of our 
studies. Much of the existing theorizing on radicalization is drawn from the retrospective 
analysis of known terrorists’ radicalization processes. Yet, it is perhaps even more 
essential to understand how non-radicalized individuals can develop support for 
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radicalism under the right set of circumstances. We encourage the terrorism and 
acculturation research communities to continue to collaborate in order to advance a better 
understanding of outcomes for acculturation processes and risk factors for homegrown 
radicalization. 
Practical applications. With respect to practical implications for this research, 
there is not a single one-size-fits-all approach. We sampled from a non-radicalized 
population, and the design of interventions must take into account whether or not the 
radicalization process has already begun. From a preventative standpoint, we find it 
crucial that policymakers invest in programming geared toward providing opportunities 
for Muslim immigrants to actively maintain their multiple cultural identities. It is in 
everyone’s best interest—for immigrants as well as for society as a whole—to cultivate a 
climate for integration. 
However, fostering a more welcoming climate for integration is not as simple as 
merely promoting a more positive image of Islam in society. It is necessary for the people 
and policy-makers to acknowledge that national identities are derived from diverse 
sources of cultural influence, and that this includes meaningful contributions from 
individuals with a Muslim heritage. Muslims should not be forced to choose between 
their national and heritage culture identities, but rather feel as if one can develop a 
national identity without having to give up their cultural heritage. Unfortunately, 
discriminatory responses to the threat of radicalism continue to grow out of fear. For 
example, an anti-Islamic organization called PEGIDA, loosely translated as “Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamization of the West,” has taken hold in Germany as a 
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response to the recent rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, organizing rallies in 
several large cities throughout the country (Brady, 2015).  
As for young Muslims who are already feeling marginalized and excluded, 
community integration programs could help identify people who are at risk and steer 
them toward a non-radical community that can provide a sense of personal significance. 
However, we must note that we did not find that inducing a personal sense of significance 
actually increased perceptions of significance or lessened support for radicalism in Study 
3, so we cannot assume that all roads toward restoring significance reduce risk of 
radicalization. It will be important for future research to examine what sorts of groups 
and activities may be perceived as attractive alternatives to radical organizations in 
satisfying needs for significance.  
The White House has made some recent strides in the right direction since their 
Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015. They have proposed 
educational and cultural exchange projects geared toward promoting diversity, tolerance, 
and minority integration. They are looking to build community resilience programs for 
at-risk youth through programs that provide technical skills and training, and offer 
opportunities for civic education, community service, and empowerment. These types of 
programs are promising in light of the present research on the role of significance loss in 
radicalization, and it will be important to conduct evaluations in order to determine 
whether these programs are successful in providing alternative avenues toward 
significance gain for at-risk youth. 
With respect to policies aimed at identifying radicals, we surmise that many of the 
counter-terrorism initiatives in place may actually paradoxically fuel support for 
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extremism. Recent examples of homegrown plots lend support to this notion. For 
example, Faisal Shahzad felt that Muslims were being humiliated throughout the world 
and struggled to find a peaceful but effective way to cope before ultimately attempting to 
set of a car bomb in Times Square (Elliott, 2010). Thus, racial profiling and spying 
programs that target Muslims are likely to induce feelings of perceived discrimination or 
exclusion and contribute to a sense of significance loss. We discourage policymakers 
from designing programs that only serve to perpetuate hostility between the Muslim 
community and Western governments. 
Several Western nations are now faced with the task of developing policy that 
deals with the potential threat of nationals who have returned from fighting in Syria and 
Iraq. The city of Aarhus in Denmark has experienced success with their program in 
which law enforcement has partnered with the Muslim community to approach at-risk 
individuals and steer them away from engaging in radical behavior. The success of this 
program is not surprising, in light of the present work on cultural identity maintenance. 
The joint effort of the Danish and Muslim communities to engage at-risk individuals may 
very well reduce the likelihood of immigrants becoming marginalized and excluded. Yet, 
it is important to prevent certain unintended consequences of community policing, such 
as alienating at-risk individuals through engendering a sense distrust and suspicion 
between members of the Muslim community. 
Finally, it is important to remember that although Islamist extremism has 
dominated the discussion of terrorism in the global realm, this is a phenomenon that is 
not inherently linked to Islam. After all, in Study 3 we found that non-Muslim 
immigrants can also become attracted to radicalism under conditions of significance loss. 
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This is a finding that needs to be reiterated in the public discourse on homegrown 
terrorism in order to prevent further scapegoating of Muslims. 
In sum, the face of extremism is changing in that it should no longer be 
considered a threat that solely comes from the “outside.” Counterterrorism efforts should 
look inward to ask what attributes of our own societies might provide fertile breeding 
ground for radicalism and why some people might be motivated to join extremist groups 
and causes. In this research, immigrant identity processes have emerged as an important 
contributing factor. We hope that attention to these findings may result in both more 
effective homeland security policy and also better integration for Muslim as well as non-
Muslim immigrant communities. 
Conclusion 
This work connected the acculturation and radicalization literatures by 
highlighting the relevance of cultural identity processes in homegrown radicalization. 
Namely, marginalization was a key contributor of significance loss, which we found in 
two of our studies to be amplified by experiences of exclusion from the mainstream 
society. In support of the significance loss theory of radicalization (Kruglanski et al., 
2009), we found that psychological threats to personal significance induced by 
marginalization and exclusion were indeed related to support for radical groups and 
causes, and that exclusion was particularly damaging for significance loss among more 
marginalized immigrants. Importantly, we found this to be the case in both Muslim and 
non-Muslim samples, within and to some extent outside of the United States. Thus, 
cultural identity processes and social significance loss experiences are crucial 





Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Study 1 
 M SD N 
Marginalization 2.72 1.03 198 
Integration 4.96 .95 198 
Separation 2.99 1.25 198 
Assimilation 1.79 .85 198 
Exclusion 2.49 .87 198 
Significance loss 1.61 .73 198 
Host Country Tightness-Looseness 3.80 .72 198 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness 3.47 1.19 198 
Readiness to self-sacrifice 3.23 1.78 198 
Radical interpretation of Islam 2.13 .74 198 
Support for radical group 1.77 1.06 177 





Bivariate Correlations Among the Variables in Study 1 
           1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Marginalization - 
          2. Integration .24** - 
         3. Assimilation .18* -.36** - 
        4. Separation .15* .05 -.10 - 
       5. Exclusion .21** -.06 -.01 .31** - 
      6. Host Country Closed-
Mindedness .21** -.19** .04 .10 .33** - 
     7. Host Country Tightness-
Looseness -.09 .01 .00 -.08 -.04 .05 - 
    8. Significance Loss .44** -.27** .17* .15* .45** .36** -.02 - 
   
9. Readiness to Self-Sacrifice .00 -.23** .04 -.16* .15* .34** .12 .18** - 
  10. Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam .00 -.04 -.07 .42** .35** .24** -.01 .17* .10 - 
 
11. Support for Radical Groups .04 -.16* -.05 .08 .20** .10 .04 .28** .16* .44** - 
** p < .01 
           * p < .05  








Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-Sacrifice in Study 1 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.60** 
 Exclusion .34 .05 6.56** 
 Marginalization X Exclusion .15 .05 3.06** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.43* 
 Separation .00 .03 .23 
 Assimilation .04 .05 .74 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice   
 Significance Loss .50 .19 2.67** 
 Marginalization -.17 .13 -1.28 
 Integration -.39 .14 -2.76** 
 Separation -.24 .10 -2.44* 
 Assimilation -.15 .15 -.97 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .06 .03 [.01,.14] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .12 .05 [.04,.25] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .19 .08 [.06,.38] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 




Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical Interpretation of Islam in Study 1 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.60** 
 Exclusion .34 .05 6.56** 
 Marginalization X Exclusion .15 .05 3.06** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.43* 
 Separation .00 .03 .23 
 Assimilation .04 .05 .74 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Interpretation of Islam   
 Significance Loss .17 .07 2.23* 
 Marginalization -.10 .05 -1.91
†
 
 Integration -.05 .06 -.97 
 Separation .24 .04 6.20** 
 Assimilation -.05 .06 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .02 .01 [.0012,.05] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .04 .02 [.0052,.08] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .06 .03 [.0071,.13] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 












Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical Groups in Study 1 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .27 .05 5.82** 
 Exclusion .36 .06 6.48** 
 Marginalization X Exclusion .15 .05 2.88* 
 Integration -.11 .05 -2.26* 
 Separation -.00 .04 -.04 
 Assimilation .08 .06 1.36 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups   
 Significance Loss .43 .12 3.52** 
 Marginalization -.12 .08 -1.44 
 Integration -.17 .09 -1.93
†
 
 Separation .04 .06 .67 
 Assimilation -.17 .10 -1.80
†
 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .06 .03 [.02,.13] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .12 .04 [.05,.22] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .17 .07 [.07,.33] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 




Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Study 2 
 M SD N 
Marginalization 2.80 1.06 204 
Integration 4.48 1.19 204 
Separation 1.77 .94 204 
Assimilation 3.19 1.36 204 
Exclusion 2.88 .93 204 
Significance Loss 2.77 .88 204 
Host Country Tightness-Looseness 4.00 .65 204 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness 4.20 .99 204 
Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 4.20 .99 204 
Radical Interpretation of Islam 3.40 .65 204 






Bivariate Correlations Among the Variables in Study 2 
            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Marginalization - 
          2. Integration -.13 - 
         3. Assimilation .29** -.12 - 
        4. Separation -.18* -.29** -.01 - 
       5. Exclusion .00 -.18* -.13 .17* - 
      6. Host Country Closed-
Mindedness .07 -.02 -.31** .06 .22** - 
     7. Host Country Tightness-
Looseness -.03 -.06 -.16* -.10 -.07 .20** - 
    8. Significance Loss .31** -.11 .19** .20** .42** .11 -.08 - 
   
9. Readiness to Self-Sacrifice -.12 -.14* -.08 .17* .08 -.01 .01 -.02 - 
  10. Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam -.16* -.25** .03 .40** .37** .09 .00 .21** .22** - 
 11. Support for Radical Groups .02 -.07 .25** .24** .20** -.08 -.16* .16* .23** .52** - 
** p < .01 
           * p < .05  




Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-Sacrifice in Study 2 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .23 .04 5.13** 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.63** 
 Marginalization X Exclusion .10 .04 2.35* 
 Integration .04 .04 1.01 
 Separation .12 .03 3.37** 
 Assimilation .04 .05 .88 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice   
 Significance Loss -.03 .15 .83 
 Marginalization -.14 .11 -1.23 
 Integration -.17 .10 -1.79
†
 
 Separation .13 .09 1.46 
 Assimilation -.10 .12 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.005 .02 [-.06,.04] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.008 .04 [-.09,.07] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.01 .05 [-.12,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 






Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam in Study 2 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .23 .04 5.13** 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.63** 
 Marginalization X Exclusion .10 .04 2.35* 
 Integration .04 .04 1.01 
 Separation .12 .03 3.37** 
 Assimilation .04 .05 .88 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice   
 Significance Loss .21 .07 2.88** 
 Marginalization -.15 .05 -2.86** 
 Integration -.12 .04 -2.59* 
 Separation .16 .04 3.95** 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .44 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .03 .02 [.006,.07] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .05 .02 [.01,.09] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .07 .03 [.02,.14] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
































Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical Groups in Study 2 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .23 .04 5.13** 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.63** 
 Marginalization X Exclusion .10 .04 2.35* 
 Integration .04 .04 1.01 
 Separation .12 .03 3.37** 
 Assimilation .04 .05 .88 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups   
 Significance Loss .11 .11 1.03 
 Marginalization -.03 .08 -.38 
 Integration .03 .07 .52 
 Separation .20 .06 3.21** 
 Assimilation .30 .08 3.63** 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .02 .02 [-.01,.06] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .03 .03 [-.03,.09] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .04 .04 [-.04,.13] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 




Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Study 3 
 M SD N 
Marginalization 2.17 1.26 145 
Integration 4.97 .96 145 
Separation 3.27 1.16 145 
Assimilation 2.03 .99 145 
Significance Loss 1.74 .66 145 
Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 3.19 1.44 145 
Willingness to Engage in a Radical Act 1.75 .70 145 
Support for Radical Group 2.43 1.11 145 





Bivariate Correlations Among the Variables in Study 3 
         1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Marginalization - 
        2. Integration -.22** - 
       3. Separation .16* -.10 - 
      4. Assimilation .26* -.07 -.01 - 
     5. Significance Loss .26* -.16 .13 .10 - 
    6. Readiness to Self-Sacrifice .02 .02 .09 .00 .05 - 
   7. Willingness to Engage in a Radical 
Act .12 .10 -.07 -.14 .22** .30** - 
  8. Support for Radical Groups .07 -.25** .04 -.03 .16* .21* .12 -
 9. Anti-American Sentiment .13 -.10 .04 .03 .35** .12 .27** .21* -
** p < .01 
         * p < .05  




Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-Sacrifice in Study 3 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .12 .05 2.59* 
 Condition .10 .06 1.68
†
 
 Marginalization X Condition -.02 .05 -.36 
 Integration -.06 .06 -.99 
 Separation .05 .05 .30 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .76 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice   
 Significance Loss .09 .19 .45 
 Marginalization -.00 .11 -.01 
 Integration .06 .13 .44 
 Separation .11 .11 1.03 
 Assimilation .00 .13 .04 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Condition = 0 (Control)  .01 .03 [-.03,.11] 
 Condition = 1 (Exclude) .01 .02 [-.02,.08] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Condition was coded such that 0 = Control and 1 = Exclusion 




Moderated Mediation for Willingness to Engage in a Radical Act in Study 3 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .12 .05 2.59* 
 Condition .10 .06 1.68
†
 
 Marginalization X Condition -.02 .05 -.36 
 Integration -.06 .06 -.99 
 Separation .05 .05 .30 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .76 
Dependent Model     
 Willingness to Engage in a Radical Act   
 Significance Loss .25 .09 2.81* 
 Marginalization .09 .05 1.84
†
 
 Integration .11 .06 1.76
†
 
 Separation -.07 .05 -1.37 
 Assimilation -.14 .06 -2.37* 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Condition = 0 (Control)  .03 .03 [-.0004,.12] 
 Condition = 1 (Exclude) .03 .02 [-.002,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Condition was coded such that 0 = Control and 1 = Exclusion 




Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical Groups in Study 3 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .12 .05 2.59* 
 Condition .10 .06 1.68
†
 
 Marginalization X Condition -.02 .05 -.36 
 Integration -.06 .06 -.99 
 Separation .05 .05 .30 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .76 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice   
 Significance Loss .21 .14 1.45 
 Marginalization .01 .08 .08 
 Integration -.27 .10 -2.75* 
 Separation -.00 .08 .97 
 Assimilation -.07 .10 -.73 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Condition = 0 (Control)  .03 .03 [-.004,.12] 
 Condition = 1 (Exclude) .02 .02 [-.004,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Condition was coded such that 0 = Control and 1 = Exclusion 




Moderated Mediation for Anti-American Sentiment in Study 3 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .12 .05 2.59* 
 Condition .10 .06 1.68
†
 
 Marginalization X Condition -.02 .05 -.36 
 Integration -.06 .06 -.99 
 Separation .05 .05 .30 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .76 
Dependent Model     
 Anti-American Sentiment   
 Significance Loss .41 .10 4.12** 
 Marginalization .02 .06 .42 
 Integration -.03 .07 -.44 
 Separation -.01 .06 -.20 
 Assimilation -.02 .07 -.26 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Marginalization through Significance Loss CI95 
 Condition = 0 (Control)  .06 .04 [-.003,.16] 
 Condition = 1 (Exclude) .04 .03 [-.009,.11] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Condition was coded such that 0 = Control and 1 = Exclusion 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Protocol* 
 
First, I’d like to learn a little bit more about you and your background.  
 
1. Could you tell me when you or your family first came to the United States?  
 
a. What were their reasons for coming?  
 
b. Can you remember what it was like when you first arrived [2nd generation: what 
was it like when you were growing up here?] –are there any kinds of experiences 
that stand out in your mind?  
 
c. How many of your family members live here, and how many still live in X?  
 
d. Do you still go back to XX, how often, and for what purpose?  
 
Now I’m going to ask you a few questions about the people you spend time with on a 
regular basis at home, at work, or in the community.  
 
2. Who do you spend most of your time with in your daily life- would it be friends, 
family or co-workers? How much of your time do you spend with friends or family?  
 
a. What is the ethnic background of people with whom you interact with the most? 
Is it people from X, other Muslims in the United States, non-Muslim Americans, 
or all? 
b. In what situations [work, school, family, mosque, etc…] of your daily life do you 
interact with other people from X, American Muslims, and American non-
Muslims?   
 
3. How would you describe the time you spend with family and friends who live in the 
United States? Who do you rely on for emotional or moral support? How do you help 
each other? 
 
4. Is there a large X community in your area? 
 
5. Do you ever wish you had more of a sense of community here, or an opportunity to 
socialize more with people from X? Why or why not? 
 
I’d like to now ask you some questions about some of your traditions and customs from 
your culture XX.  
 
6. What kinds of traditions and customs do you still practice from culture XX? Do you 
feel like you are able to maintain customs and traditions from X culture while living 
in America?  
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a. Do you think you’re able to practice your faith the way you want to in America? 
 
b. What about wearing religious articles of clothing like a headscarf or a kufi? 
 
7. To what extent do you feel like your customs and traditions are respected by other 
Americans? Tell us more about why you think that. Do you ever feel pressured to 
assimilate to American culture? Can you give me some examples? If/when you feel 
pressured to assimilate, where do you think that pressure generally come from? (e.g. 
Peer pressure? Media? School?) 
 
a. What makes it difficult for you to adapt to American culture? (e.g. different 
religious beliefs? Political system? Fashion/styles of dress? 
Language/communication methods? Gender relations? Concepts of modesty?) 
 
8. To what extent do you think Americans are interested in learning about X culture? Do 
you find it difficult to explain your culture and personal beliefs to Americans? Do you 
feel like they understand your cultural heritage or your faith? 
 
Now I’d like to ask you some questions now about your perceptions of American culture.  
 
9. What do you think about mainstream American culture? What do you like or dislike 
about it? 
 
10. Countries vary on whether they are permissive or strict. Do you think the United 
States is a permissive culture where there is a lot of latitude in terms of how people 
behave, or a strict culture where there is less latitude for how people behave? [If 
participant has trouble responding: In other words, do people behave however they 
want to, or do they tend to behave in a way that follows social norms?] Do you like or 
dislike this? Why? 
 
11. Do you think there should be more or less rules for appropriate behavior in the United 
States than there are now? How come? 
 
12. With respect to being a permissive or strict culture, how do you think Country X 
compares? Do people have more or less freedom to decide how they behave? Is there 
more or less disapproval for behaving inappropriately? What about within the 
Country X community in the United States? 
 
 
13. Sometimes people adapt traditions from a new culture. What kinds of new American 
traditions and customs do you now practice? (probe: music, dress, food, manner of 
speaking). Do you feel that these practices are respected by your own ethnic group, or 
do you feel that some people in your group don’t like these traditions? How does this 




14. As someone who lives in the US but comes from X, how much do you feel like 
you’re a part of American culture? How much do you feel like you’re part of X-
culture? (Think about what matters the most to you when you introduce yourself to 
someone: Being a Muslim? Being a person from [X], or being an American?) 
 
a. Have there been times you’ve felt like you belong to one culture more than the 
other? In which culture do you find yourself better able to express yourself and be 
understood?  
 
b. Have there ever been times when you do not feel a strong connection to either 
culture? Please tell me a bit more about that. 
 
c. [Regardless of answer] How does that make you feel?  Do you wish it were any 
different? 
 
15. Do you think its better to raise kids in America or in X country? For what reasons? 
 
a. If answers is X country, do you ever plan to return to X country? Do you visit 
often and do your children, if any, also identify with that culture?  
 
16.  If you had the option of giving charity somewhere, would you prefer to give charity 
here in the US or to send it back home to X? Why? 
 
17. Do you think that there are shared values in both cultures? If so, please give some 
examples. 
 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about the kinds of experiences you and people 
from X have had living in the United States.  
 
18. To what extent do you think Americans in general have positive attitudes toward 
immigrants? Why or why not?  
 
19. To what extent do you think people from your group XX feel that Americans have 
positive attitudes toward immigrants? Why or why not?  
 
a. Do you think many immigrants from X feel like they are not accepted or they are 
discriminated against by American society at large? If so, what are some 
examples? 
 
b. Has anyone you know personally experienced exclusion or discrimination? If so, 
please tell us what happened. 
 
c. Have you ever felt like you were treated differently [at your college/university]? 
Have you ever felt excluded or discriminated against by others? What happened, 
and how did it make you feel? 
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20. Based on your impressions from other non-Muslims in your surroundings as well as 
the media, how would you describe the image of Muslims in America?  
 
a. If negative: why do you think people have these images? 
 
b. How does this personally affect you?  
 
c. If negative, how would you seek to improve the image of Muslims?  
 
21. How have your experiences while living in the US affected your image of 
Americans? How have your experiences affected your image of your culture X? Of 
Islam?  
 
For many people from X, religion plays an important role in every day life. Now I’d like 
to ask you some questions about what Islam means to you. 
 
22. Would you consider yourself a religious person? What is more important to you, your 
national identity or your religious identity? How come? 
 
a. Do you consider yourself a member of the global ummah ?  
 
b. [If yes:] Is your allegiance to the global ummah more important than your national 
identity? What does that mean for you in everyday life? 
 
23. Do you attend a mosque? How often? Is the congregation from various ethnicities or 
is largely from X country? 
 
a. What types of topics are typically discussed in weekly Friday sermons /khutbahs? 
(e.g. seerat/history of the Prophet’s life, moral/character development, global 
politics, US foreign policy, Arab-Israeli conflict?) 
 
b. Do you discuss problems that you and others in your group have experienced in 
the U.S. at the Mosque? What kinds of solutions are discussed to deal with these 
problems?  
 
c. If attends mosque, is the Imam from X country? Do you feel his sermons 
accurately reflect your values? Your understanding of Islam? 
 
As you probably know from media coverage, there are some Islamic extremist groups 
operating in the United States. We’d like to ask for your thoughts about some of these 
movements. For example, Yasser Qadhi, founder of the Al-Maghrib Institute in America 
and well known Salafi preacher, has had five of his students linked to terrorist plots.  
 
24. Why do you think people are joining militant movements? Do you see this as part of a 
larger trend occurring across the US?  
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25. Some people believe that violence can be an effective tool to resolve issues in certain 
situations. What do you think about that? If so, what kinds of situations? If not, why 
not? 
 
a. What other alternatives might there be to violence? 
 
26. Do you think Muslim community leaders are doing enough to prevent violent 
extremism in your community? Why or why not? 
 
27. Have you heard of the terms dar ul harb or dar ul Islam to describe nations? Is this 
framework important for Muslims in America? [If yes: How so?] 
 
We’ve just discussed some challenges faced by immigrants and American Muslims in the 
United States. I just have a few more questions for you. We’re interested in improving 
experiences for immigrants and Muslims in the United States, and we’d like to hear your 
perspective on this topic.  
 
28. If you or another member of the X or Muslim community were concerned or 
dissatisfied with policies implemented by the US government, how would you seek to 
remedy the problem?  
 
a. Do you feel like people from X, or Muslims in general, have a voice in America 
to address problems? What are some ways people from X or Muslims are able to 
express their voice? 
b. Is engaging in inter-faith dialogues between Muslims and non-Muslims a 
productive activity? Is it helpful for Muslims to be involved in social and 
community services with non-Muslims? 
 
c. Do you feel like your community’s needs are better addressed through political 
channels, social network/cultural affiliations or through the mosque? 
 
d. Does the government or community do enough to reach out to the Muslim 
community in America to build better relationships and to seek their input on 
policies? Or do you think the government makes policies against Muslims in 
America? How could this be improved? 
 
This concludes the interview. Thank you so much for sharing your thoughts and 
experiences with us. Now is the chance for you to tell us anything else that might have 
been on your mind during the interview or if you have any questions for me. Otherwise, 
we’ll finish here. 
 
*The interview protocol was in German and referred to Germany rather than the United 
States in Study 2. The German version also made more locally relevant references to 
homegrown threats. 
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Appendix B: Acculturation Strategy Measures* 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 












1. I wish to maintain my heritage culture values rather 
than adopt American values. (separation, values) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. I wish to maintain my heritage culture values and also 
adopt key features of American values. (integration, 
values) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. I wish to give-up my heritage culture values for the 
sake of adopting American values. (assimilation, 
values) 
1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. I do not wish to maintain my heritage culture values or 
adopt American values as I feel uncomfortable with 
both types of values. (marginalization, values) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
5. I wish to maintain my heritage culture customs rather 
than adopt American customs. (separation, customs) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
6. I wish to maintain my heritage culture customs and 
also adopt key features of American customs. 
(integration, customs) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
7. I wish to give-up my heritage culture customs for the 
sake of adopting American customs. (assimilation, 
customs) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
8. I do not wish to maintain my heritage culture customs 
or adopt American customs as I feel uncomfortable 
with both types of customs. (marginalization, customs) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
9. There are times when I feel like I don’t belong to any 
culture. (additional marginalization item) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
10. Sometimes I don’t feel part of American culture 
or part of Muslim culture. (additional marginalization 
item) 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
 
*The measure was in German and referred to Germany in Study 2. 





Appendix B: Acculturation Strategy Measures (cont’d) 
 

















1. I feel similar to other people from my heritage country 
in terms of general attitudes and beliefs. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. I like the people from my heritage country. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. I feel I fit in with other people from my heritage 
country. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. I feel the people from my heritage country have a 
sense of solidarity. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
5. My heritage country identity is important to me. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
6. I identify with other people from my heritage country. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
7. My ties with other people from my heritage country 
are strong. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
8. I am glad to be a member of my heritage country's 
culture. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
9. I see myself as a member of my heritage country's 
culture. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
 
Host country*: 
1. I feel similar to other Americans in terms of general 
attitudes and beliefs. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. I like American people. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. I feel I fit in with other American people. 1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. I feel the American people have a sense of solidarity. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
5. My American identity is important to me. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
6. I identify with other Americans. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
7. My ties with other Americans are strong. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
8. I am glad to be part of America's culture. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
9. I see myself as part of America's culture. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
*The measure was in German and referred to Germany in Study 2. 
Source: Hogg & Hains, 1996; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hogg et al., 2007 
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Appendix C: Exclusion Measure* 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 












1. I sometimes feel that other non-Muslim Americans 
avoid interacting with me. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. I can’t rely on my non-Muslim American friends or 
family in times of need. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. Non-Muslim Americans often seek out my company. 1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. If I want to socialize with my non-Muslim American 
friends, I am generally the one who must seek them 
out. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
5. I am fortunate to have many caring and supportive 
non-Muslim American friends. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
6. Non-Muslim Americans shun me. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
7. I think there are many non-Muslim American people 
who like to be with me. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
8. I often feel like an outsider in non-Muslim American 
social gatherings. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
9. I feel welcome in most non-Muslim American social 
situations. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
 
*The measure was in German and referred to Germany in Study 2. 
Source: Spivey, 1990; Rubin, Watt & Ramelli, 2012 
 148 
Appendix D: Significance Loss Factor Structure and Loadings 
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
I feel ashamed. .73   
I feel humiliated. .73   
I feel rejected. .61   
I feel meaningless. .52   
I feel hopeless. .50   
I feel like an outsider. .50   
I feel nonexistent. .48   
I feel disconnected from other people. .44   
I feel angry.* .38   
I feel invisible.* .32   
I feel like others interact with me.  .76  
I feel that others like me.  .74  
My self-esteem is high.  .70  
I feel powerful.  .69  
I feel important.  .66  
I feel I have the ability to significantly alter events in my life.  .60  
I feel I belong.  .57  
I feel satisfied.  .56  
I feel good about myself.  .56  
I feel useful.  .53  
I feel I have control over my life.  .52  
I feel confused.   -.85 
I feel uncertain.   -.77 
I feel unsure of myself or my future.   -.66 
I feel indecisive.   -.57 
I feel torn.   -.56 
I feel insecure.   -.53 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Direct Oblimin 
*Items with loadings less than .40 were not included in the factor.  
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I feel nonexistent. .85    
I feel meaningless. .85    
I feel rejected. .85    
I feel humiliated. .75    
I feel hopeless. .74    
I feel ashamed. .66    
I feel like an outsider. .55    
I feel disconnected from other people. .51    
I think there are many non-Muslim American people 









I am fortunate to have many caring and supportive 









I sometimes feel that other non-Muslim Americans 




If I want to socialize with my non-Muslim American 





I can’t rely on my non-Muslim American friends or 




I often feel like an outsider in non-Muslim 




Non-Muslim Americans shun me.  -.50   





Sometimes I don’t feel part of American culture or 




I do not wish to maintain my heritage culture values 
or adopt American values as I feel uncomfortable 
with both types of values. 
   
.72 
I do not wish to maintain my heritage culture 
customs or adopt American customs as I feel 
uncomfortable with both types of customs. 
   
.72 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Direct Oblimin 
Results include data from both the American and German samples (N = 402) 
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Appendix F: Self-Sacrifice Scale 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 























1. I would defend a cause to which I am truly committed 
even if my loved ones rejected me. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
2. I would be prepared to endure intense suffering if it 
meant defending an important cause. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
3. I would be ready to give my life for a cause that is 
extremely dear to me. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
4. I would be willing to give away all my belongings to 
support an important cause. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
5. I would be ready to give up all my personal wealth for 
a highly important cause. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
Source: Bélanger, Caouette, Sharvit, & Dugas, 2014 
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Appendix G: Radical Interpretation of Islam Scale 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 













1. The Quran should only be understood according to its 
literal meaning 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. Western nations are forcing their values on Muslims 
throughout the world 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. Muslims in America should help their oppressed 
brothers and sisters in other parts of the world by 
participating in combative jihad. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. Combative jihad is the only way to conduct jihad. 1      2      3      4      5      6       
5. It is important to give to Islamic charities, even if their 
ideological beliefs may be extreme at times. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
6. Those who do not practice Islam properly are non-
believers/Kafirs. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
7. Islam cannot be fully practiced in a non-Muslim state 1      2      3      4      5      6       
8. Most non-believers are trying to discredit Islam 1      2      3      4      5      6       
9. Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries are 
obligated to immigrate to Muslim countries 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
10. America is a good place to practice my faith and be 
Muslim. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
 
 
*The measure was in German and referred to Germany in Study 2. 
Source: Kruglanski, Gelfand, Sheveland, Babush, Hetiarachchi, Bonto, & Gunaratna, 
2015 
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Appendix H: Radical Group Description in Studies 1 and 2* 
 
On the next page you will read a description of a new organization for Muslim 
Americans. Please read the description carefully. You will then answer some questions 
about the passage.  
 
Fundamental Muslim is a growing organization composed of young 
Muslims in the United States who will not compromise our core Islamic 
values. Our mission is clear: to advocate for Muslims in a country that 
doesn’t respect us. We will find a place for Islam in American politics and 
retaliate against injustices suffered by Muslims in America, and around 
the world. True Islam is at odds with American moral values and 
therefore we must work to undermine their corrupt cultural and political 
fabric in order to create a truly just society under the rule of Allah. The 
United States is intent on subverting the interests of the Islamic Ummah 
and we must use everything in our power to stop it. America is 
unwelcoming to Muslims no matter what country you are from, no matter 
how long you’ve lived here, so join our struggle if you want real change. 
 
Our leadership is exceptionally bright and determined, and our members 
unite behind us in the execution of our goals. We take pride in the loyal 
commitment of our members—once a member, always a member—this is 
our pledge of support. We work swiftly and efficiently. We’re about action, 
not talk. The United States is a legitimate target of our action until it 
changes its anti-Muslim agenda. Protest – and vigorously. Rallies – large, 
loud ones. March-outs. We’ll blockade the streets if we have to. Muslims 
can’t be pushed around. There’s no way Americans can take our religion 





*The script was in German and referred to Germany rather than the United States in 
Study 2. 






Appendix I: Support for Radical Group Measures 
 
To what extent do you think MOST PEOPLE YOU KNOW would…  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




1. Want to join the group 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
2. Identify with the group 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
3. Like the group’s members and the group as a whole 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
4. Perceive personal similarity to the group and its 
members 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
How likely do you think MOST PEOPLE YOU KNOW would participate in the 
following activities for the group?  
 













1. Attend monthly meetings 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
2. Lobby, petition, and letter-write on behalf of the group 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
3. Participate in demonstrations, sit-ins, and blockades on 
behalf of the group 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
4. Act as a representative of the group 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
To what extent do you think MOST PEOPLE YOU KNOW would understand if this 
group participated in the following behaviors? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      
Very 
Much 
1. Participating in an illegal demonstration 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
2. Participating in a violent demonstration 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
3. Writing a political slogan on a public wall 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
4. Damaging other people’s property 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Integration: Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-
Sacrifice in Study 1. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Integration -.13 .05 -2.65** 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.22** 
 Integration X Exclusion -.18 .05 -3.40** 
 Marginalization .22 .04 5.26** 
 Separation -.01 .04 -.36 
 Assimilation .05 .05 1.04 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice     
 Significance Loss .50 .19 2.67** 
 Marginalization -.17 .13 -1.28 
 Integration -.39 .14 -2.76** 
 Separation -.24 .10 -2.44* 
 Assimilation -.15 .15 -.97 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Integration through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .01 .03 [-.05,.08] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.06 .04 [-.19,-.006] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.14 .07 [-.34,-.04] 




Exploratory Analyses for Integration: Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam in Study 1. 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Integration -.13 .05 -2.65** 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.22** 
 Integration X Exclusion -.18 .05 -3.40** 
 Marginalization .22 .04 5.26** 
 Separation -.01 .04 -.36 
 Assimilation .05 .05 1.04 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Interpretation of Islam  
 Significance Loss .17 .07 2.23* 
 Marginalization -.10 .05 -1.90
†
 
 Integration -.05 .06 -.97 
 Separation .24 .04 6.20** 
 Assimilation -.05 .06 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Integration through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .005 .01 [-.02,.03] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.02 .02 [-.07,-.0004] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.05 .03 [-.12,-.004] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Integration: Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical 
Groups in Study 1. 
 
  
 B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Integration -.13 .05 -2.54* 
 Exclusion .34 .06 6.10** 
 Integration X Exclusion -.16 .06 -2.94** 
 Marginalization .24 .05 5.41** 
 Separation -.02 .04 -.55 
 Assimilation .09 .06 1.61 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups     
 Significance Loss .43 .33 4.73** 
 Marginalization -.12 .08 -1.44 
 Integration -.17 .09 -1.93
†
 
 Separation .04 .06 .67 
 Assimilation -.17 .10 -1.80
†
 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Integration through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .006 .03 [-.06,.06] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.05 .04 [-.16,.0003] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.12 .06 [-.27,-.02] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Separation: Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-
Sacrifice in Study 1. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Separation -.0009 .04 -.03 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.18** 
 Separation X Exclusion .04 .04 .94 
 Marginalization .23 .04 5.21** 
 Integration -.11 .05 -2.26* 
 Assimilation .05 .05 .95 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice     
 Significance Loss .50 .19 2.67** 
 Marginalization -.17 .13 -1.28 
 Integration -.39 .14 -2.76** 
 Separation -.24 .10 -2.44* 
 Assimilation -.15 .15 -.97 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Separation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.02 .02 [-.07,.02] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.0005 .02 [-.04,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .02 .03 [-.03,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Separation: Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam in Study 1. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Separation -.0009 .04 -.03 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.18** 
 Separation X Exclusion .04 .04 .94 
 Marginalization .23 .04 5.21** 
 Integration -.11 .05 -2.26* 
 Assimilation .05 .05 .95 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Interpretation of Islam     
 Significance Loss .17 .07 2.23* 
 Marginalization -.10 .05 -1.90
†
 
 Integration -.05 .06 -.97 
 Separation .24 .04 6.20** 
 Assimilation -.05 .06 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Separation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.006 .01 [-.03,.007] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.0002 .01 [-.01,.02] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .006 .01 [-.01,.04] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Separation: Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical 
Groups in Study 1. 
 
  
 B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Separation -.01 .04 -.24 
 Exclusion .35 .06 6.20** 
 Separation X Exclusion .05 .04 1.07 
 Marginalization .25 .05 5.45** 
 Integration -.11 .05 -2.11* 
 Assimilation .09 .06 1.58 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups     
 Significance Loss .43 .33 4.73** 
 Marginalization -.12 .08 -1.44 
 Integration -.17 .09 -1.93
†
 
 Separation .04 .06 .67 
 Assimilation -.17 .10 -1.80
†
 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Separation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.02 .02 [-.07,.01] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.004 .02 [-.04,.03] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .01 .03 [-.04,.08] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Assimilation: Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-
Sacrifice in Study 1. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Assimilation .06 .05 1.03 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.15** 
 Assimilation X Exclusion .09 .06 1.45 
 Marginalization .22 .04 5.01** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.48* 
 Separation -.003 .04 -.09 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice     
 Significance Loss .50 .19 2.67** 
 Marginalization -.17 .13 -1.28 
 Integration -.39 .14 -2.76** 
 Separation -.24 .10 -2.44* 
 Assimilation -.15 .15 -.97 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Assimilation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.01 .03 [-.10,.04] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .03 .03 [-.02,.11] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .07 .06 [-.01,.22] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Assimilation: Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam in Study 1. 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Assimilation .06 .05 1.03 
 Exclusion .32 .05 6.15** 
 Assimilation X Exclusion .09 .06 1.45 
 Marginalization .22 .04 5.01** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.48* 
 Separation -.003 .04 -.09 
Dependent Model     
 Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam     
 Significance Loss .17 .07 2.23* 
 Marginalization -.10 .05 -1.90
†
 
 Integration -.05 .06 -.97 
 Separation .24 .04 6.20** 
 Assimilation -.05 .06 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Assimilation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.003 .01 [-.03,.01] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .01 .01 [-.01,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .02 .02 [-.004,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Assimilation: Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical 
Groups in Study 1. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Assimilation .10 .06 1.70
†
 
 Exclusion .35 .06 6.13** 
 Assimilation X Exclusion .09 .06 1.42 
 Marginalization .24 .05 5.20** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.30* 
 Separation -.01 .04 -.36 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups     
 Significance Loss .43 .33 4.73** 
 Marginalization -.12 .08 -1.44 
 Integration -.17 .09 -1.93
†
 
 Separation .04 .06 .67 
 Assimilation -.17 .10 -1.80
†
 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Assimilation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .01 .03 [-.05,.07] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .04 .03 [-.01,.12] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .08 .05 [-.002,.21] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Appendix S: Additional Measures 
 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness* 
 
We will now ask you about your perceptions of cultural openness in the United States. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 












1. Even though most Americans like to think they are 
open-minded, they actually are not. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. Most Americans are more prejudiced than they would 
like to believe they are. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. When Americans ask me where I come from, I sense 
that they aren’t really interested in learning about my 
culture. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. Most Americans are not interested in learning about 
other people’s cultures. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
 
Host Country Tightness-Looseness* 
 
The following statements refer to the United States as a whole.  Please indicate whether 
you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale.  Note that 
the statements sometimes refer to "social norms”, which are standards for behavior that 
are generally unwritten.  
 












*The measures were in German and referred to Germany in Study 2. 
Source: Gelfand et al., 2011 
1. There are many social norms that people are supposed 
to abide by in this country. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
2. In this country, there are very clear expectations for 
how people should act in most situations. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
3. People agree upon what behaviors are appropriate 
versus inappropriate in most situations in this country. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      
4. People in this country have a great deal of freedom in 
deciding how they want to behave in most situations. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
5. In this country, if someone acts in an inappropriate 
way, others will strongly disapprove. 
1      2      3      4      5      6       
6. People in this country almost always comply with 
social norms. 




Exploratory Analyses for Integration: Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-
Sacrifice in Study 2. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Integration .05 .04 1.19 
 Exclusion .31 .05 6.45** 
 Integration X Exclusion .02 .04 .66 
 Marginalization .24 .05 5.27** 
 Separation .12 .04 3.34** 
 Assimilation .05 .05 .93 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice     
 Significance Loss -.03 .16 -.21 
 Marginalization -.14 .11 -1.23 
 Integration -.17 .10 -1.79
†
 
 Separation .13 .09 1.45 
 Assimilation -.10 .12 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Integration through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.0008 .01 [-.03,.01] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.002 .01 [-.03,.01] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.002 .01 [-.05,.02] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Integration: Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam in Study 2. 
 
  
 B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Integration .05 .04 1.19 
 Exclusion .31 .05 6.45** 
 Integration X Exclusion .02 .04 .66 
 Marginalization .24 .05 5.27** 
 Separation .12 .04 3.34** 
 Assimilation .05 .05 .93 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Interpretation of Islam     
 Significance Loss .21 .07 2.88** 
 Marginalization -.15 .05 -2.86** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.58* 
 Separation .16 .04 3.94** 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .43 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Integration through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .01 .01 [-.01,.03] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .01 .01 [-.004,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .01 .02 [-.01,.05] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Integration: Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical 




  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Integration .05 .04 1.19 
 Exclusion .31 .05 6.45** 
 Integration X Exclusion .02 .04 .66 
 Marginalization .24 .05 5.27** 
 Separation .12 .04 3.34** 
 Assimilation .05 .05 .93 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups     
 Significance Loss .11 .11 1.03 
 Marginalization -.03 .08 -.38 
 Integration .03 .07 .52 
 Separation .20 .06 3.21** 
 Assimilation .30 .08 3.63** 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Integration through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .003 .01 [-.007,.03] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .005 .009 [-.004,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .008 .01 [-.008,.06] 





Exploratory Analyses for Separation: Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-
Sacrifice in Study 2. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Separation .12 .03 3.54** 
 Exclusion .33 .05 6.66** 
 Separation X Exclusion .06 .03 1.77
†
 
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.40** 
 Integration .05 .04 1.20 
 Assimilation .05 .05 1.00 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice     
 Significance Loss -.03 .16 -.21 
 Marginalization -.14 .11 -1.23 
 Integration -.17 .10 -1.79
†
 
 Separation .13 .09 1.45 
 Assimilation -.10 .12 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Separation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.002 .01 [-.03,.02] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.004 .02 [-.05,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.01 .03 [-.07,.05] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Separation: Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam in Study 2. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Separation .12 .03 3.54** 
 Exclusion .33 .05 6.66** 
 Separation X Exclusion .06 .03 1.77
†
 
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.40** 
 Integration .05 .04 1.20 
 Assimilation .05 .05 1.00 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Interpretation of Islam     
 Significance Loss .21 .07 2.88** 
 Marginalization -.15 .05 -2.86** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.58* 
 Separation .16 .04 3.94** 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .43 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Separation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .01 .01 [.0004,.04] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .03 .01 [.007,.06] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .04 .02 [.009,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Separation: Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical 
Groups in Study 2. 
 
  
 B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Separation .12 .03 3.54** 
 Exclusion .33 .05 6.66** 
 Separation X Exclusion .06 .03 1.77
†
 
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.40** 
 Integration .05 .04 1.20 
 Assimilation .05 .05 1.00 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups     
 Significance Loss .11 .11 1.03 
 Marginalization -.03 .08 -.38 
 Integration .03 .07 .52 
 Separation .20 .06 3.21** 
 Assimilation .30 .08 3.63** 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Separation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .008 .01 [-.005,.04] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .01 .02 [-.01,.05] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .02 .02 [-.02,.08] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Assimilation: Moderated Mediation for Readiness to Self-
Sacrifice in Study 2. 
 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Assimilation .02 .05 .37 
 Exclusion .34 .05 6.74** 
 Assimilation X Exclusion .12 .06 1.88
†
 
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.44** 
 Integration .05 .04 1.21 
 Separation .12 .03 3.46** 
Dependent Model     
 Readiness to Self-Sacrifice     
 Significance Loss -.03 .16 -.21 
 Marginalization -.14 .11 -1.23 
 Integration -.17 .10 -1.79
†
 
 Separation .13 .09 1.45 
 Assimilation -.10 .12 -.83 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Assimilation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) .003 .02 [-.02,.06] 
 Exclusion (Mean) -.001 .01 [-.03,.01] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) -.004 .02 [-.06,.04] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Assimilation: Moderated Mediation for Support for a Radical 
Interpretation of Islam in Study 2. 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Assimilation .02 .05 .37 
 Exclusion .34 .05 6.74** 
 Assimilation X Exclusion .12 .06 1.88
†
 
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.44** 
 Integration .05 .04 1.21 
 Separation .12 .03 3.46** 
Dependent Model     
 Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam     
 Significance Loss .21 .07 2.88** 
 Marginalization -.15 .05 -2.86** 
 Integration -.12 .05 -2.58* 
 Separation .16 .04 3.94** 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .43 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Assimilation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.02 .02 [-.07,.01] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .004 .01 [-.02,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .03 .02 [.0005,.10] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses for Assimilation: Moderated Mediation for Support for Radical 







































  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Assimilation .02 .05 .37 
 Exclusion .34 .05 6.74** 
 Assimilation X Exclusion .12 .06 1.88
†
 
 Marginalization .24 .04 5.44** 
 Integration .05 .04 1.21 
 Separation .12 .03 3.46** 
Dependent Model     
 Support for Radical Groups     
 Significance Loss .11 .11 1.03 
 Marginalization -.03 .08 -.38 
 Integration .03 .07 .52 
 Separation .20 .06 3.21** 
 Assimilation .30 .08 3.63** 
Conditional Indirect Effect of Assimilation through Significance Loss CI95 
 Exclusion (-1 SD from mean) -.01 .02 [-.07,.007] 
 Exclusion (Mean) .003 .01 [-.009,.04] 
 Exclusion (+1 SD from mean) .02 .02 [-.01,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




T-tests between the American and German Samples   
 U.S. Germany  
 M SD M SD t(400) 
Marginalization 2.72 1.03 2.80 1.06 .81 
Integration 4.96 .95 4.48 1.19 4.50** 
Separation 2.99 1.25 1.77 .94 1.52 
Assimilation 1.79 .85 3.19 1.36 -.23 
Exclusion 2.49 .87 2.88 .93 4.42** 
Significance loss 1.61 .73 2.77 .88 3.23** 
Readiness to self-sacrifice 3.23 1.78 4.20 .99 6.05** 
Radical interpretation of 
Islam 
2.13 .74 3.40 .65 5.65** 
Support for radical group* 1.77 1.06 2.80 1.06 1.35 
Tightness-Looseness 3.80 .73 4.00 .65 2.86* 
Host Country Closed-
Mindedness 
3.48 1.19 4.20 .99 6.57** 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 






US-Germany Serial Mediation Model to Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 
 B SE t 
Tightness-Looseness    
Country -.10 .03 -2.86* 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness    
Tightness-Looseness .19 .08 2.36* 
Country -.34 .05 -6.21** 
Integration    
Host Country Closed-Mindedness -.10 .05 -2.07* 
Tightness-Looseness .07 .08 .92 
Country .21 .06 3.75** 
Readiness to Self-Sacrifice    
Integration -.25 .08 -3.37** 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness .25 .07 3.33** 
Tightness-Looseness .14 .12 1.15 
Country -.34 .09 -3.89** 
Indirect Effects of Country   CI95 
#1 -.01 .01 [-.05,.006] 
#2 -.0045 .003 [-.01,.0008] 
#3 .0018 -.003 [-.001,.01] 
#4 -.0005 .0004 [-.002,.0001] 
#5 -.08 .03 [-.16,-.03] 
#6 -.01 .01 [-.02,-.001] 
#7 -.05 .02 [-.11,-.02] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Country was coded as -1 = Germany, 1 = United States 
Indirect effect key: 
#1: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 
#2: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 
#3: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Integration  Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 
#4: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Integration  Martyrdom 
#5: Country  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 
#6: Country  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Integration  Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 
#7: Country  Integration  Readiness to Self-Sacrifice 




US-Germany Serial Mediation Model to Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam  
 B SE t 
Tightness-Looseness    
Country -.10 .03 -2.86* 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness    
Tightness-Looseness .19 .08 2.36* 
Country -.34 .05 -6.21** 
Integration    
Host Country Closed-Mindedness -.10 .05 -2.07* 
Tightness-Looseness .07 .08 .92 
Country .21 .06 3.75** 
Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam    
Integration -.11 .04 -2.76* 
Host Country Closed-Mindedness .15 .04 3.93** 
Tightness-Looseness -.01 .06 -.15 
Country -.17 .04 -3.84** 
Indirect Effects of Country   CI95 
#1 .00 .02 [-.01,.02] 
#2 -.003 .001 [-.01,.02] 
#3 .001 .001 [-.001,.004] 
#4 -.0002 .0002 [-.001,.0000] 
#5 -.05 .02 [-.09,-.03] 
#6 -.004 .003 [-.01,-.002] 
#7 -.02 .01 [-.05,-.005] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Country was coded as -1 = Germany, 1 = United States 
Indirect effect key: 
#1: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam 
#2: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Support for a Radical Interpretation of 
Islam 
#3: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Integration  Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam 
#4: Country  Tightness-Looseness  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Integration  Martyrdom 
#5: Country  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam 
#6: Country  Host Country Closed-Mindedness  Integration  Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam 
#7: Country  Integration  Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam 
   
 176 



























Appendix GG: Radical Group Description in Study 3 
 
We are interested in understanding more about student activism and want to know what 
kinds of organizations will appeal to students. We will show you one or more 
descriptions of groups geared toward students, and will ask you about your perceptions of 
these groups. 
 
Minorities with Might is a growing organization composed of young 
immigrants and minorities in the United States who will not compromise 
our core cultural values. Our mission is clear: to advocate for minorities 
in a country that doesn’t respect us. We will find a place for our culture in 
American politics and retaliate against injustices suffered by minorities in 
America, and around the world. We are at odds with American moral 
values and therefore we must work to undermine their corrupt cultural 
and political fabric in order to create a truly just society. The United 
States is intent on subverting the interests of immigrants and minorities 
and we must use everything in our power to stop it. America is 
unwelcoming to immigrants no matter what country you are from, no 
matter how long you’ve lived here, so join our struggle if you want real 
change. 
  
Our leadership is exceptionally bright and determined, and our members 
unite behind us in the execution of our goals. We take pride in the loyal 
commitment of our members—once a member, always a member—this is 
our pledge of support. We work swiftly and efficiently. We’re about action, 
not talk. The United States is a legitimate target of our action until it 
changes its anti-minority agenda. Protest – and vigorously. Rallies – 
large, loud ones. March-outs. We’ll blockade the streets if we have to. 
Minorities can’t be pushed around. There’s no way Americans can take 
































  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .12 .05 2.53* 
 Integration -.07 .06 .23 
 Separation .05 .05 .97 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .43 
Dependent Model     
 Willingness to Engage in a Radical Act     
 Significance Loss .25 .09 2.82* 
 Marginalization .09 .05 1.84
†
 
 Integration .11 .06 1.76
†
 
 Separation -.07 .05 -1.37 
 Assimilation -.14 .06 -2.38* 
Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects  
 Total effect of Marginalization .12 .05 2.43* 
 Direct effect of Marginalization .09 .05 1.84
†
 
    CI95 
 Indirect effect of Marginalization .03 .02  [.003,.09] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 




Exploratory Analyses: Mediation Model for Anti-American Sentiment 
   B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Significance Loss     
 Marginalization .12 .05 2.53* 
 Integration -.07 .06 .23 
 Separation .05 .05 .97 
 Assimilation .02 .06 .43 
Dependent Model     
 Anti-American Sentiment     
 Significance Loss .41 .10 4.12** 
 Marginalization .02 .06 .42 
 Integration -.03 .07 -.44 
 Separation -.01 .06 -.20 
 Assimilation -.02 .07 -.26 
Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects  
 Total effect of Marginalization .07 .06 1.24 
 Direct effect of Marginalization .02 .06 .42 
    CI95 
 Indirect effect of Marginalization .05 .03 [.007,.11] 
† p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
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